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Abstract 
This thesis explores the theoretical debate regarding the pursuit of weak versus 
strong sustainability (SS). It is argued that the choice between these paradigms needs 
better scientific information plus knowledge of citizen preferences in order to be 
resolved.  
The novelty of this research lies in providing an empirical test of Aldred (2002) 
and Turner (2007) who claim that investment in social capital such as schools and 
hospitals may be an adequate compensation measure when environmental damages 
occur. Following Pearce et al. (2006) and Atkinson et al. (1997) the benefits of 
preserving natural capital are also analysed through a contingent valuation (CV) study 
in which environmental damages of different sizes and consequences are depicted.    
The main research questions are: Are the views of elites and citizens as regards 
sustainability similar? Do citizens exhibit strong sustainability preferences with regards 
to compensation schemes? Can the use of CV help substantiate the case for strong 
sustainability? These research questions are answered undertaking a mixed 
methodological approach. Elite interviews, focus groups and a survey explore expert 
and non-expert views on sustainability.  
Statistical analyses confirm Aldred’s (2002) and Turner’s (2007) claim. However, a 
significant number of respondents choose natural capital as the preferred 
compensation option. Multinomial logit models used show the main characteristics 
that determine the likelihood of choosing a given compensation option. Answers to 
the compensation question leads to the expectation that respondents to the valuation 
question will pay significantly more to avoid larger environmental damages. This 
expectation is confirmed by the statistical analyses undertaken. Interval data models 
provide information on the variables that determine willingness to pay. The results are 
encouraging as they signal scope sensitivity but doubts remain over whether CV can 
adequately capture preferences when evaluating environmental losses as willingness 
to pay amounts are not proportional to the damages described. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Motivation 
The publication of the report ‘Our Common Future’ (WCED, 1987) not only put 
development and environmental concerns on the international policy agenda, it also 
provided the most often cited, and arguably vague, definition of sustainable 
development as the development that ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987: 
43). This broad definition and the myriad of existing interpretations (Pezzey and 
Toman, 2002) lend the term a widespread popularity among policy-makers at various 
governance levels, although implementation of the concept was, and still is, in need of 
further theoretical developments and empirical implementation and testing. 
Two broad paradigms emerged within the sustainability literature, weak and strong 
sustainability (henceforth WS and SS respectively).  Pearce et al. (1989) provided the 
conceptual divide between these two paradigms. The intersection of these paradigms 
lies in that they both strive for lasting development. They differ however in the 
assumptions about the substitutability of different types of capital and thus about the 
need to preserve any specific form of wealth for future generations.  
Adherence to any of these two paradigms is largely dependent on better 
understanding of the environment and better understanding of the demands for (and 
acceptance of) sustainable development policies by citizens. Thus, asking whether 
specific forms of capital should be preserved and whether compensation in the form of 
natural capital or other forms of capital would be acceptable when environmental 
damages occur, may help advance the debate regarding sustainability. It may also 
provide relevant policy indications of the socially acceptable sustainability paths. The 
scarce amount of empirical papers on sustainability (Pezzey and Toman, 2002) 
provides the rationale for an applied inquiry into sustainability preferences.  
Sustainability is, in its broad sense, a supra-national endeavour that is influenced by 
national actions. Within nations, sustainability will be influenced by what happens to 
the different sectors and products (Pezzey, 1992). At project and portfolio levels of 
analysis, valuation procedures such as those offered by contingent valuation 
(hereinafter CV) can be used as a tool for analysing citizen willingness to pay for 
prevention measures to protect natural capital (Pearce et al. 2006) and explore the 
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benefits of sustainable development (SD) policies (Atkinson et al. 1997). The remainder 
of this section will analyse the field of enquiry chosen to advance the understanding of 
preferences towards sustainable development.  
Approximately 71% of the earth is comprised of oceans and large seas. Direct and 
indirect environmental services and functions provided by marine and coastal areas 
include, among others: food production, biodiversity, climate regulation, disease 
control, waste absorption, flood protection and cultural and recreational services 
(Hassan et al. 2005). Marine and coastal areas are linked through the use that species 
and humans make of these ecosystems. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) 
acknowledges that there is neither a regional nor a global management framework to 
guide the inevitable trade-offs between competing activities that may affect coastal 
areas. One such activity is oil exploration and its related hydrocarbon transport. 
Accidental oil spills such as the one cause by the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon 
platform off the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 or the Prestige oil spill off the Spanish 
coast in November 2002 are recent examples of the conflicts between environmental 
protection and economic development.  
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report expects oil spills to have a moderate 
impact on maritime areas by 2025. Certain oil spills such as the Exxon Valdez, the 
Prestige and (presumably) the Deepwater Horizon, however, cause long term damages 
to marine and coastal ecosystems, especially if the areas affected are vulnerable or are 
already degraded. Accidental oil spills may not be the most serious threat to the 
marine environment but they are visible incidents that trigger policy action at various 
administrative and geographical levels, widespread media attention and civil society 
alarm.  
Furthermore, major transport routes such as the Fisterra maritime corridor are oil spill 
‘hot spots’. In fact, five out of eleven major spills in EU waters have taken place in 
Galicia (Spain) in the last three decades (Loureiro et al. 2006). Although accidental oil 
spills worldwide have decreased in recent decades, the European Atlantic that includes 
the area of Galicia does not show a clear reduction in the number of spills (Vieites et 
al. 2004). According to Loureiro et al. (2006) and Vázquez et al. (2004: 28) ‘the coast of 
Galicia has received more than ten percent of the world’s maritime oil spills’. 
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According to the Ministry of Environment1 Spain has 7,880 Km of coast. Approximately 
44% of Spain’s population lives in coastal municipalities that represent 7% of the 
available land (MMAMRM, 2007). Urbanization, land use planning, climate change and 
economic activities as important as tourism2 and maritime transport3 have resulted in 
increasing pressures on the marine and coastal environment.  
In Spain, 85% of imports and 70% of exports are carried by sea. The EU is the largest oil 
recipient amounting to ‘27% of the world oil-related trade, compared to 25% by the 
US. The largest share of this transport takes place either in the Atlantic coasts or in the 
North Sea. This means that between 1,500 and 2,000 oil tankers navigate EU waters 
each year’4. Hydrocarbon shipping is therefore an important economic activity for 
fossil fuel dependent economies. This activity can threaten the global commons; 
adding one ship implies a direct benefit for the firms that exchange goods but the 
costs, in the form of increased risks of accidents, are borne by society that may or may 
not have benefited directly from those goods. The ‘tragedy’ comes from the 
‘remorseless working of things’ (Whitehead, 1948 in Hardin, 1968: 1244) in the form of 
environmental damages. 
EU’s integrated maritime policy and Spain’s coastal sustainability strategy both point 
to increased relevance of environmental resources. They both call for sustainability but 
fail to explicitly state what paradigm of sustainability they refer to or whether this 
quest is backed by citizens.  
In order to analyse sustainable development the Prestige spill (to date the most recent 
large scale accidental oil spill Spain has suffered) is studied as the baseline scenario 
from which to build compensation and valuation scenarios. It had long term 
consequences for the economy, the environment and Spanish society. It triggered an 
unprecedented amount of voluntary work in cleaning-up activities. It also resulted in a 
‘regulatory thrill’ (Tan, 2006) at various administrative levels. Citizen response plus 
                                               
1
 Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Medio Rural y Marino 
2
 10.3% of Spain’s GDP in 2009 came from the tourist sector according to the National Statistics Institute. 
See: http://www.expansion.com/2010/02/18/empresas/1266495717.html 
3
 The European Maritime Safety Agency stated that maritime transport carries 80% of world trade, 90% 
of EU’s external trade and 40% of trade among EU members. Three million people in the EU work in the 
maritime sector. 
4http://www.mma.es/portal/secciones/acm/aguas_marinas_litoral/prot_medio_marino/contaminacion_mar
ina/trafico_maritimo.htm (author’s translation) 
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policies enacted in the aftermath of the spill led to enquiring into sustainability 
preferences in this context.  
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1.2 Research questions 
The understanding of complex environmental problems such as those caused 
by oil spills benefits from the knowledge and inputs of both experts and non-experts 
(Dürrenberger et al. 1999) to successfully design and implement feasible and socially 
acceptable policies. Existing maritime policies call for public participation and expert 
inputs as well as for sustainable development. Routine integration of expert and non-
expert knowledge plus the engagement in sustainability is nevertheless missing in the 
implementation of marine and maritime policies in Spain5. As is the case in other policy 
areas (see McVittie, Moran and Elston, 2010), to the researcher’s knowledge there has 
been no analysis of whether policy goals and public preferences ‘match’ in the area of 
marine resource management and accidental oil spills. In order to help improve the 
integration of expert and non-expert knowledge the first research question explores 
whether experts and citizens view sustainability in the same way in the context of oil 
spill prevention, management and compensation. 
When faced with environmental losses derived from excessive pollution, increases in 
(any type of) capital may offset these environmental losses if we adhere to the weak 
sustainability paradigm. That is, increased material welfare can compensate for 
environmental degradation (Hartwick, 1977). Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) present 
an arguably modified Hartwick-type compensation criterion whereby social capital 
(henceforth defined as investments in schools, hospitals or other community services) 
could potentially compensate for environmental losses.  On the other hand, strong 
sustainability proponents (it its weakest sense) would argue that certain types of 
capital (i.e. natural capital in the form of ‘any stock provided by nature’ (Pezzey, 1992: 
322)) overall cannot be substituted by increased consumption, although some form of 
substitution via increased levels of natural capital could compensate for environmental 
losses (substitution of like-for-like). 
Adherence to any particular sustainability paradigm depends, to a certain extent, on 
what path society chooses to take. This choice will be shaped by a country’s 
development level, preferences and needs, among others. Hence, the second research 
                                               
5
 Calls for integrating expert and non-expert knowledge are made in existing strategies despite the fact 
that potential inconsistency problems can emerge between experts and non-experts whereby non-experts 
are concerned with environmental problems that are not considered to be very important by experts 
(Atkinson et al. 1997).  
 15 
question explores whether a Hartwick-type rule or stronger forms of SD (replacing like-
for-like) can be valid in terms of compensation for environmental damages suffered. 
This question will be addressed by asking the type of compensation that citizens in two 
Spanish cities (a coastal one, La Coruña, and an inland one, Madrid) would prefer if 
they were faced with three future spills of different sizes and consequences. This 
research also analyses the characteristics that best determine the probability of 
choosing one compensation option over another. 
Criticisms regarding the usefulness of sustainability and its application have spurred 
research into what sustainability is and how it can be practically used in policy-making 
in order to leave a bequest to future generations. One of the possible ways of doing 
this is combining sustainability and valuation (Pearce, Atkinson and Mourato, 2006). 
Additionally, as Atkinson et al. (1997) claim, SD proponents have so far paid little 
attention to the costs and benefits of sustainability. The final research question will 
therefore ask whether valuation in the form of a Contingent Valuation (CV) 
experiment, can help substantiate strong sustainability. That is, whether respondents 
are willing to pay to preserve natural capital and if so, how much.  
In the context of accidental oil spills, the Prestige gave rise to public outcry and 
demonstrations, an unprecedented amount of volunteers that went to clean-up the 
spill and a significant public investment effort in recovering the economy of the 
affected areas. The context specific question addressed is, given these reactions, can 
we say there is a shift in citizen preferences towards protection of natural capital 
manifested through significantly higher WTP to avoid potentially irreversible damages? 
This is analysed through the willingness to pay (WTP) for prevention schemes to 
protect the marine environment. A further question that will be asked is whether WTP 
is proportional to the hypothetical damages described. Finally, socio-economic 
characteristics that best explain respondents’ willingness to pay to avoid a future spill 
are explored.  
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1.3 Contribution to the field 
When technology and human mediated risks happen, there is increased 
‘concern over the relationship between citizens, science and technology’ (Irwin, 1995: 
9). According to Bonnes et al. (2007) there is a burgeoning literature of experts versus 
‘lay’ analysis of environmental risks and some of the scholars in the field conclude that 
participatory approaches will facilitate sustainable outcomes (ibid.). They furthermore 
conclude that expert and ‘lay’ knowledge can be complementary as lay knowledge may 
add local understanding of environmental phenomena (to expert understanding) that 
can ground expert analysis in locally acceptable policies. As Bäckstrand (2003: 37) 
states, ‘In the quest for sustainability, ‘’universal’’ knowledge must be connected to 
place-based knowledge’ that is traditionally held by non-expert citizens. In addition to 
this and in the context of oil spills, Leschine (2002) calls for the joint analysis of the 
social, political and environmental impacts and recognises the all too frequent lack of 
social input in the analysis and perceptions of environmental damages. Additionally, 
Moyano et al. (2009) acknowledge the scarce analysis of the perceptions of citizens as 
regards environmental problems and public policy. It is these theoretical gaps that the 
analysis of experts versus citizen views as regards sustainability aims to bridge. 
Hence, experts and citizens understanding of sustainable development in oil spill 
settings will add some insight into the ongoing paradigmatic debate between weak 
sustainability and strong sustainability from two perspectives: that of the policy-
makers, civil servants, businessmen associations and NGO’s, who have specialised 
knowledge and input into decision-making processes, versus that of citizens who have 
place-based knowledge and who are to accept policies for them to be successful. It 
also provides insights of how civic science6 can be applied to oil spill management. 
Economic interpretations of welfare assume losses can generally be offset by 
increasing the amount of other goods or money. Resources are hence largely 
substitutable and compensation either in monetary terms or in alternative goods can 
make individuals ‘whole’. If there are losses for which there is no possible substitution 
with other goods, compensation would have to be infinite and the economic 
                                               
6
 ‘Civic science has been defined as the efforts by scientists to reach out to the public, communicate 
scientific results and contribute to scientific literacy’ (Bäckstrand, 2003: 28). The use of ‘civic science’ is 
said to be able to tackle two of the main on-going problems that undermine scientific knowledge: lack of 
trust by the public and increase in the democratization of science (ibid.) 
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framework is not well suited to analyse the ‘adequacy or fairness of compensation’ 
(Ozdemiroglu et al. 2009: 16). Recently developed project restoration approaches are 
based on the above economic interpretations and analyse the amount of resources 
required to offset environmental damages. These approaches do not engage in the 
type of resources that would offset environmental damages or their relationship to the 
sustainability paradigms. This thesis aims to explore this gap. Hence, citizen views are 
integrated with expert knowledge to produce a set of compensation and valuation 
scenarios. Additionally, the attempt to include a wealth of agents in the development 
of compensation and prevention scenarios is to the researcher’s knowledge, a new 
applied contribution, especially when analysing compensation preferences.  
The empirical contribution when analysing survey respondents’ preferences for 
different type of compensation packages is to provide a test for Aldred (2002) and 
Turner’s (2007) claim. In their papers, the authors theorise that money may not be an 
adequate compensation measure when faced with environmental damage but 
investment in social capital such as schools and hospitals may be socially preferred. 
Linking this claim with the sustainability framework (as described by Pearce et al. 
(1989) and analysed by Neumayer (1999), Atkinson et al. (1997), Dietz and Neumayer 
(2007), Pezzey and Toman (2002) among others) answers the question of whether 
respondents’ compensation preferences point towards a SS compensation rule rather 
than a Hartwick-type compensation criterion that assumes there is perfect 
substitutability between different forms of capital. 
The main contribution of the CV experiment is to advance the understanding regarding 
valuation and strong sustainability following Pearce et al. (2006) and Atkinson et al. 
(1997). One way of attempting this is assuming, as the above authors do, that as we 
approach the critical amount of an asset, individuals will experience large welfare 
losses. If the welfare loss is very large, adherence to strong sustainability may be 
socially desirable. Yet this will require adequate information on the relevance of the 
resource and its loss as well as on ‘good measures of willingness to pay for the 
resource’ (Pearce et al. 2006: 246). The contributions to project appraisal and strong 
sustainability are overall conceptual. There is therefore scope for empirically testing 
the suitability of project appraisal as a tool to go deeply into strong sustainability. This 
thesis aims at doing this.  
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In the context analysed, it is hypothesised that social and policy responses in the 
aftermath of the last large scale spill in Spain may be indicative of a shift towards 
strong sustainability. The results from chapter four of the thesis (on compensation) 
indicate that over a third of survey respondents would prefer natural capital (replacing 
like-for-like) if a future spill happened. This helps strengthen the case for a possible 
shift to a strong sustainability paradigm by survey respondents. In order to test this 
interviewees are asked about whether they would be willing to pay to prevent future 
spills (one of the three scenarios had large, potentially irreversible consequences) and 
if so, how much. This approach builds on past CV studies on oil spill management, 
taking up the recommendations by Arrow et al. (1993) concerning the usefulness of 
building a body of knowledge regarding WTP for spills of different sizes and 
consequences. In addition, this chapter contributes to the debate on protest responses 
and on scope sensitivity (by conducting both an external and an internal scope test in 
an oil spill situation). Some of the most relevant literature on oil spills does not report 
external scope tests (see for example Carson et al. (2003) and Loureiro et al. (2007, 
2009) and Bonnieux and Rainelli, (2003)). In the present thesis testing for external 
scope sensitivity implies using a split-sample design so that half of the sample is asked 
about their WTP to avoid a small and medium size spill and the other half of the 
sample is asked about their WTP to avoid a medium and a large size spill. 
Finally, the valuation question furthers existing knowledge regarding protest 
responses. This is done by analysing differences in WTP estimates using two alternative 
classifications of protests (Bateman et al.  2002 and Brouwer et al. 2008) as few CV 
studies report the classification of protest responses used or whether WTP estimates 
would differ significantly if alternative classifications were used. 
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1.4 Methodology: qualitative and quantitative methods 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to answer the research 
questions put forward above. Theoretical and topic-related motives favoured 
undertaking a multi-method approach to explore the pursuit of weak and strong 
sustainability policies. Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato (2007: 297) claim that ‘one of 
the recurrent themes in the sustainability literature has been the extent to which a 
loss of natural capital can be made up for in welfare terms by increases in other forms 
of capital. This issue was raised early on in the debate on sustainability by Pearce and 
has never really been resolved’. These authors tackle the issue empirically as regards 
production functions finding a fair degree of substitutability but to my knowledge 
there is no empirical analysis of citizen preferences as regards the type of capital that 
would be preferred when faced with environmental damages such as hypothetical 
spills of different sizes and consequences. As this is a relatively novel area of enquiry, 
exploratory analysis in the form of qualitative methods was a logical starting point to 
understand the range of feasible policy options, the policy drivers of these options, the 
understanding and the acceptance of potential policies by focus group participants. 
The information obtained from both qualitative research methods used (semi-
structured elite interviews and focus groups) was then funnelled into the development 
of the compensation and the valuation exercises that were the core elements of the 
quantitative analysis (the survey) (see Shipman, 1997). The rationale for this mixed 
approach can be summarised as ‘a mixture of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
can ensure that numbers are related to complex social situations from which indicators 
have been extracted’. (Shipman, 1997: 27). 
Qualitative methods 
Qualitative research is one of the available methods for obtaining data that focuses on 
systematic interpretation of behaviours, organisational functioning and cultural values. 
This information is obtained and interpreted through methods that differ from 
statistical analysis of quantitative data. Interpretation entails categorising focal 
concepts, establishing relationships between categories and subcategories and finally 
integrating them into a theoretical framework (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
Advantages, beyond being able to explore in greater depth the reasons for taking 
action, lie in the fact that qualitative interviews allow greater flexibility and do not 
 20 
force respondents to ‘fit’ their answers into what the researcher sets as options. In this 
sense, interviews aim at exploring the complexity and details of the selected topic, 
revealing different options for action, rather than directly categorising responses. This 
type of research provides further insight into the motivations of human actions which 
complements the information provided by quantitative research.  
Limitations of this type of approach are as follows. When developing qualitative 
research, the interviews are not conducted by using a representative sample of the 
population. Thus, the results obtained from this type of approach cannot be 
generalized to the population. Conclusions drawn from qualitative research are 
therefore considered logical conclusions and not statistical conclusions. Interviews are 
also thought to be less replicable than questionnaires as they do not have a fixed set of 
questions to ask repeatedly but a number of ‘open’ topics to be discussed.  
The complex nature of the topic analysed, the importance of establishing personal 
contact with interviewees in ‘privileged’ positions of knowledge and the length 
required to fully answer the questions also favoured a qualitative engagement with 
elites. Additionally, the results and analysis of the qualitative research undertaken 
were expected to help explain the findings of the quantitative research (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2007; Wass and Wells, 1994; Shipman, 1997). 
Although a quantitative approach to the information held by elites was theoretically 
feasible (i.e. designing a questionnaire of the key issues: compensation schemes, 
prevention programs, definition of SD used, inter and intra-generational equity, etc.) it 
was hypothesised that given the sensitive nature of the topic, given the on-going policy 
developments, given the intricate characteristics of oil spills and their management, 
face-to-face interaction with ‘elites’ would provide useful information on what was 
happening and why that would have not been fully retrieved from a survey.  
Elite interviews provided an in-depth overview of compensation schemes, prevention 
schemes, the understanding of SD and questions about equity beyond those that 
might have been offered through a questionnaire. Semi-structured interviews allowed 
to build rapport with the interviewees and are thought to have facilitated fruitful 
discussion and interaction that would have been constrained by a quantitative 
exchange with elites.  
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In the aftermath of the Prestige oil spill a myriad of policy developments (such as the 
design of contingency plans, compensation legislation or clean-up activities among 
others) were taking place (Tan, 2006). According to elite interviewees these 
developments were the result of the ongoing interaction among a number of 
stakeholders and were being implemented by policy-makers and civil servants with 
specialized knowledge. The evolving nature of the decisions made, the contextual 
information held by elites, the reasons for actions taken or feasible changes in future 
compensation and prevention policies were not readily available in publicly available 
documents. This information was thought to be essential for the development of 
feasible and credible compensation and prevention scenarios. Elite interviews were 
hypothesized to be able to provide this information.   
The second qualitative research method used in the thesis, focus groups, was chosen 
due to its hallmark characteristic of being able to produce information through the 
interaction of group members that would be impossible to obtain without this guided 
exchange of ideas. This group interaction is argued to be particularly fruitful when the 
topic analysed has not been explored in depth (Morgan, 1997; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998), as was the case when analysing for example preferences for different types of 
capital in the compensation exercise. Similarly to elite interviews, developing 
understandable compensation and valuation scenarios was hypothesised to benefit 
from the input of the socially constructed interaction among FG participants who 
would provide information on the local language and understanding of the topics 
analysed (Gaskell, 2005). 
In the thesis the focus groups served a double purpose. The first role of the FG was to 
be a source of information in order to compare and contrast the views of elites and the 
views of non-expert citizens as regards sustainability. The second role of the FG was to 
provide data to develop and refine the compensation question and the valuation 
question in the survey. Other disciplines such as marketing have also successfully used 
focus groups in this second role of providing information for survey development 
(McQuarrie, 1996). The faster implementation and the lower cost of focus groups 
(compared to additional one-on-one semi-structured interviews with non-experts) was 
a further reason to explore citizen views using this research method (Morgan, 1997).  
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Quantitative method: Survey 
A survey can be defined as the ‘research strategy that involves the structured 
collection of data from a sizeable population’ (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007: 
612) 
Surveys are the most often used technique for obtaining primary data in social science 
research.  According to Burton (2000), survey information can be divided into the 
following categories: physical condition of interviewees, socio-economic variables, 
behaviour, attitudes and intentions. Within survey research we find two broad 
categories, descriptive research, that is considered less sophisticated, and explanatory 
research that is more complex and aims not only at describing but also at uncovering 
the causal explanation for the answers obtained.  
Within the different types of explanatory research designs7, cross-sectional design is 
used whereby people with different characteristics (age, gender, education, socio-
economic situation, etc.) are interviewed once. The main advantage of cross sectional 
design over longitudinal design is that fewer resources (in time and money) are needed 
to obtain and analyse data.  
The main advantage of quantitative methods over qualitative methods is that the 
former allow the researcher to collect large amounts of information at a ‘low’ cost. 
These techniques have a long tradition in aiding policy-makers and thus are well tested 
and widely accepted. As questionnaires do not change throughout the interview 
process8 they can be replicated and results checked and then validated or discarded. 
Procedures for developing and implementing questionnaires are controlled and 
standardised. 
On the other hand, disadvantages include the fact that researchers’ assumptions and 
limitations are reflected in the questions asked. This distorts reality. Models and 
assumptions are simplified representations of the phenomena studied and different 
researchers may disagree on whether the assumptions made and the focus and 
intention of the questions asked are the most appropriate. Surveys may not be able to 
help establish causal explanations due to lack of social contextualisation. Surveys are 
                                               
7
 Classical experimental design, quasi-experimental design, cross-sectional design and longitudinal 
designs (see Burton, 2000, Chapter 20, for a description of the characteristics of each) 
8
 Although face-to-face interviews with different interviewers may of course suffer from some degree of 
interviewer bias and thus alter questions to a certain extent. 
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also said to neglect human will in actions and thus purport an image of a respondent 
who is always pre-determined by external forces. Surveys have been criticised as 
overly applied and thus adding little to theoretical advances. Technically, 
measurements made and analyses conducted can be flawed, biased or wrong. Besides, 
response rates might not reach the required level to be considered representative. In 
order to try to minimise potential problems good practice guidelines have been 
followed, peer review has been sought and piloting was used to test the questionnaire.  
Table 1.4.1 below provides a summary of the different methods used, the number of 
interviews and their main purpose. 
Table 1.4.1 Methods used, quantity and purpose 
Method Quantity Purpose
Elite interviews 18
Analyse expert (elite) views and sunderstanding of 
sustainable development
Inform the survey development process
Focus groups 8
Analyse citizen (non-expert) views and 
understanding of sustainable development
Inform the survey development process
Pilot 25 Test questionnaire
Survey 720
Analyse respondent preferences for compensation 
Analyse respondent willingness to pay to prevent 
environmental damage
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1.5 Policy relevance  
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill off the Gulf of Mexico and its global 
repercussions for the US, BP, and indirectly the UK, inevitably highlight the recurrent 
policy relevance of oil spills. Up-to-date analysis of crisis management, damage 
mitigation, compensation preferences and willingness to fund prevention policies can 
be of interest to policy-makers facing oil spills and perhaps in other crisis situations.  
EU and Spanish policy requires, at a theoretical level, engagement with sustainable 
development and public participation. The analysis of existing policy strategies 
highlights the largely unexplored relationship between oil spill management and 
sustainable development in Spain. The analysis undertaken in this thesis is framed 
within the current multi-level and multi-agent governance structure. This can arguably 
help unveil areas that can be improved in the ongoing process of oil spill preparedness 
and operational response in the light of the Spanish Coastal Sustainability Strategy and 
the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy.  
The policy relevance of analysing elite interviews and focus groups with regards to 
sustainable development is three-fold. First, were this type of research be included as 
part of the policy-making process, it might help to project an image of transparency 
that could help build trust and appease citizens in future oil spills. Second, listening to 
voters’ preferences could help politicians to be re-elected. Finally, increasing 
stakeholder participation enhances the spirit of the European Integrated Maritime 
Policy. 
The usefulness of analysing citizens’ preferences as regards compensation is two-fold. 
Firstly, the research is intended to help policy-makers understand taxpayers’ 
preferences in terms of compensation packages if and when a new spill occurs. 
Secondly, this thesis aims at facilitating the analysis of the adequacy of existing 
compensation options given the limited coverage of international compensation 
mechanisms. 
Analysing citizens’ willingness to pay to prevent future spills is relevant for policy-
making for two reasons. First, it may allow decision-makers to compare oil spill 
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prevention budgets with voters’ willingness to pay for these9. Second, the results 
obtained could help reduce the expense of commissioning new CV studies as this will 
allow the possibility of conducting benefit transfer (BT).  
                                               
9
 One should however bear in mind the limited sample size and the semi-probability sampling process 
followed 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review focusing on sustainable development 
and the two main paradigms of sustainability: weak and strong sustainability. Key 
issues on the measurement of sustainable development are also discussed. Sustainable 
development policies in Spain and the institutional context in which they develop are 
analysed. Chapter 3 shows the similarities and differences that arise from experts’ 
views and from public preferences in the sustainability debate. This is framed within 
the context of oil spills. Chapter 4 provides a test of Aldred (2002) and Turner’s (2007) 
assertion on acceptance of social capital (schools, hospitals, etc) as the preferred 
compensation option versus the weak and strong sustainability compensation options. 
Chapter 5 analyses respondents’ willingness to pay to prevent future spills of different 
sizes and consequences. The last chapter (chapter 6) discusses the key findings of the 
thesis. This is followed by the policy recommendations. The chapter concludes with a 
brief reference to future research that could help test the reliability and robustness of 
the results obtained. It also briefly reflects on the possible contribution of 
neuroeconomics to stated preference methods.   
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 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2.1 Introduction 
Sustainability, as we saw in the introductory chapter, is concerned about long 
rung intra and intergenerational welfare. The key concepts within the sustainability 
debate refer to the limits of the environment, society and technology and the needs of 
present and future generations (Atkinson et al. 1997). These needs can only be 
accounted for by the actions and omissions of the current generation that will impact 
on the availability of different types of capital.  
Preserving capital stocks as a whole or assigning special protection status to certain 
forms of capital (e.g. natural capital) leads us to distinguish among different 
sustainability paradigms. Deciding on which sustainability path to choose will depend 
on the development stage, stocks of capital available and preferences of different 
nations, among other factors. Despite the global nature of the quest for sustainability, 
national, sector and project-based efforts are all part of the sustainability web (Pezzey, 
1992).  
An economic enquiry into sustainability brings the analysis into the realm of 
compensation. As Barbier, Markandya and Pearce (1990: 1260) claim, economic 
efficiency and equity are joint concerns addressed by sustainability and they will 
require ‘actual compensations of future generations by the present generation…via a 
transfer of capital assets…no less than the current capital stock’. Weak and strong 
sustainability paradigms will diverge in the type of compensation needed. Weak 
sustainability abides by the Hartwick-Solow rule that states that the total stock of man-
made and natural capital has to be maintained through reinvesting in any form of 
capital when there has been depletion of any form of capital. Strong sustainability is a 
‘broad church’ but overall it will require maintaining natural capital by adding natural 
capital when it is depleted (or ensuring the functions of critical natural capital are 
maintained). The extent to which these compensation efforts are feasible and 
acceptable is subject to debate (Dietz and Nuemayer, 2007; Humphrey, 2001).  
Regardless of the sustainability path taken, it is argued that valuation can be a useful 
tool to inform about the consequences of different and often competing development 
options. This assumption does not imply neglecting the limitations of valuation as an 
information tool regarding efficiency. Rather, it entails being aware of these limitations 
and being mindful of the complementarities of other disciplines and other ethical 
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theories. The role of valuation is hence circumscribed to providing one of many 
possible inputs to decisions. 
As regards the context chosen for an enquiry into sustainable development it can be 
said that the sea provides humans with a myriad of goods and services. It performs 
complex ecosystem functions that make life possible. Threats to the marine 
environment come from a wide variety of agents and activities. One them is oil 
transport. Economic activities have historically taken precedence over environmental 
protection. This is still the case in many places around the world as there is no 
overarching marine protection framework. The recent explosion of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig and the gushing of oil for approximately three months have highlighted 
the environmental, social, economic and political relevance of preventing and 
managing oil spills. 
The existing legislation and institutions in charge of oil spill management in the context 
analysed call for the preservation of capital, both man-made and natural capital. At a 
theoretical level this implies acknowledging some form of sustainable development. 
The emphasis has been traditionally placed on preserving and compensating for losses 
in man-made capital, hence shying away from the strong sustainability paradigm. 
This is partly due to the private nature of man-made capital lost coupled with civil 
liability conventions that have traditionally focused on economic losses. Historical 
emphasis on compensation via man-made capital can also be a consequence of the 
relatively recent importance assigned to natural capital in the policy agenda. 
Additionally, valuing non-market losses is difficult. Furthermore, quantitative and 
qualitative limitations in compensation according to the IMO, the EU Environmental 
Liability Directive and the Spanish legislation lead to the (at best) partial compensation 
of environmental losses when oil spills happen.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a definition 
of sustainability and its weak and strong paradigms. It also provides insights from other 
fields of knowledge that can complement economic analyses relative to intentions, 
attitudes and behaviours. Section 2.3 discusses how to measure sustainability. Section 
2.4 briefly outlines the main gaps in the literature in theoretical an empirical terms. It 
also provides explanations regarding the way in which this thesis aims to explore these 
gaps. The remainder of the chapter zooms into the specific context in which the 
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research is developed. Section 2.5 explores sustainable development strategies in 
Spain. Section 2.6 provides the rationale for analysing oil spills in Spain. Section 2.7 
discusses the key institutions, regulations and policies involved in oil spill management 
in Spain as well as the property rights enshrined in the use and management of the 
marine space. Section 2.8 discuses the main issues analysed and their link to the 
remainder of the thesis. 
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2.2 Sustainability: Definitions, paradigms and broader issues 
Economics has been concerned about how long resources would last since, at 
least, the 18th century with the work of Malthus (1798) on the limited availability of 
land and growing population, the work of Jevons (1865) on the limited availability of 
coal and Britain’s rising energy demand and the work John Stuart Mill who analysed 
the existence of a stationary state with constant population and capital (Pezzey and 
Toman, 2002; Pearce, 2002).  
An economic definition of sustainability will strive for enduring wellbeing or utility of 
individuals derived from increased consumption, the availability of amenities provided 
by renewable resources and (reductions in) pollution (Neumayer, 1999). The working 
definitions that will be used throughout the thesis claim that development10 is 
sustainable if it provides 
‘Non-declining per capita utility - because of its self-evident appeal as a criterion 
for intergenerational equity’ (Pezzey, 1989: 11) or, 
‘Non-declining utility of a representative member of society for millennia into 
the future’ (Pezzey, 1992: 323) 
The elements ensuring capacity to provide non-declining wellbeing are different types 
of capital defined as ‘any economically useful stock’ (Pezzey, 1992: 322). The types of 
capital that will be referred to throughout the thesis are: natural capital which 
comprises nature in a broad sense (plants, animals, renewable and non-renewable 
resources, biodiversity, ecosystems, etc.). Man-made capital (also called physical 
capital or just capital) includes buildings, machinery, infrastructures, etc. Social capital 
defined as community facilities such as schools and hospitals (Turner, 2007) that 
provide the capacity to provide health and educational services, among others. The 
last type of capital is human capital (also called intellectual capital) which includes 
ingenuity, intelligence, knowledge and skills.  
As claimed by Pearce et al. (1989: 179-180), the conditions to achieve sustainable 
development (SD) are: ‘(a) development subject to a set of constraints which set 
resource harvest rates at levels no higher than managed or natural regeneration rates; 
and (b) use of the environment as a ‘waste sink’ on the basis that waste disposal rates 
                                               
10
 Following the distinction between development and growth provided by Daly (1990: 1) ‘growth is 
quantitative increase in physical scale, while development is qualitative improvement or unfolding of 
potentialities’. 
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should not exceed rates of (natural or managed) assimilation by the counterpart 
ecosystems’. Additionally these authors claim there is some degree of substitutability 
between ‘renewables and exhaustibles’.  
Limitations to the SD concept arise from its definition as there is no consensus 
regarding what sustainability objectives or standards are (Pezzey and Toman, 2002). 
Despite the seemingly clear ‘rules’ for achieving SD a myriad of variables blur the 
implementation of strategies to abide by these rules. The Governance for Sustainable 
Development report (2003) acknowledges the existence of four dimensions of 
sustainable development: the ecological, the economic, the institutional and the social 
dimension which are all interconnected. The multiple dimensions of sustainability plus 
issues such as the lack of scientific information, the political bargaining process that 
tends to shape the scientific mandates, etc. make abiding by the above stated 
conditions to achieve SD a complex endeavour. As Farrell et al. (2005: 143) claim SD is 
‘a political concept replete with governance questions’ for which there are no 
definitive guidelines (in Jordan, 2008).  
The main reasons given in the literature for adherence to sustainable development 
are: first, individuals care about the welfare of their descendants and thus, they would 
potentially be willing to save some of their resources for their descendants; second, as 
time is unidirectional, the present generation bears the burden of deciding implicitly or 
explicitly (through their actions) for those yet unborn. Finally, there is also a moral 
argument for caring about future consequences of today’s decisions, that it is ‘right’ to 
do so (Neumayer, 1999).  
Within the sustainability discourse two ‘paradigms’ have been differentiated: weak 
sustainability and strong sustainability (Pearce et al. 1989). They both advocate for 
development that is prolonged into the future, but they differ in what the necessary 
conditions are for this durable development. Underlying assumptions regarding 
substitution between the different forms of capital and regarding compensation also 
differ among these paradigms. Their views on the capacity of the environment to 
produce goods and services, its resilience, the uniqueness and essential life support 
features of certain environmental assets are the main points of disagreement between 
these two approaches. 
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Weak sustainability (hereinafter WS) assumes: firstly, substitutability among the 
different forms of capital. According to Solow, ‘the current generation does not 
especially owe to its successors a share of this or that particular resource. If it owes 
anything, it owes generalized productive capacity or, even more generally, access to a 
certain standard of living or level of consumption’ (Solow, 1986: 142); secondly, 
resources are super-abundant or that elasticity of substituting man-made capital for 
natural capital is greater than or equal to one or that technological progress will be 
able to overcome any resource constraint (Neumayer, 1999: 24). WS also assumes 
there are well functioning price mechanisms (Azqueta, 2002 and Beckerman, 1995). 
Prices are assumed to be able to signal scarcity and thus spur substitution of cheaper 
assets for relative expensive (scarce) assets. The result of this process can imply 
advances in technological progress that increase the worth of reserves of non-
renewable products.  
The requirements from a WS perspective to achieve SD imply maintaining total net 
investment in man-made and natural capital greater than or equal to zero, known as 
the Hartwick rule (Hartwick, 1977). This rule implies reinvesting the rents obtained 
from exploiting natural capital in reproducible capital that will be inherited by 
generations to come. However, if different forms of capital are assumed to be 
substitutable, any form of capital could be depleted if enough investment is made in 
other forms of capital. It should be noted however that as the resource base (stock) is 
depleted towards a given threshold, its price would rise, thus making conservation an 
increasingly attractive option for policy-makers, provided the market mechanism is 
able to adequately reflect scarcity, i.e. there are complete markets. 
A modified form of WS could come from Aldred’s (2002) and Turner’s (2007) proposal 
that states that when individuals are faced with environmental losses, some forms of 
compensation, say money, may not be appropriate whereas others, say schools or 
hospitals, may be accepted as adequate compensation. As Aldred (2002: 38 - 39) 
explains ‘large environmental losses may not be commensurable with money... It is 
often supposed that if no amount of money can compensate for a loss, nothing else 
can serve as adequate compensation either. But since no assumption has been made 
that the loss has infinite value, this need not be so. Rather, the agent might accept the 
loss if, say, a new local hospital is built as compensation’. There could therefore be 
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some substitutability (and acceptable compensation projects) or no substitutability but 
an acceptance of certain types of compensation (Humphrey, 2001) and there is a 
possibility that money is not the adequate measuring rod when asking individuals 
about certain losses (Aldred, 2002; Turner, 2007; O’Neill and Spash, 2000; Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).  
Proponents of strong sustainability (henceforth SS) call for stronger constraints on 
development strategies in order to ensure lasting development. The reasons for 
demanding a greater protection of the environment rest on the fact that there is lack 
of scientific knowledge and uncertainty regarding the consequences of natural capital 
depletion. The possibility exists of irreversible consequences of depleting natural 
capital (e.g. species becoming extinct). There are environmental assets that provide 
life-support functions. Lastly SS claims that there are environmental losses for which 
individuals cannot be compensated even though in some cases compensation may 
mitigate damages. As Spash (1993: 127 - 128) claims ‘the transfer of a set of ‘’goods’’ 
may be unacceptable as an attempt to correct for loss or injury due to the violation of 
rights…in terms of economic compensation…(when) rights that ought not to be 
violated have been violated … compensation is undertaken to mitigate the wrong’.  
Different proponents support different versions of SS, and it is hard to pinpoint the 
requirements of SS (Neumayer, 1999). Here are however two main camps within SS: 
1. SS (in its ‘softer’ version) will require maintaining the value of total capital and 
natural capital at least constant. This version of SS allows for depletion of non-
renewable resources (such as oil) if the proceeds from depleted assets are 
reinvested in renewable alternatives (e.g. solar energy development projects). 
This would allow for substitution between different forms of natural capital. It 
would also allow compensation in natural capital. As Aldred (2002: 43) states 
‘perhaps in some cases only ‘in-kind’ compensation – environmental goods to 
replace environmental losses – will suffice’. There remain doubts that this in-
kind compensation will be adequate for all kinds of environmental losses 
(Neumayer, 1999; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). 
2. SS (in its more ‘stringent’ version) will require maintaining the value of total 
capital plus maintaining the physical stock of natural resources that are 
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considered critical natural capital (CNC), in other words, non-substitutable 
(vital) natural assets. These resources can be used within the regenerative 
capacity of the environment, but their functions must be maintained. 
Identifying what critical natural capital is and what is worth has been difficult 
(Pearce, Atkinson and Mourato, 2006) although recent work on ecosystems 
valuation, climate change and managing catastrophic impacts can be said to be 
analysing environmental change in ways relevant to the identification and 
management of critical natural capital.  
Both paradigms of SD suffer from diffuse definitions (Pezzey and Toman, 2002) that 
have helped broaden the scope of the concept but have made the implementation 
through policy measures elusive and complex (Cowell, 1997). Besides, the boundaries 
between WS and SS are not clearly specified (Azqueta, 2002). SD as a concept has been 
criticised ever since it reached the public debate. Little and Mirrlees (1994) and 
Beckerman (1995) among others criticise SD saying that it is more of a ‘buzzword’ 
(what Ann Markusen (1999) would call a ‘fuzzy’ concept) than a substantial 
contribution to environmental economics or policy-making. A further critique to the 
concept stems from the idea that SD will entail reducing or eliminating certain 
economic activities such as mining (Little and Mirrlees, 1994).  
This last critique would not hold however if the approach to sustainability was that of 
WS requiring that total net investment should be greater than or equal to zero. It 
would also be possible to deplete non-renewable resources if the ‘softer’ version of SS 
was followed as it allows depletion of resources as long as the proceeds are reinvested 
in renewable alternatives. If SS in its more ‘stringent’ version was followed, economic 
activities could continue provided the functions of critical natural capital are 
maintained.  
As with many of the academic debates whose classifications come across as eschewed 
towards the extreme propositions, SD seems to divide academia and policy-makers11 
into WS supporters and SS advocates. Reality may however be less clear-cut and for 
good reasons too. SS may be seen as WS with extra sustainability requirements. 
However WS may, theoretically at least, allow for ‘optimal’ depletion of all natural 
                                               
11
 Although policy-makers would more realistically pursue WS at best, leaving SS for the rhetorical 
political discourse, except for initiatives such as the EU Environmental Liability Directive for example. 
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capital provided enough capital (man-made, human or social) is built in exchange. The 
above stated reasons (i.e. irreversibility, loss aversion and uncertainty12) may lead to 
pursue more stringent SD requirements demanded by SS.  
Depending on the environmental problem analysed it may be possible to substitute 
say man-made capital for natural capital and increase well-being. Conversely, before 
certain thresholds are reached it may be advisable to refrain from resource use in 
order to avoid irreversible losses of critical natural capital. The vast array of situations 
and the complexity of environment-economy-social relationships could therefore 
signal towards the need for tailor-made SD approaches that take into account 
politically feasible and socially desirable options. 
Broader issues: Plurality and cross-fertilization in valuing environmental damage 
Neoclassical welfare economic theory is underpinned by the following assumptions 
(see box 2.2.1 below): 
Box 2.2.1 Assumptions of neoclassical welfare economics 
 ‘Agents’ values are expressions of their preferences
Their preferences are ordered and have a certain structure – they are transitive, reflexive, complete and continuous
The strength of agents’ preferences for marginal changes in a bundle of goods is expressed in their willingness to pay 
for their satisfaction.
Agents have subjective probabilities about the likelihood of different possible outcomes.
Agents are instrumentally rational. They act so as to realise the greatest expected satisfaction of preferences, given 
budget constraints and assignments of probabilities to different possible states of the world.
Preferences are exogenously determined, stable, context independent and ethically unchallengeable’.  
O’Neill and Spash (2000: 522 – 523) 
Gowdy (2004) highlights the problems and caveats of neoclassical welfare economics 
precepts when choosing between policy options and concludes that value judgements 
will inevitably inform policy recommendations. Understanding the values, ethical 
categories and preferences and providing an explicit account of these in valuation 
exercises may be useful to understand sustainability paths. Neoclassical economics 
regards all goods as tradable, assumes a lack of pure altruism in individual choices, 
sees processes as irrelevant and believes preferences are exogenous. In contrast to 
this, empirical observations may be in accordance with alternative ethical theories. 
                                               
12
 Irreversibility/irreversibilities can be defined as ‘changes that are physically impossible to reverse or 
prohibitely expensive to reverse’ (Turner, Pearce and Bateman, 1994: 57).  Loss aversion ‘is equivalent to 
a utility function which is steeper for losses than for gains’ (Kahneman and Trevsky, 1979 in Schmidt and 
Zank, 2005:158). Uncertainty can be defined as ‘a situation where the probability distribution over a set 
of possible states of the world and the resulting payoffs cannot be known objectively , but individuals 
have subjective beliefs about the distribution and the payoffs’ (Neumayer, 1999: 100) 
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These may show the existence of lexicographic preferences13, loss aversion, altruism 
and a significant role of context and processes in the outcomes of valuation.  
In addition to the limitations of the above assumptions (e.g. due to the existence of 
bounded rationality of individuals, limitations of WTP estimates, altruistic motives for 
actions, etc.) it has been argued that environmental goods can be considered, at least 
by some individuals in society, a special type of goods. This may entail social 
construction of preferences, the possibility of changing preferences through 
deliberation with significant others or through public processes. Furthermore 
contextual issues can also be seen to have a significant weight in decisions (Roberts, 
2004).  
Different ethical theories14 have therefore helped shed light to the way choices are 
made in the environmental realm. According to Randall (2000) there is an emerging 
consensus among philosophers that no ethical theory is likely to reign. Pluralism seems 
to be one way forward to guide decisions. In this sense, and from an ethical 
perspective it will be argued that ‘some questions in life are best resolved by reference 
to moral imperatives, some as matters of respect for rights, and for the remainder it is 
reasonable to go about maximizing value, perhaps even focusing on consequences and 
evaluating them in terms of their impact on the level of preference satisfaction’ (ibid.: 
255). What people actually choose and their motives could illustrate how pluralism is 
related (or unrelated) to sustainable development.  
In addition to the input of ethical pluralism to the field of environmental valuation, 
cross-fertilization from sociology and psychology has also been seen in the inputs to 
valuation instruments. In this sense, economists have ‘borrowed’ attitude-behaviour 
models from these fields. The most often quoted model in the stated preference 
literature is Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action (1975). This theory explains 
behaviour as a result of the joint influence of various factors that result in a framework 
                                               
13
 Gowdy (2004: 247) describes lexicographic preferences as a situation in which ‘people may place 
absolute values on environmental preservation and refuse to make trade-offs between environmental 
features and money’. 
14
 According to Randall (2000: 253) philosophers identify two main ethics. First, axiology according to 
which ‘goodness is a matter of value’. Welfarism, which is one type of consequentialism, is part of 
axiology (here, good action is whatever produces good consequences and consequences are evaluated 
according to their contribution to welfare). Second, deontology where ‘goodness is whatever emerges 
from right action’. Within this, we can find two types of deontological ethics: Kantianism according to 
which right action is ‘that which is obedient to moral duties derived ultimately from a set of universal 
moral principles’. The second type of deontology, useful from an economic perspective, is contractianism 
that claims ‘right action respects the rights of individuals’ (ibid.)  
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for action. These factors are: beliefs15 about the consequences of certain behaviour, 
normative beliefs about the studied behaviour, attitudes16 towards behaviour, 
subjective norms regarding behaviour and intentions17 to perform a given behaviour. 
All these will shape behavioural18 outcomes. An adaptation of this idea is given by 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975: 16): 
Figure 2.2.1 Diagram of Fishbein’s and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action 
 
 
Beliefs   Attitudes 
  (Information)            (Favourable/ 
                           unfavourable  
                       towards the issue)       
Intention   Behaviour                                                                             
(Probability     (Acts) 
of action)  
 
Normative   Subjective 
Beliefs   norm19 
(Information on           (What significant  
what we should do)           others think we   
                             should do) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
 
When there is no observable behaviour, Fishbein and Ajzen state that intentions may 
be considered good predictors of behaviour. This will occur if both intentions and 
behaviour are analysed with the same level of specificity, if the lapse of time between 
the question regarding intentions and the actual behaviour is short and if there are no 
external factors that may disrupt the link between intentions and behaviour. In 
addition, Bateman et al. (2002) state that monetary valuation will be a more powerful 
predictor of behaviour than attitudes. Finally, familiarity with the described scenarios 
                                               
15
 Belief is defined by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) as the information an individual has about any aspect of 
the person’s environment.  
16
 Attitude is a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the analysed issue. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). 
17
 Intention is defined as the subjective probability that an individual will effectively pursue a given 
course of action. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). 
18
 Behaviour is defined as ‘observable acts’ of individuals. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). 
19
 Subjective norm is defined as what ‘significant others’ think with regards to a given behaviour. 
                 Influence 
                 Feedback 
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may enable better predictions in the intention-behaviour relationship than when the 
situation to be valued is unfamiliar.  
As has been argued SD will depend, to a certain extent, on what citizens’ want. As a 
significant proportion of environmental goods and services are not traded in the 
market, despite their potentially high values, information on the beliefs, attitudes, 
intentions, etc. of citizens are of essence in understanding citizen preferences as 
regards sustainability. 
This section has focused on the requirement to maintaining capital (in toto or 
maintaining total capital plus natural capital) for the future in order to meet 
sustainability requirements.  The additional inputs from other disciplines described in 
the last part of this section are thought to be able to provide a broader and more 
complete framing that may help engage in the enquiry regarding the pursuit of 
sustainable development.  
We agree that ‘any policy regime must be capable of being monitored, if the success or 
failures of the policies are to be judged. Ultimately, this means data concerning the 
environment, the economy and society must be collected, analysed and made usable 
to policy-makers’ (Atkinson et al. 1997: 20). The following section will analyse how 
sustainability can be measured for the two paradigms, WS and SS, at the portfolio 
levels of analysis. 
 40 
2.3 Measuring sustainability: is there a role for valuation? 
Although there is wide ranging literature on sustainable development there has 
been arguably less focus on ‘identifying essential elements of sustainable development 
to not only guide the formulation of goals and the indicators selected to measure them 
but to enhance learning about how to progress towards sustainable development’ 
(Becker, 2005: 88). Additionally, various authors have acknowledged the myriad of 
attempts to make sustainability indicators operational (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007) as 
well as the limitations and preliminary nature of the existing indicators Rigby et al. 
(2000) in Becker (2005). This section will mainly focus on the micro-level approaches to 
measuring SD and its relationship to valuation. 
When analysing WS at a project level, economic efficiency will be pursued. Although 
pursuing efficiency is known to be insufficient to achieve sustainability, the fact that 
natural resources are normally underpriced and overexploited means that moves 
towards efficiency may be regarded as positive steps towards sustainability. The 
relationship between WS and CBA is mainly based on the following issues (Pearce, 
Atkinson and Mourato, 2006):  
1. Public projects, which should arguably bear in mind future consequences, 
embody similar characteristics to private investment projects. The reason for 
this is that they require up-front investments, yielding benefits in the future. 
They can contribute to (or hinder the achievement of) sustainability if they 
result in accumulation (or loss) of capital. 
2. Investment decisions, when made following CBA requirements, may not only 
yield net increases in wealth but may also contribute to the goal of 
sustainability, if savings are effectively allocated to the best alternative 
available. 
3. WS is concerned with saving enough for the future. CBA by definition will 
require having net benefits from the projects undertaken. 
4. WS theoretical framework and requirements (i.e. the Hartwick rule) ‘give rise to 
CBA rules’ (ibid.: 243). This implies all projects yielding net benefits should be 
undertaken. It will however require that compensation is actually paid. The 
calculations of net present value will include, as a separate item, the net effects 
of the project on the environment (Turner, Pearce and Bateman, 1994).  
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The functions20 performed by natural capital, its limits in terms of productive capacity 
and waste assimilation capacity, the limited knowledge we have regarding these 
capacities and the threats to which natural capital is exposed can provide the rationale 
for considering it a special type of capital worthy of protection. In order to link the 
economy with the environment, the concept of Total Economic Value (TEV) emerged 
as a useful heuristic.  
TEV presents us with the monetary valuation of environmental assets. It is calculated 
as the sum of all relevant WTP or WTA of individuals with standing in the valuation 
process. One of the main concerns regarding TEV is that it is a partial account of the 
entire value provided by the environment. The environment, as a system in which life 
occurs, can be said to have some prior value related to its life support capacity 
(primary value), which is not captured by TEV. Total economic value only accounts for 
secondary value of environmental assets that are use and non-use values (Turner, 
Pearce and Bateman, 1994).  
Use values imply utilization or consumption of goods and services at present, actual 
use, and the possibility of using goods and services in the future, option value. Actual 
use can, in turn, be divided into direct use (e.g. fishing) and indirect use (e.g. carbon 
storage in forests). Direct use values leave a behavioural trail in the sense that they 
refer to values of using goods and services that are directly or indirectly traded in the 
market. Their market prices are related to these values.  
TEV also encompasses non-use values (also called passive use values) defined as the 
utility an individual derives from a good even though no direct use is experienced now 
or in the future. Non-use values leave no behavioural trail. To elicit these values 
individuals affected by a project will have to be asked about their WTP.  There are 
several motivations. For example altruism will refer to the value an individual derives 
from the existence of an asset due to the fact that other people from the present 
generation might enjoy it. Bequest value refers to the value individuals assign to the 
asset for its enjoyment by generations to come. Lastly, existence value is the WTP an 
individual would offer for preserving a good even though he does not plan to use it 
and does not foresee its use by others (Atkinson et al. 1997). Existence value 
                                               
20
 The provision of life support functions such as weather regulation, provision of raw materials, enabling 
waste assimilation and supplying amenities. 
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motivations may include concern for the good itself, or feeling responsible for 
preserving the good (also called stewardship motivation). 
Non-use values are related to the ecological functions that the environment performs. 
Within the ecological functions, the waste absorption capacity and the provision of 
biodiversity are seen by ecologists as ‘assets’ for which there are no substitutes 
(Norton and Toman, 1997).  In this sense, strong sustainability advocates believe the 
way to ensure sustainability is through preservation of stocks of natural capital. 
Focusing on the micro-level, adherence to the Safe Minimum Standard (SMS) is one 
possible approach to SS that links CBA rules to preservation of natural capital. SMS 
implies maintaining critical flows of resources so that it will be possible to rebuild the 
stock in the future. The objective of this standard is to minimise maximum possible 
loses (Bishop and Ready, 1991) and it will imply that ‘policy-makers follow standard 
cost-benefit rules unless there is a compelling reason not to’ (Pearce et al. 2006: 246).  
This decision rule received the input of Ciriacy –Wantrup (1952) and was first applied 
to game theory by Bishop (1978). The rationale behind this rule is that ‘there is 
evidence that individuals consider regret when making decisions under uncertainty 
rather than maximising expected utility (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982 in Ready an Bishop, 
1991: 311). The criticisms to the SMS approach are, however, numerous. This decision 
criterion will favour prevention of environmental damage unless the costs of doing so 
are intolerably high and although it is an intellectually appealing concept it has not 
been embedded in a theoretical model of social choice (Ready and Bishop, 1991 and 
Hohl and Tisdell, 1993). Crowards (1998) points out the existence of both an unclear 
definition of what safe minimum standard entails and the different interpretations 
given by different authors of the costs of applying SMS and how these costs should be 
measured. Furthermore, in order to set environmental standards, there is a need for 
complete scientific information regarding system’s capacities and limits. According to 
Hohl and Tisdell (1993) this information is still unsatisfactory. The SMS rule is also 
criticised for being pessimistic and eschewed towards environmental preservation. 
Some authors have argued (see Pearce et al. 2006) that monetisation could, in 
principle, help in deciding preservation (or otherwise) of natural resource. Despite the 
limitations of this approach it will be assumed that this may be the case and that 
valuing environmental preservation will help in advancing the knowledge of the costs 
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and benefits of sustainability (Atkinson et al. 1997). In order to analyse the value of 
critical assets it is assumed that the price of the asset will tend to infinity as the 
amount of asset tends to the critical amount of the asset. It follows that, the closer we 
get to the threshold amount of the asset, the larger the welfare loss (reflected in 
higher WTP). This is hypothesised to require a good measure of WTP for critical 
resources and, it would also require (harder to find) accurate economic and scientific 
information regarding the importance and characteristics of the resource. The last 
empirical chapter attempts to capture survey respondent’s WTP to prevent 
environmental damages of varying degrees, including a scenario in which irreversible 
damages occur and thresholds are trespassed.  
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2.4 Motivating the analysis: exploring existing gaps 
 As Robèrt et al. (1997: 79) claim ‘environmental problems have multiplied and 
changed character during the past decades: from local to global, from distinct to 
diffuse, from short time delay between cause and effect to long time delay, and from 
relatively low complexity to high complexity [Holmberg & Karlsson 1992 mm]. This 
enlargement of complexity and effects has increased the need for a compass to point 
us in the direction of sustainability’.  
Previous sections in this chapter have shown many advances in the understanding of 
sustainable development. There are however areas where further research is called 
for. These areas are related to both theoretical and empirical contributions, Pezzey 
and Toman (2002).  
It has been argued that the analysis of whether policy goals and public preferences 
‘match’ is missing in the analysis of sustainability, as is the case in other research areas 
(see McVittie, Moran and Elston, 2010). This research area is approached in the 
remainder of this thesis by means of comparing and contrasting the views of elites and 
focus group participants on sustainable development.  
Monetary compensation and in-kind compensation are assumed to be able to provide 
restoration when faced with welfare losses due to (some) environmental damages. 
Neoclassical welfare economics as well as more recent proposals such as those related 
to resource equivalency analysis focus on the amount of compensation that would 
offset environmental damages. For other environmental losses and depending on the 
type of preferences of individuals, it may be the case that no amount of compensation 
and no type of compensation will restore pre-damage levels of welfare. Theoretically 
this can be linked to weak and strong sustainability paradigms. Testing whether 
individuals would prefer one type of capital (say infrastructures) or another (say 
schools or natural parks) can be a matter of empirical enquiry that could further the 
analysis of sustainability. The main contribution offered in this area is to explore the 
type of compensation preferred when faced with environmental damages and its 
relationship to SD paradigms. 
In order to meet this research endeavour respondents to an in-person questionnaire 
were given information about three hypothetical spills of different sizes and 
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consequences and were asked whether they would accept compensation. 
Respondents who accepted compensation were asked to choose among three types of 
compensation projects. These compensation projects are modelled to emulate three 
possible sustainability stances in the weak-to-strong sustainability continuum. 
Investments in man-made capital (à la Hartwick), investments in social capital (à la 
Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007)) and investments in natural capital (in line with the 
‘softer version’ of the strong sustainability paradigm) form the basis of the 
compensation exercise.  
Despite advances in the theory regarding sustainable development, the analysis of the 
costs and benefits of sustainability, and in particular in the area of water pollution 
have been under-researched (Atkinson et al. 1997). This thesis aims to bridge this gap 
by assessing the benefits of preventing future environmental damages (caused by 
hypothetical oil spills) that would reduce natural capital in the medium to long term.  
It has been argued that at the micro-level, in order to unveil the value of the critical 
amount of natural capital, the price of the asset will tend to infinity as the amount of 
asset tends to the critical amount. It follows that, the closer we get to the threshold 
amount of the asset, the larger the welfare loss (reflected in higher WTP). This 
however would require a good measure of WTP for critical resources and accurate 
economic and scientific information regarding the importance and characteristics of 
the resource that is harder to find. This is done through the analysis of the answers to 
the in-person questionnaire that presents respondents with three hypothetical spills of 
different sizes and consequences and asks interviewees about their willingness to pay 
to prevent future environmental damage (and hence to preserve natural capital). The 
remainder of the chapter presents the context in which these research areas will be 
explored.  
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2.5 Sustainable development strategies in Spain and in Galicia 
The Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992 called for the development of SD 
strategies. At the OECD level this goal had been largely met with the exceptions of 
Belgium, Canada, Hungary, Mexico and Spain that still lacked such strategies in 2006 
(Jiménez Herrero, 2006). After the EU’s renewed SD strategy in 2006 Spain presented 
its sustainable development strategy in November 200721 as well as its Coastal 
Sustainability Strategy.  According to the OECD (2007: 9) ‘Achieving the goals of 
sustainable development depends to a large extent on governance practices, 
particularly the effective implementation of national sustainable development 
strategies (NSDS)’.This section will briefly analyse the main features of the Spanish and 
the Galician sustainable development strategies with special emphasis on maritime 
resource and pollution management.  
The Spanish Sustainable Development Strategy (SSDS) is based on overarching 
principles that include inter and intragenerational equity, the precautionary principle 
and the polluter pays principle (PPP).  No explicit reference is made regarding the 
sustainability paradigm the government seeks to achieve.  
There is however an optimistic view of the role of economic growth as a facilitator of 
environmental protection. The SSDS does not mention limits, irreversibility or limits to 
substitution between different types of capital. Increasing public and stakeholder 
participation is seen as a goal in the development of SD. Analysing costs and benefits 
of actions is mentioned as a desirable goal, thus opening the door to CBA-type 
analyses and hence echoing the Atkinson et al. (1997) in their call for this data.  
The SD strategy lacks specific requirements to achieve lasting development, except for 
the reduction in energy consumption of 2% per annum that is proposed (without 
providing any rationale for that figure). Although some references are made regarding 
the environment’s absorptive capacity, the emphasis throughout the document is on 
resource use.  
With regards to marine areas the SD strategy falls short of providing any specific 
guidance. On the one hand it acknowledges that there is an overarching lack of data 
                                               
21
 http://www.la-moncloa.es/NR/rdonlyres/B73920C0-8F78-4EFE-83D8-A570345ADBA4/0/EEDS.pdf 
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regarding the state of marine resources22. It also recognises the lack of marine 
protection and the need to reduce the risk of accidental oil spills. On the other hand 
maritime transport is hailed as a competitive option (vs. road transport), thus implicitly 
accepting the increase in the risk of accidents without providing guidance regarding 
additional prevention, compensation or allocation of funds, equipment or personnel 
that this would entail.  
The first indicators regarding the evolution of environmental quality in Spain were 
drawn up by the Ministry of Environment since its creation in 199623. The analysis of 
the state and evolution of the different indicators of sustainability is additionally 
undertaken each year since 2005 by the OSE (Observatorio de la Sostenibilidad en 
España). Regarding marine protection OSE’s 2009 analysis indicates that there are 
plans to develop an inventory of marine Natura 2000 Network areas in the 10 Marine 
Protected Areas (MPA’s) to be officially designated. Although there is still considerable 
lack of data in order to tailor protection for these areas, this could be considered as a 
step in the right direction. Oil spills are only mentioned in passing when referring to 
the disruptions they cause for birds. No measures are mentioned on prevention or 
management of oil spills. 
Spain’s Coastal Sustainability Strategy24 was also released in 2007. Intergenerational 
equity concerns and the environment’s carrying capacity are mentioned in the strategy 
although no specific actions to address these concerns or indicators on which to take 
actions are mentioned. The strategy however acknowledges the lack of data and states 
the Ministry’s goal to obtain baseline data on the state of coastal areas.  
The strategy describes the geographical characteristics of the Spanish coastline with a 
larger focus on the Mediterranean region and the islands. Few references to the 
Atlantic region are found. The strategy acknowledges the strategic nature of Spain’s 
coast in economic, environmental and social terms. Tourism and maritime transport 
are the two economic activities that are recognised as the most relevant ones in terms 
of the challenges to achieve an Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) as advocated by 
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 In this sense the SSDS calls for the development of a map of Marine Protected Areas (MPA’s).  
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http://www.mma.es/portal/secciones/calidad_contaminacion/indicadores_ambientales/banco_publico_ia/#
4 
24http://www.mma.es/secciones/medios_comunicacion/prensa/noticias/pdf/ESTRATEGiACOSTA051020
07PresCONSEJOMINISTROS.pdf 
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the EU. The strategy dwells on the need to manage urban planning in coastal areas and 
leaves the management of maritime transport largely unexplored. 
The only measures to be taken by the Ministry of Environment to ensure sustainability 
are: the drawing up of a document to know the baseline scenario of the coast and the 
active regional authorities’ engagement with different agents to develop future 
actions. Future developments of this strategy are supposed to provide more specific 
goals. 
The SD Strategy for Galicia (SDSG)25 sets four main fields on which to focus in order to 
achieve sustainable development. They are: economic competitiveness, demographic 
equilibrium, social cohesion, environmental quality and urban and ‘heritage’ planning 
(Xunta de Galicia, 2005a). The main purpose of analysing this document was to gain 
understanding of the theoretical underpinning of SD in Galicia focusing on the oil spill 
management field. In order to analyse environmental quality in Galicia the SDSG 
concentrates on water, biodiversity, atmosphere, noise, waste and land. It defines SD 
as a dynamic process providing indicators to measure sustainability and objectives to 
be reached. These indicators however leave many aspects of the environment out of 
the analysis and the goals set are unrelated to physical limits in terms of resource use 
or pollution absorption capacity of the environment. 
The SDSG states that the best strategy to achieve sustainability would be through the 
establishment of voluntary agreements. The industry would have to agree on the 
efforts needed to achieve SD. A more restrictive statement in terms of access to 
sensitive areas is made when the document deals with sustainable tourism. The means 
to achieve sustainability in tourism implies restricting access to environmentally 
sensitive areas. Although this seems to point towards a stricter approach (banning the 
use of certain natural assets) the document does not provide any information 
regarding which areas would fall under the ‘sensitive category’ or which activities 
would be considered damaging. The lack of specification provides shallow guidance for 
policy-makers. This may result in heterogeneous responses that fall short of SD 
requirements.   
The SDSG is however more specific when it describes drinking water quality as it 
establishes limits and goals in order to ensure health and safety of water consumption. 
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 It was published in 2005 and is currently being updated.  
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As regards bathing waters, the characteristics of different bathing water qualities (0, 1 
or 2 depending on the characteristics of the water analysed) are also more narrowly 
defined. So, in those issues related to health (water consumption and bathing water 
quality) there is stricter guidance and limits compared to other areas of the 
environment.  
With regards to biodiversity, the SDSG acknowledges the existence of valuable 
environmental resources and areas that are protected under international agreements 
and national legislation (Ramsar wetlands in Galicia, Natura 2000 Network sites26, 
Spanish legislation such as the law 4/1989 on conservation of open spaces27, wild flora 
and fauna). The SDSG states that those areas should be monitored in order to obtain 
information regarding the state of conservation, the regulatory measures 
implemented and the limits on the use of these areas. The indicator used in order to 
measure sustainability is equal to the area protected by any environmental protection 
instrument divided by the total protected area. The indicator is not critically analysed. 
The benchmark set for this indicator is Spain’s average biodiversity protection. This 
again is unrelated to whether protection will enable durable development of Galician 
biodiversity in terms of maintaining environmental functions.   
Finally, as regards public participation, the SDSG strategy supports the idea of having 
as much civil society participation as possible. The indicator used is the number of 
people receiving training and education on sustainability. The goal is to increase this 
population every year. This indicator does not imply that civil society’s opinions and SD 
preferences would be considered in decision-making processes. 
The above SD strategies analysed in this thesis do not deal with irreversible effects, 
uncertainty or system’s limits. The indicators presented are not explained nor critically 
analysed. The goals set do not seem to follow any specific sustainability rationale. They 
only aim at reaching EU’s mean figures, or Spain’s or increasing or decreasing the 
magnitudes in the variables analysed. This could be seen as an overall strategy to 
follow rather than a SD strategy. The political appeal of the term ‘sustainable’ can 
however imply that having a ‘SD strategy’ is profitable in terms of votes. This may be 
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 Spain being the EU country that includes a wider area in this network due to exceptional characteristics 
in terms of habitats and species according to the SDSG. 
27
 Open spaces are areas in which elements or natural systems of particular value, interest or singularity 
can be found’ (Xunta de Galicia, 2005 a: 271) 
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so even if the underlying assumptions of the SD strategy to be followed are not 
explained and system limits are largely ignored. Finally no cost analysis is provided 
regarding what it would mean in monetary terms to reach the established goals; nor 
does it say whether these strategies are demanded or even accepted by citizens. The 
above analysis of SD strategies has highlighted that there is scope for further empirical 
enquiry into the views of experts and citizens regarding sustainable development 
strategies. The following chapter strives to fill this gap exploring the views of elites and 
focus groups regarding sustainability. 
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2.6 Rationale for analysing oil spills in Spain 
The Fisterra maritime corridor bears 70% of hydrocarbon traffic travelling to 
central and northern Europe (Vázquez, Varela and Prada, 2004). The Spanish region of 
Galicia28 has received over 10% of the world’s oil spills. Approximately 45,000 boats 
navigate close to its coasts annually, of which more than 13,000 carry potentially 
dangerous substances. This means 36 boats carrying dangerous goods sail in Galician 
waters every day (García Negro et al. 2007).  Additionally, until 2017 maritime 
transport is expected to be increasing. This will mean increasing the risk of oil spills by 
25% (Vieites et al. 2004). Potential damages of oil spills can affect ‘key ecosystems and 
species (that) may be permanently damaged regardless of the size of the spill and 
indirect long term effects cannot be excluded’ (Ibid.: 537). The areas that are more 
likely to be affected within Europe are the English Channel and Galician waters. 
Map 2.6.1 below shows the main accidental spills that have taken place in EU waters 
from 1970 to 2001.  
Map 2.6.1 Accidental oil spills in the EU (1970 – 2001) 
 
Qualitative and quantitative limitations under the international compensation system 
that is applicable in the EU (CLC and IOPC-funds) imply that there are damages derived 
from oil spills that are borne by governments and therefore by society, making oil spills 
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 See map in Annex A.1.1. 
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a ‘cheap’ occurrence for the maritime business. Compensation only includes direct 
damages such as those affecting fishing tackles or infrastructures, reasonable 
preventive measures that are determined on a case by case basis, cleaning operations, 
revenue losses and the cost of studies to assess the damages. Ecological damages 
(non-use values) are excluded from the compensation system (Mason, 2005).  
Additionally the EU Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/CE) (that provides the 
framework for implementing the polluter pays principle, preventing and remedying 
environmental damage) excludes oil spills from its reach. Article 4.2 states ‘This 
Directive shall not apply to environmental damage or to any imminent threat of such 
damage arising from an incident in respect of which liability or compensation falls 
within the scope of any of the International Conventions listed in Annex IV, including 
any future amendments thereof, which is in force in the Member State concerned’ (L 
143/59). The Spanish Law that transposes the EU Directive (Ley 26/2007) in its article 
3.5 follows the EU spirit in that it excludes damages that are ‘covered’ by international 
agreements.  
International compensation payments were limited to approximately 171M€ at the 
time of the Prestige spill (García Negro et al. 2007), which was insufficient to cover the 
damages caused by the Prestige spill. Thus, the Spanish government and its citizens 
had to cope with the payment of all the damages not covered by the compensation 
instruments available. In order to boost the economy additional investment 
expenditure as a policy response to the Prestige oil spill included 5,200M€ from the 
state and 882.33M€ from the Autonomous Community (regional government). 
Prevention and management of spills were also in progress at the time the Prestige 
occurred. There was a known lack of oil spill fighting means (equipment and 
personnel). There was also a very general National Contingency Plan without a 
Regional or Territorial Contingency Plan for Galicia that was only published in 2007. 
Coordination and cooperation problems that were repeatedly voiced in the aftermath 
of the Prestige are still a cause for concern according to the institutions in charge of oil 
spill preparedness and management.  
The frequency of spills in Spain (see map 2.6.2 below), the economic, environmental 
and social damages caused, and the limited prevention, management and 
compensation framework at all institutional levels provide the rationale for studying oil 
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spills in Spain. The Prestige oil spill has been used as the status quo situation in the 
thesis as it is the more recent large scale spill occurred in Spain. 
Map 2.6.2 Main accidental oil spills in Spain (> 1,000 tons) 
 
Source: CEPRECO (2008) 
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2.7 Oil spills in Spain: key institutions, regulations and policies 
Maritime transport is a lucrative activity that implies many boats navigate EU 
waters. Safety concerns are therefore expected among EU citizens due to the large 
amount of vessels and past spills29. In order to improve safety in the maritime 
transport sector, international, EU and national legislations and policies have 
developed through time, mainly as a reaction to accidents. The institutions that deal 
with oil spills affecting Spain (and the EU) include the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and national bodies that will be described below. Key 
features of the most relevant policies at the national level will be analysed in this 
section. The Galician case will be discussed as an example of regional policy-making. 
The relationship between the existing legislation and sustainable development will also 
be highlighted.  
Article 45 of the Spanish Constitution states that, ‘all individuals have the right to enjoy 
an adequate environment that enables their appropriate development as well as the 
duty to preserve it. The authorities will watch over the rational use of all natural 
resources in order to protect and improve the quality of life and protect and restore 
the environment, supported by the indispensable collective solidarity’ (López Guerra, 
1994: 55)30. Institutionally, the Central Government is responsible for this 
constitutional mandate regarding maritime protection at a national level. The Ministry 
of Public Works and within it the State Merchant Navy Office is competent to legislate 
on issues related to the merchant navy. According to law 27/1992, the State Merchant 
Navy Office is in charge of marine environmental protection. In order to respond to 
maritime pollution SASEMAR (salvage and maritime safety society) was created under 
the auspices of the State Merchant Navy Office. It is SASEMAR who has the equipment, 
personnel and know-how to respond to oil spills at the national level. At the regional 
level, autonomous communities are also responsible for environmental protection. At 
the local level, the city council is in charge of keeping beaches and public spaces clean. 
To complicate things further, if an oil spill is large enough, other institutions such as 
                                               
29
 Note that although 80% of oil spilled comes from operational spills (i.e. voluntary discharges), it is 
accidental spills the ones that attract widespread media and public attention putting pressure on policy-
makers to react to these events.  
30
 Author’s translation. 
 55 
civil defence services, the Home Office, the Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of 
Defence or even other countries can intervene.  
According to the former Centre for Maritime and Coastal Pollution Prevention 
(CEPRECO)31, jurisdiction in marine protection was dispersed and thus the CEPRECO 
was created in the aftermath of the Prestige spill to coordinate oil spill prevention and 
management. The CEPRECO had limited resources and hence its power to effectively 
coordinate other institutions (that have more means and personnel) was restricted. It 
was furthermore re-structured just over four years after its creation and relocated into 
the State Sea and Coastal Sustainability Office in Madrid.  
The key government policies to prevent, manage and compensate for oil spills in the 
aftermath of the Prestige with a special focus on the region of Galicia are analysed 
below.  
The National Salvage Plan (NSP) is a document that analyses the actions and 
investment plans for 2006-2009 in the field of maritime human salvage activities and 
pollution fighting (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006). With regards to ‘singular 
geographical locations and activities’ the plan states that special attention should be 
paid and actions taken should be guided towards protection of sensitive areas. The 
plan is vague as it does not give any guidance regarding the specific actions that would 
meet the protection requirements of the NSP. The NSP also describes a wealth of 
institutional agents involved in maritime salvage and pollution fighting activities and 
seeks greater coordination among the different bodies. The main institutions are 
described in table 2.7.1 below: 
Table 2.7.1 Institutions involved in oil spill management 
INSTITUTION DESCRIPTION
Coastal Autonomous 
(regional) Communities
Basque Country, Galicia, Cantabria, Andalusia, Asturias, Murcia, C. Valencia, 
Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla
Institutions in the 
Central Government 
Prime Minister's Office (CEPRECO, DISSC), Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and 
Food, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Defence, Home Office Ministry (Civil 
Guard, Civil Defence Services and Emergency Services) Ministry of Environment 
(State Coastal Office, State Biodiversity Office, State Environmental Evaluation 
and quality Office, National Meteorology Office), Ministry of Labour and Social 
Services, Ports and port Authorities
Other entities Spanish Red Cross, potential polluting firms, industrial associations
Other countries Neighbour countries: France, Portugal and Morocco  Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2006: 39) 
                                               
31
 Regulated by the Royal Decree 2182/2004 
 56 
The NSP in its final section describes the main investment items that amount to over 
1,000M€ in pollution fighting equipment, operating and management costs for 2006-
2009. The valuation section fails to analyse the reasons to allocate specific funds to the 
different items. No detailed description of the specific actions appears in the plan (e.g. 
allocating equipment to most sensitive areas within pollution fighting activities).  
The National Contingency Plan (NCP) is an operational document intended to provide 
policy-makers and civil servants with hands-on advice in oil spill management 
situations. The document clarifies the broad steps to be taken and agents involved in 
oil spill management as well as the activation of contingency plans as a response to oil 
spills (Ministerio de Fomento, 2001). In relation to the protection of environmental 
and economic resources it lacks specific information regarding for example which are 
the characteristics that define sensitive areas, which protection actions are to take 
place and how are these protection actions funded. The reason for this lack of 
specificity is related to the fact that many areas of competence (such as regional 
response to oil spills) are transferred to regional governments; invading those areas 
would be illegal. Delays in the development and implementation of regional 
contingency plans have hindered a coordinated response to oil spills.  
In any case, the National Contingency Plan requires access to information regarding 
sensitive areas, important resources, information regarding the areas that should be 
assigned a high priority for protection and information regarding the best means 
available to protect these areas. Thus, it would seem, on paper at least, that according 
to the NCP, there are priorities given and protection measures ensured for areas of 
special environmental, economic and social importance or vulnerability.  
The Regional Contingency Plan for Galicia (RCPG) aims to protect the marine 
environment through prevention and management strategies. According to Xunta de 
Galicia (2007) (regional government) the plan was developed following the mandate of 
the NCP and taking into account other territorial plans thus striving to develop a 
homogeneous response to oil spills in Spain. The fact that a myriad of institutions are 
still involved in oil spill management signals the potential coordination problem that 
may arise again in a future spill. In fact a civil servant consulted stated that as of March 
2010, they were working on reducing the number of institutions involved in oil spill 
management activities. In addition to this, there is an ‘operational coordinator’ for the 
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plan in the Civil Defence department. The fact that the equipment, personnel and 
funds largely belong to other (central) government institutions (i.e. the State Merchant 
Navy Office), again casts doubts on the effectiveness of such coordination capacity. 
Other key aspects of this plan are: first, it includes the mandate to use GIS32 to 
determine vulnerable areas but fails to inform about whether sacrifice areas33 or 
refuge areas34 are determined. It also lacks guidance on the equipment, skills and 
personnel needed to provide adequate preparedness, mitigation and recovery to 
priority protection areas.  Additionally, integration of research knowledge and 
institutions at national and international levels is contemplated. An example of this is 
the use of Environmental Sensitivity Indicator (mirroring the NOAA35 indicator) which is 
included in the plan alongside risk assessments. These result in classifying risks into 
unacceptable, tolerable and acceptable. For the former category the plan allows 
banning activities independently of the costs of doing so. Doubts remain regarding the 
politically feasible scenarios in which this mandate would take effect. Finally, no 
mandate is given in the plan to manage volunteers, should they be allowed to 
intervene again in future oil spills. 
The shock and public outrage caused by the Prestige oil spill plus the limited 
compensation paid by the international funds available (CLC and IOPC Funds) were 
coupled with the development of economic recovery plans by policy-makers at a 
regional and national level. These were the Plan Galicia 2003 (state level) and Plan de 
Dinamización Económica de Galicia – Plan Galicia (regional level). Society’s demand for 
prompt and effective response on the part of the Spanish authorities was exacerbated 
by the region’s economic divergence compared with Spanish development and GDP 
per capita36, its lack of infrastructures and its economic dependency on the industries 
(mainly fishing and tourism) that were more severely affected by the oil spill. Both 
plans, as will be shown below are largely directed towards investments in 
                                               
32
 GIS is the acronym for Geographical Information Systems. 
33
 Sacrifice areas are those that are selected to direct pollution in case of an oil spill, should this be 
technically and politically feasible. 
34
 Refuge areas are those where vessels can be directed and moored so that they are not exposed to rough 
weather conditions. Any port or estuary, provided it has enough depth of water, can be considered a 
refuge area. 
35
 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
36
 According to the Spanish National Statistics institute Spain’s GDP per capita in 2003 was 18,328€ and 
Galicia’s GDP per capita in 2003 was 14,496€.  
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infrastructures (man-made capital) and economic incentives to boost Galicia’s 
economy. The objectives of the two plans can be summarised in table 2.7.2 below: 
Table 2.7.2 State and autonomous community objectives for economic policy plans 
STATE LEVEL PLAN
(Plan Galicia 2003)
REGIONAL PLAN (2003-2006)
(Plan de Dinamización Económica de Galicia – 
Plan Galicia)
Environmental regeneration Territorial cohesion to reach 90% of Spain’s mean GDP by 2015.
Territorial cohesion Economic diversification and modernisation
Promotion of private investment in Galicia Recovery of economic dynamism experienced since the late 90’s
Economic diversification in Galicia
Increase added value of Galician products and 
improve working conditions for employees of 
affected economic sectors 
Promotion of Galician’s image  Sources: González Laxe (2003), Xunta de Galicia (2004a) and Xunta de Galicia (2004b) 
 
According to González Laxe (2003) out of the 12,459M€ invested in the state level plan 
(Plan Galicia 2003) 5,200M€ were new investments to accomplish the above stated 
objectives in order to mitigate the effects of the Prestige oil spill. The rest of the 
programmed investment was pending from other initiatives to boost the economy of 
the area. The investment is distributed as shown in table 2.7.3 below: 
Table 2.7.3 State level Plan (Plan Galicia 2003) 
PROPOSED ACTIONS QUANTITY (M€) PERIOD
Environmental recovery 1,000 Not specified
Economic aid for affected people Not specified Not specified
Transport infrastructure plan 6,481 2000 - 2007
New infrastructures (Motorways and high speed trains,
AVE) 3,622 Not specified
National Hydrology Plan in Galicia 481 2003 – 2008
Spanish Forestry Plan in Galicia 290 2003 – 2008
Financial aid 126.5* Not specified
Incentives to private investment 75* 2003 – 2006
Technology 34.6 2003 – 2005
Education 8* Not specified
Galician product promotion 10 Not specified
Fishing sector aid 38.4* Not specified
Ship building aid 6* 2003 – 2004
Tourist sector promotion 39.6* Not specified  Sources: González Laxe (2003), Xunta de Galicia (2004a,b). 
* Note these categories include some qualitative concepts. 
The following table (2.7.4) will present the regional economic recovery plan. In the 
following breakdown the first column indicates the different items to which the funds 
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are allocated. The second column indicates the total amount spent on each different 
items and the third column the additional ‘effort’ (new investment) made after the 
Prestige oil spill to improve the situation in Galicia.  
Table 2.7.4 Regional plan (Plan de Dinamización Económica de Galicia 2003-2006) 
PROPOSED ACTIONS
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT 
(M€)
ADDITIONAL EFFORT DUE TO 
PRESTIGE ACCIDENT (M€)
Infrastructures 1,033.75 648.88
Roads (2003 – 2008) 783 510.33
Ports 42.39 42.39
Industrial land 190.43 85
Electrification 11.63 4.85
Gasification 6.30 6.30
Fishing sector 320.65 155.53
Off-shore fishing 87.02 49.29
Aquiculture 15 15
Transformation industry 178.43 59.48
Port equipment 27 18.57
Recovery of unproductive areas 5 5
Education 7 7
Technology centres 1.20 1.20
R+D 43.10 43.10
Tourism 39.41 9.57
Commerce 57.77 3.75
Arts and crafts 2.56 1.74
Education 98.53 -
Incentives for employment 42.26 -
Incentives for investment 24.89 19.77
Total 1,662.91 882.33  Sources: González Laxe (2003) and Xunta de Galicia (2004b) 
 
The lack of unlimited liability for oil carriers and non-existent regional contingency 
plans37 plus increasing hydrocarbon traffic made pollution an increasingly likely and 
cheap option (in any spill in which the damage caused were larger than the 171M€ 
that were covered by the CLC38 and IOPC39 funds)40. The breakdown of both plans 
shows that investment is mainly directed towards building infrastructures (man-made 
capital)41. This meant a weak sustainability response (if viewed from the capital 
approach in the sustainability parlance). 
                                               
37
 until 2007 in the case of Galicia 
38
 CLC is the acronym for Civil Liability Convention 
39
 IOPC is the acronym for International Oil Pollution Compensation funds  
40
 This compensation quantity was raised to approximately 1,000M€ via a supplementary fund but the 
rationale is still applicable.  
41
 See figures in bold in tables 2.7.3 and 2.7.4 
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The follow-up of the investments publicised in the economic recovery plans (Plan 
Galicia) led to the analysis of a later document called the Strategic Plan for Transport 
and Infrastructures (PEIT 2005 - 2020 in its Spanish acronym). The PEIT took over the 
investments planned in the economic recovery plan but the document does not 
analyse in any detail what was finally invested nor the specific actions that were 
developed within the different items examined in the economic recovery plans. The 
PEIT states that one of the strategies that would be pursued implies the recognition of 
the Canary Islands and Galician waters as especially sensitive marine areas. The 
document does not analyse what this means, whether funds, personal and technical 
means would be allocated to monitor and protect those waters, nor does it analyse 
whether this would only imply that the existing means would be allocated to these 
areas first, or whether other initiatives would be developed.  
 
Property rights and the marine space and who owes compensation to whom? 
The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences defines property 
rights as ‘the right to use a particular item of property in a particular way. An item of 
property can be used in more than one way, as long as those different uses do not 
exclude each other. Therefore, there can be more than one property right attached to 
one item of property’ (12206 – 12206). In fact, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and 
Ostrom (2003) classify property rights in the following five categories: 
1. Access: Right to enter a given area 
2. Withdrawal: Right to extract resources 
3. Management: Right to determine the rules of use 
4. Exclusion: Right to allow or restrict access 
5. Alienation: Right to sell  
Ostrom (2003) further stresses that property rights inform about actions that can be 
taken as regards ‘things’. Property rights provide the owner(s) of a resource with the 
power to use it and to exclude others from use. According to Ogus (2004: 16) 
‘institutions within a society are given the authority to define the extent of an 
individual’s power of exclusion and to enforce that power against intruders, ultimately 
by threatening physical compulsion’. In terms of management and withdrawal rights 
Bromley and Cochrane (1994: 9) state ‘property … is a right to a benefit stream that is 
only as secure as the duty of others to respect the conditions that protect that stream’.  
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The types of goods that are subject to the above rights and ownership are routinely 
classified as private goods (easy to exclude and rival in nature), common-pool 
resources (difficult to exclude and rival in nature), club and toll goods (non-rival in 
nature and easy to exclude) and public goods (non-rival and non-excludable) (Prakash 
and Kollman, 2004). All these can be affected by accidental oil spills, as was clear in the 
Prestige spill given the widespread damage caused.  
Davidse et al. (1999) present a typology of ownership to which property rights accrue. 
These are summarised in the table 2.7.5 below.  
Table 2.7.5 Types of ownership of property 
Ownership of property Characteristics 
State Managing agencies (national, regional or local) determine use and access. Individuals have to abide by the established rules. 
Private Individuals or firms have socially acceptable use rights and duties. Society has to respect these rights.  
Common Shared resource where there are socially acceptable rules of use and maintenance.  
Non-Property 
The resource is open for all individuals to use. Rules governing use are 
restricted to how individuals should behave in society. Navigational 
regulations would be an example of the constraints that relate to this 
type of ownership. 
Source: Davidse (1999: 538) 
 
The ownership of rights is relevant to determine whether to use WTP or WTA. Pearce 
(2002) provides the rules of thumb according to which WTP should be used for 
quantity increases if survey respondents do not have the right to the improved 
situation. Alternatively, if those with standing in the valuation exercise have the right 
to an improved environment (or to a no-change situation) and they are faced with a 
reduction in environmental quantity (or quality) then WTA should be used. In practice 
however, WTP tends to be used (as we will see below), leading to what can be seen as 
a systematic undervaluation of environmental losses that may lead to suboptimal 
environmental policies.  
Property rights in relation to the marine space have evolved through time and are 
argued to involve all of the above types of goods, ownership and rights. The complex 
nature of the marine environment and the ill-protection that threatens marine 
resources (Hassan et al. 2005) make the analysis of rights, liability and compensation 
schemes of the essence in the development of credible compensation scenarios in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. The property rights applicable to the marine space have been 
traditionally characterised as non-property regarding their ownership. This view of the 
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sea as an open access resource resulted, among other factors, from the economic 
importance of maritime trade but this right has been transformed through time. 
Hence, free navigation has been increasingly restricted by requirements to protect the 
sea (see Tan, 2006) 
As argued by Clapp and Dauvergne (2005: 70) a state has, since the signature of the 
Treaty of Westfalia in 1648, ‘supreme authority to act within its territory’. The nature 
of transnational environmental problems, such as oil spills, and the emergence of 
international institutions such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have 
displaced some of the power (from states to international institutions) to enact rules. 
As argued by Wu (2002) it was not until 1969, in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon 
spill that international law, under the IMO, regulated compensation for oil pollution 
damage. Compensation was by the end of the 60’s paid through the Civil Liability 
Convention (CLC69) were the ship owner was strictly liable (no guilt had to be proven 
by victims to receive compensation although victims had to demonstrate the damage 
suffered). In 1971, the International Fund for the Compensation for Oil pollution 
damage (IOPC fund) was created as an additional compensation tier that 
complemented the CLC and that was financed by oil companies. So, ship owners and 
oil companies (loosely speaking, the polluter) provide since the late 60’s compensation 
for the damages caused by oil spills although this compensation is limited in quantity 
and in the type of damages covered. This leaves ample scope for governments to step 
in and compensate for those damages not covered by international compensation 
mechanisms.  
Ever increasing damages caused by accidental oil spills such as the Amocco Cadiz and 
the Tanio, among others, exposed the limits of existing compensation mechanisms as 
the available funds were not enough to compensate for the damages caused (Wu, 
2002; González Laxe, 2005). This led to the 1984 protocols that increased 
compensation amounts. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez was a turning point in US legislation 
that gave rise to a schism in international oil spill legislation and compensation rules. 
Since then, the US is subject to the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (stricter and with higher 
compensation requirements that have been revised after the BP spill). Limited liability 
and compensation under IMO rules (which apply to the EU) has remained entrenched 
in international compensation systems and it continues to be the case to date. In fact, 
according to the IOPC fund as regards the Prestige: 
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‘The maximum amount available for compensation under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and 
the 1992 Fund Convention in respect of the Prestige incident is €171.5 million (£148.7 million). 
The figures given in May 2003 by the Governments of the three States affected by the incident, 
Spain, France and Portugal, as to the damage caused indicated that the total amount of the 
damage could be as high as €1 050 million (£910.1 million). Under the 1992 Conventions, the 
Fund has to give all claimants equal treatment. The Executive Committee therefore decided in 
May 2003 that the 1992 Fund's payments should be for the time being limited to 15% of the loss 
or damage actually suffered by each individual claimant as assessed by the 1992 Fund's experts. 
The Committee reconsidered the payment level several times but decided, as late as in June 
2005, that the level of 15% should be maintained’. 
Source: http://www.iopcfund.org/prestige.htm 
 
Although as of March 2005 the compensation amount was raised to 750 million special 
drawing rights (under 1,000 million Euros), this is clearly insufficient to compensate for 
the damages caused by large scale accidental oil spills.  The lack of retroactivity implied 
that this higher compensation limit did not apply to the damages caused by the 
Prestige spill. 
Damages that are larger than the maximum amount that can be compensated or 
different in type (e.g. non-use values lost), damages occurring outside territorial 
waters or the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and interim damages are borne by 
governments and by society. What is covered by the compensation mechanism, 
classified as ‘damage’, includes: preventive measures, ‘reasonable’ measures of 
reinstatement, property loss, consequential loss and pure economic loss.  
According to the above analysis polluters ‘owe’ compensation to directly affected 
parties according to IMO applicable rules. But this compensation is limited in type and 
quantity. Even though at the EU level the Environmental Liability Directive 
(2004/35/CE) could have potentially implied filling the gap of international 
compensation mechanisms, the EU Environmental Liability Directive (that provides the 
framework for implementing the polluter pays principle, preventing and remedying 
environmental damage) excludes oil spills from its reach. Article 4.2 states ‘This 
Directive shall not apply to environmental damage or to any imminent threat of such 
damage arising from an incident in respect of which liability or compensation falls 
within the scope of any of the International Conventions listed in Annex IV, including 
any future amendments thereof, which is in force in the Member State concerned’ (L 
143/59). The international conventions referred to in annex IV include the following42:  
 
                                               
42
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:EN:PDF 
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Box 2.7.1 Annex IV. EU Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/CE). Exclusions  
(a) The International Convention of 27 November 1992 on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; 
(b) The International Convention of 27 November 1992 on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage; 
(c) The International Convention of 23 March 2001 on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage; 
(d) The International Convention of 3 May 1996 on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea; 
(e) The Convention of 10 October 1989 on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels. 
The Spanish Law that transposes the EU Directive (Ley 26/2007) in its article 3.5 
follows the EU spirit in that it excludes damages that are ‘covered’ by international 
agreements.  
In Spain, Article 45 of the Constitution states that, ‘all individuals have the right to 
enjoy an adequate environment that enables their appropriate development as well as 
the duty to preserve it. The authorities will watch over the rational use of all natural 
resources in order to protect and improve the quality of life and protect and restore 
the environment, supported by the indispensable collective solidarity’ (López Guerra, 
1994: 55)43. There is hence a constitutional mandate for the Spanish government to 
protect and restore the environment. Governments, as argued above, can step in to 
compensate society for the damages caused by oil spill. As no pre-established 
regulations exist for this government intervention and given the fact that society funds 
through their tax payments additional compensation, it seems reasonable to ask what 
type of compensation society wants. This is the core subject discussed in chapter 4.    
Expectations of compensation and compensation exercise 
In Spain laws and royal decrees have been passed after major spills to regulate 
compensation44. The vast majority of claimants after the Prestige spill received money 
from the Spanish government. Then the government claimed before the IOPC Funds45. 
Claimants in Spain forfeited their right to future compensations when they accepted 
the governments’ funds. This is an interesting feature of the way compensation is 
claimed which is different from that of other European countries such as France for 
example where affected parties did not receive compensation from their government 
                                               
43
 Author’s translation. 
44
 The legislation passed after the Prestige included the Real Decreto Ley 4/2003 de 20 de junio and Real 
Decreto Ley 4/2004 de 2 de julio 
45
 http://www.iopcfund-docs.org/ds/pdf/92exc32-4-1_s.pdf 
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and claimed compensation directly from the international funds available under the 
CLC 92 and the IOPCF when the Erika spill happened.   
The existing compensation process means that Spanish citizens, through their tax 
payments, end up funding compensation that is not paid for by the international 
instruments at hand. Hence, compensation for damages over and above the existing 
compensation limits and compensation for non-use values lost is not included in 
existing international compensation schemes. This is illustrated by one of the elite 
interviewees involved in the coordination of prevention and management plans who 
stated ‘the issue is that the IOPCF compensated for 15% to 30% of the damages 
suffered and the Spanish Government paid compensation for 100% of the damages’.  
Given the above information and striving to replicate credible, understandable and 
feasible compensation scenarios, survey respondents were told that the government 
would provide additional compensation (in the form of man-made capital, social 
capital and natural capital). Compensation exercises in future research could tell 
respondents that compensation would be provided by different institutions (other 
than the government) in order to test whether the compensation provider has a 
bearing on the choice of the preferred compensation option. Changing the 
compensation provider would detract from the reality of current compensation 
schemes (and perhaps from the credibility of the exercise) but it would allow testing 
the effect of different compensation providers over the compensation preferences.  
To conclude, the policies and plans analysed in this section make repeated references 
to environmental protection. They contemplate the use of tools such as bans to 
protect the environment. But overall no clear protection goals are set. There is a lack 
of detailed monitoring, verification and protection instruments to ensure sustainable 
management of environmental resources. Compensation is provided ad hoc after 
spills, and government investments to boost the economy emphasise investments in 
man-made capital without providing the rationale for this choice. Authorities’ 
engagement with citizen preferences in these situations was nowhere to be seen. 
These gaps are explored in the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
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2.8 Final remarks 
 Economics has been concerned with scarcity of resources for centuries. The 
beginning of the XXI century with a crowded world and ever increasing demand for 
resources and for waste absorptive capacity has broadened the reach of that 
traditional concern. The analysis of sustainability (i.e. concerned about enduring 
development), has produced a vast amount of literature which has not been matched 
by empirical analysis. This is so especially in areas such as water pollution.  
Weak and strong sustainability paradigms emerged by the end of the 80’s as a 
framework that could encompass most views regarding economic development and 
the use of environmental sources and sinks. Pursuing weak or strong sustainability has 
however very different implications regarding the environment. Weak sustainability 
assumes a modified neoclassical welfare economic framework of unlimited 
substitution, trade-offs, rational individuals and actual compensation for welfare 
losses. Strong sustainability limits substitution, acknowledges the existence of a special 
type of capital (natural capital) to be preserved, accommodates better the idea of 
lexicographic preferences and hence is osmotic to the possibility of limited 
compensation for certain environmental losses.  
Strong sustainability has nevertheless made its way to a certain extent both to the 
empirical academic research arena and to the regulatory realm. The existence of the 
Environmental Liability Directive is one such example. Academic analysis of the 
applications of Habitat and Resource Equivalency analysis such as those undertaken by 
Ozdemiroglu et al. (2009) provide an enquiry into how much natural capital is enough 
to compensate for an environmental loss.  
The analysis of what type of capital would be adequate to compensate for an 
environmental loss is however missing from the academic empirical analysis. This is 
one of the theoretical contributions of this thesis. It explores whether compensation is 
seen as adequate and desirable when environmental damages occur and if so, the 
types of capital preferred as compensation (and hence preferences for weak or strong 
sustainability). Given the exploratory nature of this enquiry, in addition to the 
contributions from the literature, a specific context is used to ground the analysis, that 
of water pollution due to oil spills. This is done by comparing and contrasting the views 
of elites and citizens through a multi-method approach that combines qualitative data 
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from elite interviews and focus groups with quantitative data from an in-person 
survey. 
Existing literature acknowledges the scant analysis of the costs and benefits of 
sustainability (Atkinson et al. 1997). The non-marketed nature of non-use values 
provides scope for fruitful cross-fertilization of sustainability and valuation via stated 
preference techniques. The contingent valuation study used in the last part of the 
empirical analysis in this thesis will strive to explore the benefits of preserving natural 
capital at risk of oil spills of different sizes and consequences, including a situation in 
which irreversible losses may occur.   
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERT AND PUBLIC PREFERENCES IN 
THE SUSTAINABILITY DEBATE.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The literature review chapter highlighted the relevance of multiple agents in 
the pursuit of sustainability. It also stressed the need for better scientific information 
as well as the need for inputs from citizens in order to choose socially acceptable 
sustainability paths. Additionally, a lack of data on whether elites’ and citizens’ views 
on sustainability coincided was discussed.  
In order to explore the above issues, this chapter will analyse the similarities and 
differences between experts’ views and those of citizens as regards sustainability. This 
will entail looking into issues related to substitutability of natural resources, 
compensation, limits, thresholds, irreversible losses and preservation of natural 
capital. This will be done by using qualitative methods. Elite interviews and focus 
groups (FG) of citizens were conducted to engage in this analysis.  
The combination of expert knowledge and public knowledge has been advocated by 
researchers on a variety of settings. According to Yearly (2000: 105) ‘In case after case, 
it has been suggested that “expert” accounts of physical reality have conflicted with 
local people’s knowledge and that rather than local knowledge being routinely inferior 
and defective, it has commonly proven more sensitive to local ‘realities’’. Additionally, 
(Bäckstrand, 2003) claims that a balance between expert knowledge and public 
participation in the context of sustainable development is called for when dealing with 
global environmental issues. Although the scope of this thesis is mainly national, the 
consequences of oil spills are known to sometimes affect various countries. There are 
furthermore clear links between national oil spill management and international 
environmental management as maritime transport is global in nature. 
Elite interviews and focus group discussions are hypothesised to be able to shed light 
on the policy paradigm that was applicable in Spain in the aftermath of the Prestige.  
The results from these methods were also expected to aid in understanding whether 
the myriad of plans, policies and regulations that emerged after the Prestige could 
signal towards the uptake of a particular sustainability paradigm in the context of oil 
spill management.  
This chapter will therefore compare the inputs of experts (with specialised knowledge) 
to the views of FG participants (as ‘lay citizens’ with local knowledge whose 
 70 
acceptance and engagement with the behavioural requirements of sustainable 
development are indispensable). As acknowledged by Macnaghten and Jacobs (1997: 
5) ‘public support or identification is important if sustainable development is to have a 
significant effect on policy’.  
The value of this research can be summarised in three areas. It can enrich the ongoing 
paradigmatic debate between weak sustainability and strong sustainability by 
exploring citizen perceptions of public policies as well as elites’ analysis of public 
policies. It can also provide a practical example of how civic science46 can be 
implemented as regards oil spill management. In the present thesis citizen views have 
been integrated with expert knowledge to produce a set of policy options from which 
a representative sample chose their preferred management options. This top-down47 
plus bottom-up48 approach, if included in future decision-making processes, could 
increase participation and thus could arguably help democratise decision-making in 
this area. This approach tests what citizens want in terms of compensation and 
prevention when environmental damages (in this case an oil spill) happen, taking into 
account the politically feasible policy scenarios set by elites. The main applied 
contribution of this chapter is the attempt to include a wealth of actors and 
representatives in the analysis and design of compensation ‘packages’ and prevention 
strategies (in order to preserve natural capital), comparing and contrasting their views.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the 
policy-making process as a framework for understanding the management of 
environmental damages. It also reflects on how different agents involved in (or 
affecting) the policy process have perceived past environmental damages. Section 3.3 
introduces the main content of the elite interview and focus groups analysis and 
discusses the process followed to conduct first the elite interviews, and, later on, the 
focus groups. Section 3.4 presents and critically analyses the similarities and 
differences between elite interviews and focus groups with regards to sustainable 
development. The analysis is undertaken by using the framework that Roberts (2004) 
                                               
46
 ‘Civic science has been defined as the efforts by scientists to reach out to the public, communicate 
scientific results and contribute to scientific literacy’ (Bäckstrand, 2003: 28). The use of ‘civic science’ is 
said to be able to tackle two of the main on-going problems that undermine scientific knowledge, lack of 
trust by the public and increase in the democratization of science (ibid.) 
47
 Which can be seen as responding to a ‘deficit’ model in which the public is seen as lacking the 
scientific ‘facts’ 
48
 Which entails a ‘democratic’ model establishing a more fruitful exchange between experts and citizens. 
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uses as a heuristic device to present the workings of policies. Section 3.5 concludes 
with a brief discussion of the main findings.  
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3.2 Regulation, the policy process and environmentalism: a 
framework for understanding oil spills  
Regulation is a steering activity (Ogus, 2004 and Eisner, 2007). It is multi-
faceted and context-dependent. It may entail public and private intervention at various 
administrative and institutional levels. Regulation in the environmental realm is 
directed to managing sources and sinks through policies. This section will analyse 
regulation, the main policy paradigms relevant to the thesis and the policy cycle as a 
framework for understanding oil spill management. The section will also briefly hint to 
the social and political nature of environmental damage assessment, within the policy 
environment, as a basis for understanding the contributions of elites and focus groups 
in the pursuit of sustainable development. 
A variety of reasons explain why societies enact policies to steer activities. These 
reasons include wanting to act in the ‘public interest’ by means of keeping private 
interests in check (Eisner, 2007). Another driver of regulation is the existence of private 
interests with powerful groups (mainly economic and social elites) that have access to 
and influence on decision-making processes. Baldwin and Cave (1999) additionally 
acknowledge the existence of ‘shared ideas’ regarding what should be done as the 
basis for regulation. Institutional theories argue that existing institutions49 structure 
interactions and behaviours subject to their hard to change (path-dependent) rules. 
From an economic perspective the reasons for regulating activities such as maritime 
transport can be based on the existence of market failures that lead to inefficient 
outcomes. Regulation would thus try to produce efficient outcomes by facilitating or 
imposing the internalisation of externalities, providing information, securing and 
enforcing property rights, etc.  
Two policy paradigms are relevant to this thesis: the traditional policy paradigm and an 
alternative paradigm, sustainable development. The traditional policy paradigm has 
been more concerned about economic growth than about environmental problems. 
Environmental policy has therefore been reactive in nature (Viñas, 2009). This policy 
paradigm has largely provided end-of-pipe solutions rather than proactive responses. 
                                               
49
 Understood as ‘prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive and structured 
interactions including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, 
private associations and governments at all scales’ (Ostrom, 2005: 3) 
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This paradigm has also suffered from a policy implementation deficit whereby policies 
have been enacted but delays in implementation and lack of action have occurred. 
Current environmental problems and threats have shown the limitations of the 
traditional policy paradigm. In the past decades it became increasingly clear that this 
traditional policy paradigm was ‘unfit’ to deal with complex environmental problems. 
According to Carter (2007) an alternative paradigm, sustainable development, 
emerged, at least in theory, to reconcile, through regulation and policies, activities that 
foster economic growth and environmental protection. The characteristics of this 
alternative paradigm include an anticipatory or proactive response to environmental 
problems, a holistic (system-wide) response, the strategic framing of solutions and 
increased efforts to ensure full implementation of polices. The extent to which there 
has been an effective shift in the dominant policy paradigm is debatable although 
some progress has been seen (e.g. the EU Environmental Liability Directive).   
It is well known that environmental policies develop in ‘predictable and messy cycles’ 
that involve various steps. The first step is setting policy agendas. This implies socially 
constructing what will be considered important and worthy of policy action. This is 
done through the framing of environmental problems by agents and institutions that 
have unequal access and weight in the policy-making process. The second step entails 
formulating and adopting policies. The third step implies implementing policies. The 
final stage evaluates and reformulates policies.  
In order to analyse the results of elite interviews and focus groups in a systematic way, 
the policy process heuristic by Roberts (2004) is used. This is reproduced in figure 3.2.1 
below and briefly explained because it will be used in this chapter to explain and 
compare the results obtained from elite interviews with the results obtained from the 
focus groups in the analysis of sustainable development.  
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Figure 3.2.1 The Policy-making process at the government level 
 
Source: Roberts (2004: 140) 
The above figure shows in a stylised format the core elements of the policy-making 
cycle. On the left hand side, policy inputs influence the outcomes of the process.  
These inputs include the demands from interest groups. Interest groups may be either 
‘sectional’ (which represent a set of economic interests or a ‘class’ of people such as 
lobbies) or ‘cause’ groups (which promote for example environmental ideas which are 
beyond self-interested motives). The former tend to be more powerful, more cohesive 
in defending their interests and have greater access and influence on decision-making 
processes. The next input is labelled supports. The core idea is that policies and 
governments are dependent on the support of their citizens to be able to implement 
and maintain policies. The final input is labelled resources. Under this broad heading 
personnel, technical resources and skills are acknowledged to be the core elements of 
any successful policy.   
On the upper part of figure 3.2.1 we find the policy environment. This refers to the 
context in which policies arise. The political situation (e.g. pre-election time or 
budgetary allocation periods), the economic context (e.g. crises or growth periods), 
cultural factors or environmental crises (e.g. an oil spill) shape the policy agenda. The 
way in which issues come in and wane away in the policy realm can be explained with 
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reference to Downs’ Issue Attention Cycle (Downs, 1972). The stages in the issue 
attention cycle are five: 
1. Pre-problem stage. There is data on a given problem (say oil spills) but neither 
the public nor the media or policy makers are paying attention to it. Other 
groups such as environmental NGO’s or scientists may be concerned.  
2. Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm. In the aftermath of an 
environmental crisis for example, the media, the public and policy makers tend 
to become aware and show, in most cases, short-lived concern about an issue. 
This concern is coupled with the confidence in the existing capability to solve 
the problem. Programs are designed, policies enacted and institutions created 
to deal with the problem at hand.  
3. Realising the cost of significant progress. Complex problems tend to call for 
multi-dimensional and costly solutions rather than ‘off the shelf’ technical fixes. 
Agents in the policy cycle realise this during the third stage. 
4. Gradual decline of intense public interest. The realisation that the problem is 
difficult to solve implies a reduction in the interest shown by society that may 
take the form of being bored with the issue, being too scared to act or feeling 
they cannot do anything meaningful to solve the problem.  
5. The post-problem stage. The issue is not permanently ‘in people’s minds’ 
anymore but certain institutions and programs may stay. These will serve as an 
existing institutional setting for future occurrences in which the problem is 
propelled again into the policy agenda.  
According to Downs, his depiction is valid when the issue under scrutiny affects a low 
percentage of the population directly, when the issue is the result of a pre-existing 
social arrangement that benefits a powerful minority and when there are other 
concerns competing for public and policy attention. These three pre-conditions hold 
when analysing environmental damages such as those caused by oil spills. 
Crisis management literature within the analysis of public policy claims that ‘problems 
do not exist objectively as much as they do in perception’ (Birkland and Lawrence, 
2002: 17). This idea of the relevance of public perceptions plus the above reflections 
on the relevance of the policy environment and the issue attention cycle provide the 
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rationale for considering agents’ perceptions in crisis situations (such as the natural 
disasters and industrial accidents) as relevant variables in understanding policies such 
as those that relate to compensation and prevention.  
Natural disasters and industrial accidents50  such as accidental oil spills can be seen as 
sudden, uncommon, harmful events that affect a given area or interest group. These 
events are known simultaneously to policy-makers and to the public (Birkland, 1998: 
54). The analysis of crisis events such as the ones caused by inappropriate product 
management, chemical leaks that caused for example the Bhopal disaster in India, the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident, or the Exxon Valdez accidental oil spill in Alaska are 
relevant to this thesis as they present common features that can help understand 
public perceptions of these events. 
As argued by Birkland (1998), if we focus on oil spills, these are visible incidents that 
are presented to the public through ‘compelling’ pictures of oiled animals, dirty 
beaches or lost infrastructures. The media propels these images into the public sphere 
facilitating greater attention is paid to the issue. In fact, Parker and Deane (1997) 
revealed that man-made disasters, natural disasters and military interventions are the 
‘stories’ that people follow the most. The Exxon Valdez oil spill for example was one of 
the top 20 stories most followed in the news of the decade analysed by the above 
authors51. This in turn leads to negative assessments of the existing preparedness and 
management policies (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 in Brikland, 1998). Whether this 
was also the case in the aftermath of the Prestige oil spill was explored in the elite 
interviews and in the focus groups.  
Some of the key factors that help shape perceptions regarding a given problem 
include: how the media presents the issue i.e. the information received by civil society, 
how the rest of the industry backs (or fails to back) the explanation of the event, the 
reaction and credibility of the perceived ‘culprit’ or the reactions by other agents 
(NGO’s, the government, etc.) among other factors. In any case, if an identifiable 
                                               
50
 Named focusing events by some public policy scholars due to their capacity to change issues in the 
policy agenda and to the mobilisation of interest groups (Birkland, 1998) 
51
 It may occur however that such an emphasis in the media on the visible consequences leaves less room 
to explore proximate causes of environmental damage such as polluters liability being capped and hence 
failing to provide incentives for greater safety measures. Broader debates regarding oil dependency and 
fuel switching also appear but with less force, arguably due to the issue being purposefully left out of the 
agenda by powerful agents. These issue may however be discussed by elites and by focus groups, as was 
the case in this thesis.    
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polluter exists, it is likely that it will face lasting public opposition (Silva, 1995 in 
Birkland and Nath, 2000). 
Negative assessment and public opposition are acknowledged to be drivers of policy 
demands and these demands can be facilitators of policy changes (Birkland, 1998). A 
recent example of this would be the increases in operational safety measures 
recommended by the US Department of the Interior (Home Office) in the aftermath of 
the Deepwater Horizon spill52. The extent to which environmental damages spur 
effective changes will however depend on several factors among which the 
consequences of the damage and their visibility can play a significant role. This was the 
case in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill with the passing of the Oil Pollution 
Act (OPA) 1990 and in the case of the Prestige with the implementation of new safety 
regulations for hydrocarbon shipping53. 
In the Spanish context, there exists a limited amount of research on public opinion and 
perceptions regarding environmental problems and policies to arrest these problems 
(Moyano et al. 2009). In this sense, in order to understand civil society perceptions of 
environmental damages and of the policies implemented to mitigate them it can be 
useful to briefly portray the development of the environmental movement in Spain. 
This information will help contextualise and understand the views of citizens and elites 
regarding SD. 
In Spain, new social movements such as environmentalism emerged later than in other 
countries due to the transition from a dictatorial regime to a democracy (Jiménez, 
2007). This historical context also made the movement somewhat different from that 
of other countries in that initially, in the late 70’s, Spanish environmentalism was 
hardly interconnected to other environmental movements and it was by and large less 
violent (ibid.).  
Environmentalism in Spain initially focused its attention on local environmental 
problems such as nuclear power plant locations or the preservation of local habitats or 
charismatic species. Political parties were at this stage detached from the 
environmental movement and hence the assessment of the public management of 
                                               
52
 See http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598 
53
 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/safety/doc/2007_03_memo_maritime_safety_en.pdf 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/safety/third_maritime_safety_package_en.htm 
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environmental problems was characterised by open opposition and criticism towards 
for example energy policy decisions. In fact, a significant number of environmental 
organisations even avoided receiving funding from the government or from 
international institutions such as the EU or from private firms due to opposition to 
their environmental policies. 
 Later, in the 90’s, the environmental movement allied with the trade unions 
(Comisiones Obreras) as well as with left wing parties (Izquierda Unida). During this 
decade the Spanish environmental movement broadened its scope in terms of the 
issues covered and the channels through which they would seek to influence policy-
making. In this sense, the environmental movement started using both institutional 
channels and the media to voice their claims. It is also argued that environmental 
policy-making has been permeable to the demands of the environmental movement in 
part due to the increased capacity of the latter to organise protests (see Jiménez, 
2003). These protests have been significant in issues such as industrial waste and 
water management policies.  
In the early part of the 2000’s, prominent protests with high participation in 
demonstrations included those organised against the management of the Prestige oil 
spill. These demonstrations that took place in various cities in Spain can be 
contextualised as part of civil society’s disapproval of the governing party’s general 
policies (Jiménez, 2007). This overview is relevant in order to understand both the 
design and implementation of compensation and prevention programs after the 
Prestige and citizens’ perceptions as regards these compensation and prevention 
programs. 
Coming back to the explanation of the policy-making process both policy inputs and 
policy environment influence governments. As for the government, the role of 
ministers, civil servants and advisors will be relevant in determining what type of 
actions or outputs result from decision-making processes. This implied, in this thesis, 
the need to interview policy-makers and civil servants at different administrative levels 
from different departments. Policy outputs will imply enacting programs and policies, 
passing new legislation, mandating the use of policy tools, etc.  
Although, in theory, decisions can be made ‘rationally and in a comprehensive fashion’ 
(i.e. setting goals and analysing all the avenues by which they can be met), this is not 
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normally the case, partly due to the limited time and resources. Rather, an incremental 
approach whereby small changes in policies (outputs and outcomes) tend to take 
place. In this incremental approach, starting from the status quo, only those 
alternatives that are feasible and would achieve consensus are considered. An 
additional model is analysed by Roberts (2004), the mixed scanning decision-making. 
The consequences of different courses of action are considered in order to act. Both 
radical changes and incremental changes can happen under this model.  
Despite the existence of well known obstacles to change in the policy realm (e.g. 
strong economic interests or administrative fragmentation) there are factors that 
facilitate change. These include, among others, the existence of crises or the surge of 
new environmental problems that have no known solutions.  
 
Importance of citizen input into oil spill policy 
 
From a theoretical perspective, and following the policy-making heuristic used in the 
thesis, citizen support is seen as one of the many variables that have a bearing on the 
ability of governments to implement and maintain policies. This is so as active or at 
least passive acceptance by the citizens is seen as essential in supporting policies 
(Roberts, 2004; Connelly and Smith, 2003). Additionally, Macnaghten (1997: 5) claims 
that ‘public support or identification is important if sustainable development is to have 
a significant effect in policy’. Citizen input is also built in the agenda setting stage of 
the policy-making process as public attention is known to drive some actions (mainly 
reactive) of policy-makers, as was discussed by elite interviewees. As regards Downs’ 
(1972) Issue Attention Cycle, phase two (in which there is ‘alarmed discovery and 
euphoric enthusiasm’ about a given environmental problem and its solution) is driven 
by the (often short-lived) concern of the media, the public and policy-makers.   
 
Busenberg (2000) analyses the relevance of citizens (and in particular of the financial 
resources these agents have) in the outcomes of environmental policies to protect the 
marine space from accidental oil spills in the US. In his paper Busenberg describes how 
citizens were integrated into the Regional Citizens Advisory Council (RCAC) that was 
created in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill off the coast of Prince William in 
Alaska in 1989. Through the analysis of five different case studies the above mentioned 
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author concludes that the input of citizens in successful policy outcomes depends not 
only on the resources of citizens (known as the resource hypothesis) but also on the 
support for the proposed oil spill prevention and management policies by other 
influential groups such as policy-makers, the oil industry or environmental protection 
agencies. 
 
Citizen support is therefore only one of the many inputs in decision-making processes. 
Demands for environmental policies by various groups in society plus the availability of 
resources (manpower, skills, technology and funds) are further policy inputs that affect 
government decisions. The role of other stakeholders such as powerful business 
associations, the political, economic and social background, the role of civil servants 
and policy-makers all shape the outputs and the outcomes of policies (Roberts, 2004).  
 
In terms of the influence of various groups, several theories explain the weight of 
different actors in shaping policy. Connelly and Smith (2003) argue that unequal power 
and influence will determine success in policy-making. The most powerful and 
influential agents will have a disproportionate weight in the outcomes of policy-making 
processes. Additionally, public opinion is seen as fickle and fragmented, hence 
exercising only punctuated pressure upon governments to react. As González (2001: 1) 
claims environmental policies ‘are regarded as evidence that science and public action 
can triumph over corporate power and vested economic interests…(but) the 
imperatives of capitalism, and the preferences of the dominant elites within it, 
overshadow science and the general public in the formation and implementation of 
even environmental policies’.  
 
González (2001) summarises existing competing models that analyse policy 
formulation in terms of the power of different interest groups, the coordinated or 
fragmented behaviour of business, the determination of policy-making and the policy 
outcomes. Table 3.2.1 below presents the current competing models of policy-making.  
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Table 3.2.1 Competing policy-making models 
Policy-
formulation 
model 
Loci of Political Power Business Political Behaviour 
Description of Policy 
Formulation Process Policy Outcomes 
Pluralism 
Numerous interest 
groups and elected 
officials 
Fragmented 
Interest groups, 
rooted in different 
segments of society, 
competing vigorously 
Shaped by competing 
interests groups and 
elected officials 
Plural elite Various interest groups  
Coordinated to 
limited extent 
through trade 
associations 
Different interest  
groups, especially  
business groups, 
dominating different 
policy areas 
Special interests 
determine the content 
of narrowly 
constructed policies 
State 
autonomy/Issue 
networks 
State officials 
supported by issue 
networks 
Fragmented 
State officials draw 
ideas, plans and 
support from issue 
networks to develop 
policies 
Appointed and 
elected officials 
determine the content 
of policies 
Economic elite 
Individuals of wealth 
and corporate 
decision-makers 
Largely 
coordinated 
through policy-
planning 
networks and 
other social 
business 
institutions 
Economic elites, 
operating through 
policy-planning 
networks,  dominate 
the policy formulation  
process 
The policy preferences 
of economic elites 
pre-dominate 
Source: González (2001: 19) 
 
The results obtained from the analysis of elite interviews in the thesis are in accordance 
with the expectations set out above by scholars such as Connelly and Smith (2003) and 
González (2001). Hence, the economic elites are capable of shaping environmental 
policies. In this sense, elite interviewees did not seem to demand participatory 
approaches to decide which policies to adopt to respond to oil spills. Experts did 
however recognise the relevance of communication with non-experts (civic science as 
defined by Bäckstrand, 2003) as well as the fact that pressure by civil society has 
forced government action in the aftermath of oil spills such as the Prestige.  
 
The limited amount of elite interviews conducted precludes any overarching 
conclusion stating that citizen input has been ‘important’ in policy-making. What 
could, at best, be argued in the light of demonstrations, voluntary work, institutions 
set up in the aftermath of the spill and investment plans to reinvigorate the economy, 
is that citizen input was one of many variables shaping policy.  
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The policy-making process described above will be used as a broad framework for 
understanding and analysing sustainable development in the context of oil spill 
preparedness and management as seen by elites and by focus group participants. 
Before presenting the key results, the next section will briefly discuss the methods 
used.  
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3.3 Qualitative methods 
This section will introduce the qualitative research methods used in the present 
thesis and it will explore the process followed to conduct elite interviews and focus 
groups.  
Elite interviews  
Dexter (1970: 5-6) defines elite interviews as ‘an interview with any interviewee who in 
terms of the current purpose of the interviewer is given special, non-standardized 
treatment... the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach 
him what the problem, the question, the situation is. These elites are normally 
considered influential, prominent or well informed’. 
The basic advantage of qualitative interviews is the wealth of details and topics that 
may be addressed in this type of interviews. A further advantage according to Dexter 
(1970: 50) is that the ‘interviewer can adapt his comments and questions to the 
unfolding interaction between himself and the interviewee’. It is a flexible exploratory 
tool which allows respondents to answer in their preferred manner without forcing 
them to adhere to any set of fixed answers. It also allows seeking further clarifications 
and nuances to responses when interviewees provide partial or unfocused answers. 
Reasons for taking action can also be uncovered by qualitative interviews (Burton, 
2000).  
The limitations of this approach derive from the lack of representative samples in 
qualitative interviews and the consequential lack of explanatory power in terms of the 
entire population. The conclusions that will be discussed in the present chapter will 
therefore be logical conclusions drawn from the interviews. Another limitation of the 
method lies in the fact that questionnaires cover a similar number of topics in the 
majority of cases, but each respondent has been chosen due to his/her specific 
expertise, knowledge or involvement in the decision-making and / or implementation 
process. This means there may be questions and answers that are only relevant to a 
particular interviewee and are not replicable (ibid.).  
Oil spill prevention, management and compensation schemes are largely shaped by 
political elites and are implemented under the supervision of policy-makers and civil 
servants. Additionally, decision-making is an evolving process especially in oil spill 
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management given the ‘regulatory momentum’ spurred by the Prestige (Tan, 2006). 
This means reports are not always available and / or public. It therefore seemed 
reasonable to assume that direct contact with policy makers involved in oil spill 
management plans would provide otherwise hard to access or unavailable data. For 
these reasons, qualitative elite interviews were chosen as the research method to 
unveil the current decision-making process, actions and shortcomings in oil spill 
management plans as well as the recommendations for future spills.  
The main purpose of the interviews is to obtain data relevant to the analysis of 
sustainable development in the context of oil spill management, organise this 
information in a systematic way, analyse the salient issues and integrate these issues 
into the SD theoretical framework. This could arguably help future decision-making 
processes. Thus, interviews will be used as the ‘basis for generating the framework for 
further research’ (Gaskell, 2005: 39). This further research consists of the focus groups, 
the pilots and the survey. The mixed methodological approach aims to provide useful 
and accessible data to determine the socially preferred response to oil spills and its 
relationship to sustainable development.  
Focus groups 
Focus groups (FG) can be defined as qualitative research (Morgan, 1997) in which an 
interaction among a reduced number of people is maintained. During this interaction 
various topics are debated for a limited amount of time, typically between one and 
two hours. A moderator facilitates the discussion and probes respondents in order to 
explore participants’ views on the research topics of interest. The interaction among 
group members enables the researcher to explore attitudes, behaviours, thoughts, 
agreements and disagreements. Focus groups were conducted primarily to understand 
citizens’ views on sustainability in oil spill settings. General issues of concern and 
hypothetical situations can be explored through focus groups. The use of focus groups 
enables the researcher to understand and get acquainted with the ‘local language’ 
used by participants to talk about a given issue (Gaskell, 2005). All these features of FG 
help understand the knowledge, attitudes and intentions of citizens as regards 
sustainable development.  
Focus groups can be used in isolation as a method to gather data or in combination to 
supplement or add to information that has been collected through other methods 
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(Morgan, 1996, 1997). In the present thesis focus groups have been used as a 
supplementary tool to elite interviews and as a previous step to the design of the 
survey. The use of both focus groups and surveys is one of the ‘most practical ways of 
bringing together qualitative and quantitative methods’ (Morgan, 1996: 136). This 
methodological approach is especially appealing when analysing complex situations 
such as the ones created by oil spills and their management, as it will allows 
interpreting and contextualizing responses to surveys.  
The main advantages of using focus groups are, according to Gaskell (2005), firstly, the 
potential of focus groups to provide creative ideas about the topic discussed given the 
fact that participants are asked to provide their thoughts and opinions in conjunction 
with other people with whom they interact, explaining their ideas and responding to 
questions. Focus groups are also faster and cheaper to implement compared to 
individual in-depth interviews, especially when there are travelling expenses involved. 
Focus groups also allow the researcher, theoretically at least, to explore any topic that 
may be of interest (Morgan, 1997). 
On the snags of focus groups the first and probably the most problematic is the fact 
that individuals who decide to attend a focus group session tend to self-select 
themselves. This may result in too much (or too little) relevance awarded to a certain 
opinion being discussed and thus it could provide a distorted picture of the socially 
constructed topics analysed. In order to counteract this, an economic incentive was 
offered to FG participants. Although the possibility of self-selection bias cannot be 
ruled out per se, the fact that some participants stated they attended because the 
researcher was paying them is somewhat reassuring in the sense that not only 
environmentally aware individuals turned up to the focus group sessions. The second 
caveat is that certain individuals (e.g. better educated with well-paid jobs, family and 
little time to spare) are generally harder to access.  
A further word of caution that can be applied to qualitative research in general is the 
researcher’s influence on the focus of the research and the degree of researcher 
involvement in conducting research (ibid.). With regards to the influence of the 
researcher on the issue studied and the interpretation of the results obtained the only 
defence is to be explicit about the choices made. One should also try to include as 
broad a set of opinions as possible in a balanced manner that strives to accurately 
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represent the phenomenon studied. Although this will not avoid researcher bias it will 
hopefully expose the choices made and the rationale followed throughout so that 
criticism helps improve future research. The use of quantitative techniques as an 
additional research tool can also help check whether the logical conclusions reached 
after the interpretation of the qualitative data are in line with the conclusions drawn 
after the statistical analysis of the survey results. In any case, no amount of checks and 
explanations are likely to prevent researcher bias in social sciences.  
The final caveat of focus groups is the counterpart to its cost efficiency merit, namely 
its broad reach versus its depth. According to Morgan (1996: 138) ‘each focus group 
participant produced only 60% to 70% as many ideas as they would have in an 
individual interview’. With only one to two hours per focus group each participant has 
less time to explore their views and interact compared to the depth interviews in 
which the researcher can explore interviewee attitudes, behaviours and actions for the 
entire duration of the interview. Logistic and cost issues as well as the possibility of 
gathering socially perceived views of complex situations were all factored in and the 
choice of focus groups was favoured over in-depth interviews in order to gather 
citizens’ opinions on sustainable development.  
The process 
Qualitative methods are a laborious endeavour with various interlinked steps that 
interact with one another providing continuous information that helps improve the 
process. The steps are summarised in table 3.3.1 below: 
Table 3.3.1 Steps in the elite interview process and in the focus groups 
Steps Elite interviews Focus groups
Design Topic guide Topic guide
Interviewees Decide interviewees Design FG
Preparation Background research on interviees biosTechnical issues
FG facilities and materials
Technical issues
Execution Conducting elite interviews Conducting focus groups
Data 
gathering
Analysis
Recording, translation and transcription
Deductive apporach: From theory to data analysis
Explanation building  
Source: Adapted from Bauer and Gaskell (2005) 
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The main features of the above outlined steps will be discussed in the remainder of 
this section.  
Design 
The topic guides exhibit the order in which the questions were raised. The rationale 
behind this order was based on the advice given by the main methodology texts 
consulted as well as the expert advice received54. Tables 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 present the 
basic sections of the elite interviews and the focus groups, the description of each 
section and the purpose.  
Table 3.3.2 Elite interview topic guide 
Section Description Purpose
Introduction Reminder of topic to be discussed Brief introduction of each interviewee Warm-up
General questions
Marine resources
Theats to marine resources
Monitoring mechanisms
Benchmarks and goals
Analysis of management strategies
Obtain data on 
interviewees 'expert' 
knowledge
Case study specific 
questions
Causes and consequences of the Prestige spill
Commonalities & differences with other spills
Key variables in management decisions
Information in oil spills
Benchmarks 
Thresholds 
Equipment and personnel needs to:
   Mitigate
   Regenerate
   Prevent 
Existing and alternative oil spill preparedness and 
management strategies
Analyse the status quo
Context in oil spill 
management
Political, economic and social considerations in oil 
spill management
Discuss broader issues 
that may affect oil spill 
policies
Sustainability 
Definition used
Implications (substitutability, compensation, 
prevention, etc. )
Actions
Explicitly discuss the 
term & its related 
actions 
Other Other issues of interest for interviewees
Allow interviewees to 
explore other issues of 
interest  Source: Elite interviews, Dexter (1970), Matilde Fernández-Cid (pers. Comm.) 
 
                                               
54I am indebted and most grateful to Matilde Fernández-Cid for her help in refining the questionnaires 
and improving the researcher’s qualitative interviewing skills.   
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The rationale for the above questions responds to the need to draw a broad and 
accurate picture of the world of those interviewed. Context, institutional 
arrangements and decision-making in complex emergency situations are the building 
blocks of the framework in which sustainable development strategies may be adopted 
or ignored. As stated by Hertz & Imber (1995: 56) ‘it is in the situation of crisis that the 
structures and processes of social organization most vividly manifest themselves’. 
Answers to indirect and direct questions about sustainability, compensation and 
irreversible losses55 illustrate what is happening in the different areas and whether 
sustainable development is a current concern. Lastly, in order to make 
recommendations for improvement in oil spill management, it is interesting to know 
what is actually happening, what is in the make and how far different actors are willing 
to go. 
The research questions to be answered, the literature review process and the results 
obtained from the elite interview process, gave rise to the set of topics to be covered 
by the focus groups. The aim of the focus groups was to analyse participants’ 
knowledge, attitudes and intentions regarding sustainability in oil spill settings. In 
order to fulfil this purpose questions on the information and experience of participants 
(their beliefs) were asked. Their attitudes regarding oil spills were also discussed as 
well as their preferences towards different possible actions that could be taken both 
by individuals and institutions when managing oil spills. Participants were also asked to 
state their intentions (their willingness to pay) to prevent future spills and their 
willingness to accept compensation that would provide them with different types of 
capital if a new spill happened.  
Table 3.3.3 below presents the focus group topic guide.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
55
 for various papers in this topic see for example Ledoux and Turner, (2002); Markandya et al, (2006); 
Berrens et al. (1999); Walker and Meyers, (2004); Rosenberg et al. (2001); Spash, (2001); Muradian, 
(2001); Arrow et al. (1995); Kotchen and Reiling, (2000), Haines Young, (2006), Stevens et al. (1991); 
Garza-Gil et al. (2006), Ekins, (2003); Kontoleon and Swanson, (2003) and Loureiro (undated). 
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Table 3.3.3 Focus group topic guide 
Section Description Purpose of discussion
Researcher presentation Welcome
Thanking participants Warm-up
Explaining FG dynamic Provide clear instructions
Opening questions Participants introduce themselves Ice-breaker
Information  and experience with oil spills
Ranking different consequences of spills
Provision of information
Additionally to participant information baseline 
information on the basic consequences of spills 
was provided
Ensure minimum knowledge 
of all participants for later 
discussion
Feelings and worries Favourable or unfavourable comments regarding oil spills 
Importance on a 1-10 scale of different size & 
consequence spills Scope testing
Explore the credibility of 
threshold trespassing 
scenarios
Explore intentions of 
participants faced with 
threshold trespassing
Thanking participants Providing closure
Asking for further ideas/comments
Providing the opportunity to 
comment on the FG or issues 
that were not discussed
Wrap-up
Comensation exercise 
WTP exercise
Thresholds Beliefs and attitudes towards potential ecosystem threshold trespassing
Valuation
Analyse participants’ 
intentions when faced with 
different spill situations in 
which threshold trespassing is 
included
Introduction
Beliefs
Obtain data on participant 
knowledge & experience on 
the topic
Attitudes
 
Source: Focus groups 
Selecting Interviewees 
The goal in the final elite interview schedule was to have at least one representative 
from each institution involved in oil spill management, one representative from each 
major political party, environmental experts, economic experts, legal experts and the 
main NGO that was involved both in the recovery of the affected environment and in 
the public demonstrations. 
The final layout of the interviews conducted is shown in table 3.3.4 below: 
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Table 3.3.4 Elite interviews conducted 
Interviewee code Area(s) of expertise Position(s) Political tendency Access
GL26C01F Applied Economics & Maritime studies Professor Socialist Conference
ML27C01R Policy Former mayor Nationalist Summer course
FM09M02A Policy Politician Conservative Personal
NR&MTC21C03X Policy Civil servants No information available (NIA)
Conference & 
Snowballing
AQL&GA23C03J Private firms Ship agents Conservative Personal
NJFMG10M04C Lawyer Civil servant NIA Personal
TA25C04O Policy & Sociology Politician Socialist Personal
P25C04E Lawyer Civil servant. Civil defence NIA Snowballing
U25C04J Engineer (agriculture) Civil servant. Civil defence NIA Snowballing
LD26SC04B Maritime issues NGO & Politician Nationalist Mail
NL27SC04A Policy 
Civil servant Coastguard, 
maritime salvage & pollution 
prevention
NIA Mail
SG27SC04S Private firms Businessmen representation Conservative Personal
PM09M05J Oceanography Civil servant NIA Snowballing
SLLG14M07F Maritime safety and pollution fighting Civil servant Socialist Snowballing
VS26M07J Maritime pollution fighting Civil servant NIA Snowballing
FD01SC08R Open spaces and biodiversity Civil servant NIA Mail & telephone  
Source: Elite interviews 
As the first interviews were conducted and factual data were filled in by interviewees 
new ideas came up which shaped following interviews as well as the people to be 
contacted. As reflected by Dexter (1970: 43) ‘the decision as to whom to see depends 
largely upon one’s on-going reflection about the issues, upon new data and 
hypotheses that come to one’s attention, from whatever source – often from earlier 
interviews’. 
There are no guidelines carved in stone regarding the optimal focus group design but 
Morgan (1997) describes the rules of thumb that are common practice in conducting 
qualitative analyses through the use of focus groups. These rules include: organising 
groups to include previously unacquainted individuals of similar characteristics to 
facilitate group interaction; it also implies using structured interviews where the 
moderator is actively involved; the number of participants normally should be 
between 6 and 10 participants per group; and finally, each project normally consists of 
three to five focus groups.  
The selection of FG participants could be made either according to socio-demographic 
characteristics (age, gender, education, geographical location, etc.) or selecting 
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‘natural’ groups. Natural groups are formed by people who share some common 
characteristic of interest such as belonging to an NGO, being policy makers, widows, 
etc. According to Gaskell (2005) there is no one right way to select respondents. Thus 
the choice of one form of participants’ selection over another will depend on the 
research questions and aims. For the present thesis socio-demographic variables were 
considered when grouping participants together. The reason for this choice was that 
the focus groups were intended as the first step in the development of a questionnaire 
that was distributed to a sample of the population according to their socio-
demographic characteristics. Additionally this selection criterion is recommended 
when all individuals may be affected by the issue under discussion (ibid.) which would 
be the case when analysing future implementation of oil spill management strategies 
in Spain. Table 3.3.5 below presents the final layout and characteristics of the focus 
groups: 
Table 3.3.5 Focus groups conducted 
Focus group 
number City
Age 
range
Higher 
education
Number of 
attendants
FG1 Madrid 18-40 Yes 7
FG2 Madrid 18-40 No 8
FG3 Madrid >41 Yes 6
FG4 Madrid >41 No 5
FG5 La Coruña 18-40 Yes 7
FG6 La Coruña 18-40 No 8
FG7 La Coruña >41 Yes 3
FG8 La Coruña >41 No 6  
Access 
There are a variety of means to gain access to interviewees. Following Keating (2005) 
the process of negotiating access to the interviewees used regular mail, e-mail and 
telephone conversations. Besides these, attendance to summer courses and seminars 
where the elites were expected to gather was also useful in order to gain access, 
establish the first contact with the potential interviewees and have updated 
information related to oil spill management strategies. All these were useful strategies 
in order to gain access and conduct interviews.  
Focus group participants were approached in places where people gather and have 
spare time. These places were chosen too due to proximity to the places where the FG 
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would take place. Additionally an advert was posted in a higher education website56 in 
Madrid. A similar action was undertaken in Galicia as the University of Coruña through 
its student services centre offered the researcher the possibility of sending the 
announcement of the project and the request for FG participants to over 2,000 
students (both undergraduates and post-graduates) through their weekly newsletter 
distributed via e-mail. 
Additional locations used to recruit FG participants both in Galicia and in Madrid were 
local unemployment offices57 where permission was requested to speak to people in 
queues and around the premises. Other institutions such as the CICE (IT vocational 
centre) in Madrid and the Pablo Picasso Arts Vocational Centre in Coruña also granted 
the researcher access and advertisements were posted on these centres’ information 
boards. As people in Galicia did seem to take longer than expected to respond, other 
locations such as municipal libraries, parks, bars and kiosks were approached and 
information on the project and the FG process was posted in their establishments and 
distributed in person to people in the street.  
Execution 
According to Gaskell (2005: 46) ‘Essentially in the successful depth interview the 
personal worldview of the interviewee is explored in detail’. Elite interviews were 
conducted mainly in the workplace of interviewees. The power dynamics expected in 
the sense that the interviewee would largely lead the interview (see Keating, 2005) 
was mostly noted when interviewing politicians and maritime interests’ 
representatives. In the remainder of the interviews, especially with civil servants, the 
interaction was established on a more level playing field although (understandably) 
some interviewees avoided giving their opinions on sensitive issues or disclosing any 
internal or non-published information.  
At the beginning of the interview respondents were reminded of the research topic in 
order to provide an initial reference of the questions that would be discussed. A brief 
explanation of the main sections of the interview was also given. The average duration 
of the interviews was over two hours.  
                                               
56
 http://www.emes.es/Actualidad/Foro/tabid/408/type/foro/Default.aspx?postid=181 
57
 INEM (Instituto Nacional de Empleo or its new denomination since 2003, Servicio Público de Empleo 
Estatal) in its Spanish acronym which stands for National Employment Institute. 
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Assuring confidentiality was also useful in most interviews although some explanations 
and examples were offered by interviewees only if the digital recorder was turned off. 
When this happened, notes were made on confidential issues discussed as soon as the 
interview ended in order to retain the information shared, which offered insights that 
linked focal concepts58.  
The FG locations were selected both in Madrid and Coruña attending primarily to 
efficiency criteria. Four locations were used to conduct the FG. Two of these settings 
were ‘formal’, a university college (Colegio Universitario Cardenal Cisneros) and a 
cultural foundation (Fundación Pedro Barrié de la Maza). These two selected locations 
were both near the city centre thus being easily accessible for participants; they were 
well known institutions that provided confidence, encouraging individuals to take part 
in the FG process, and they were both offered to the researcher free of charge. The 
informal settings included the researcher’s home in Madrid and a meeting room in a 
hotel (Hotel Maycar) near the centre of La Coruña (Galicia).  
The basic organisation of the focus groups entailed various tasks. The premises where 
the FG’s were to be conducted were visited in order to arrange tables, chairs, food and 
drinks for participants. Photocopies of the different exercises were provided for 
participants. Once all the material and the room was prepared, FG participants were 
met by the researcher at the entrance of the premises where they were welcomed. A 
sticker with each participant’s name was distributed so group participants could 
address each other by name facilitating interaction and familiarity. Once in the room 
participants were asked to take a seat and permission was requested to record the 
session as a memory aid for the researcher, ensuring anonymity. As expected, 
anonymity was not an issue with FG participants as they were not asked to speak on 
behalf of any institution or as the ‘professional persona’ they exhibited in their work 
place (a significant difference to the elite interview process in which anonymity was an 
issue of concern).  
 
                                               
58
 This was the case when interviewing one businessmen representative. The interviewee analysed the 
pressure exercised by the industrial lobby over both the regional government and the central government 
in order to assign funds to railway infrastructures within the economic recovery plan (Plan Galicia). This 
pressure was a response of the car industry to the turbulent political moment and the EU structural fund 
negotiation process that would leave Spain and thus Galicia without funding to modernise obsolete and 
insufficient transport infrastructures in the region.  
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Data gathering 
As recognised by various authors (see Dexter 1970, Burton 2000, Keating 2005 and 
Gaskell, 2005 among others) transcribing is a time consuming activity. The accuracy of 
the transcriptions depends on the research aims. For the present thesis in which 
analysing context, processes and decision-making is the aim, extensive notes with 
frequent verbatim quote were used.  
The time devoted for transcribing and checking every hour recorded was 
approximately 8 hours for each focus group and 9 hours59 for each elite interview. The 
fact that the interviews were conducted in Spanish and the transcripts were done in 
English increased the hours spent in this activity. Within the transcriptions, reference 
to the time in which responses were offered was also recorded in order to provide a 
quick reference in case doubts arose regarding the transcribed information. Colour 
codes were used in order to distinguish questions from answers and researcher’s 
codes.  
                                               
59
 Note that Dexter (1970) allows, for the transcription and checking process, approximately 9 hours for 
every hour of interview recorded. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007) state that it can take up to 10 
hours to transcribe every hour recorded. Other authors, Keating (2005), state that the transcription process 
can take as little as 4 hours for every hour recorded.  
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3.4 Results 
The analytical approach taken is primarily a deductive one in which a pre-
existing theoretical framework helps enunciate the research questions, permeates the 
data collection effort and aids the initial analyses. The main advantage of using this 
approach is the ‘safety net’ provided by the use of a standing theoretical framework 
that guides the research effort. This approach has been loosely applied to ensure 
permeability to new concepts and findings that emerged during the course of the elite 
interviews and the focus groups (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007). 
The analytical strategy followed both in the elite interviews’ analysis and in the focus 
groups analysis can be labelled as ‘explanation building’ according to Yin (2003) in 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007). This implies unveiling an explanation for the 
phenomenon studied (e.g. whether elites and focus groups participants understand SD 
in the same way). The analysis entailed establishing different themes (topics), 
determining underlying categories and sub-categories and then exploring the more 
concrete concepts expressed by interviewees and focus group participants. Once this 
was done, interrelationships among concepts and categories helped build the 
framework in which research questions could be answered and further research 
planned.   
There is little agreement among different methodology texts regarding the best way to 
present results obtained from qualitative analysis. Where Burton (2000) would leave 
the decision of whether to quote abundantly or not to the researcher, Gaskell and 
Bauer (2005) and Alvermann, O’Brien and Dillon (1996) recommend abundant use of 
verbatim as interviewees’ statements are, according to Gaskell and Bauer (2005), 
confidence makers. Confidentiality concerns voiced by various interviewees, the 
sensitive nature of the issue analysed and the highly politicised treatment of the 
Prestige oil spill by political parties, the media and civil society (Tan, 2006) called for a 
relatively restricted use of verbatim quotes. These quotes are used where necessary in 
order to support the main ideas and interrelations presented in this section.    
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Framework  
The analysis was undertaken with the aid of an information matrix where the 
concepts, categories and topics were analysed for each elite interviewee and each FG 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007). The process of breaking up the information 
provided by respondents and then grouping it together aided in the systematic analysis 
of the different concepts and ideas raised in the interviews.  
The main findings from elite interviews and focus groups are briefly summarised 
before presenting a more detailed analysis (in the remainder of this section).  
As regards the understanding of the term sustainable development neither elite 
interviewees nor focus group respondents (non-experts) provided an academic 
definition according to which different sustainability paradigms were identified. In 
addition to this, only elite interviewees whose work was directly related to natural 
resource management were able to provide a definition of the term. Support for the 
general concept of SD was voiced but no in-depth reflection of what this meant in 
terms of protecting for example natural capital as a special type of capital was 
recognised.  
Non-experts (focus group participants), in contrast to elites, were overall more 
concerned about lasting development as this was acknowledged to affect the welfare 
of their descendants. They offered, in accordance with the literature reviewed (Bonnes 
et al. 2007), place-based knowledge and practical examples of efforts to achieve 
sustainability (via daily practices to protect natural capital). They were also aware of 
potential trade-offs between economic growth and environmental protection. Elites, 
arguably more worried about re-election, were overall silent as regards their concern 
for future generations.  
According to Jordan and Lenschow (2008) the pre-requisite for achieving sustainable 
development is integrating environmental policies across different government 
departments. In the context of accidental oil spill prevention and management (most) 
elite interviewees and focus group respondents repeatedly referred to the lack of 
integration of such policies and the lack of coordination among different government 
levels and departments.  
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When analysing compensation, two main issues were discussed both by elite 
interviewees and focus group participants: money and compensation (investment) 
packages. Elites and FG participants largely coincided in their view of monetary 
compensation. Experts and non-experts agreed that monetary compensation was 
needed for those who had had been directly affected by the spill (e.g. fishermen, net 
menders, hotels, restaurants, etc.). There was (as expected due to the more technical 
nature of the concept) little discussion about monetary compensation for non-use 
values lost. There was also coincidence in the perceptions of elite interviewees and 
focus group participants regarding the fact that monetary compensation was ‘used’ by 
the government to appease citizens.  
As regards ‘in-kind’ compensation in the form of different ‘compensation packages’ 
(that resulted from the design of the Plan Galicia and the Plan de Dinamización 
Económica de Galicia, see section 2.7 in the thesis for further explanation) and possible 
alternatives for these packages elites and FG participants showed wide-ranging 
opinions. Elite interviewees largely answered in line with their ‘professional persona’ in 
their support for (or their criticism of) past compensation packages that devoted a 
large percentage of the funds to infrastructures.  
In fact, conservative party representatives strongly supported investments in man-
made capital whereas nationalists and elites in the field of oil spill management 
suggested alternative investment packages that would focus on replacing damaged 
natural capital with like natural capital. Focus group participants overwhelmingly 
demanded natural capital to be built in compensation if a new spill happened. The self-
selection bias inherent in FG participants and the non-probability sampling followed in 
the qualitative part of the research precluded any generalisation of the findings as 
regards compensation preferences but helped define the range of compensation 
packages that could be credibly included in the survey. 
Finally, concerning the willingness to pay to prevent future spills the role of experts 
and non-experts differed. Experts were asked to provide information on the building 
blocks of prevention schemes that would protect natural capital. This information was 
summarised and then funnelled into the prevention programs presented in the focus 
groups and in the survey. The key features of these prevention mechanisms included 
more control of maritime traffic, better communication between agents in the 
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maritime sector, further R&D efforts and international cooperation. See Table 3.4.3 for 
further detail. 
Focus group participants expressed a generalised belief that prevention and 
effectiveness were largely missing in government response to oil spills (in accordance 
with theoretical predictions discussed by Birkland, 1998; Birkland and Nath, 2000; 
Birkland and Lawrence 2002). Preventing oil spills was seen as a worthy investment 
with some respondents from FG2 stating that it was cheaper and more desirable to 
prevent spills rather than having to manage their consequences. One of the FG’s (FG1) 
argued that citizens were both responsible and able to prevent environmental 
damage. FG participants reiterated the acknowledgement of the impossibility to 
eliminate the risk of oil spills but continued demanding all efforts should be made to 
minimise the risk of these accidents. One of the participants in FG5 broadened the 
framing of the issue and proposed a cost benefit analysis of maritime transport of oil 
as a decision-making tool to regulate (by limiting) vessel traffic. The main demands 
regarding prevention and management are summarised in box 3.4.1. 
When (non-expert) FG respondents were asked whether they would be willing to pay 
to prevent future spills most FG respondents answered affirmatively (80% said they 
would be wiling to pay), some seemed to favour SS (14% were WTP the maximum 
amount and were very concerned about future spills). In addition to this few 
respondents did not want to pay for protest reasons (e.g. others should pay, the 
polluter should pay). Comments and clarifications sought by non-experts respondents 
to the valuation scenarios discussed in the focus groups helped refine the final version 
of the valuation exercise in the final survey.  
The remainder of this section will analyse the outcomes of the elite interviews and 
focus groups in a detailed manner. Similarities and differences between elite 
interviewees’ responses and focus group responses will be highlighted. Table 3.4.1 
presents the topics analysed: 
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Table 3.4.1 Topics, categories and concepts: Elite Interviews & Focus Groups 
Topics (themes) Categories Sub-categories Concepts
1. Definition Understanding and use of the term SD 
i. Control
Information, Inspections, 
Technical and personal means
ii. Cooperation & coordination
Institutions: National, 
International, Companies R&D 
centres 
i. Prevention and management 
strategies
ii. Compensation strategies
4. Substitutability
Special protection areas, 
recovery and replacement 
strategies
Biodiversity
Cultural heritage
Image
6. Equity Intergenerational and intragenerational equity
Natural Resource Use: 
Overexploitation, Habitat 
destruction
Pollution: Operational discharge, 
pollution from urban areas, 
accidental spills
1. Agents
Civil society, voluntary workers, 
fishermen, lobbies, political 
parties, the media
2. Resources Relevance of natural resources
II.Context A)Policy inputs & environment
5. Limits and 
irreversibility
I. Sustainable 
development
A) Oil spills
2. Resources
3. Outputs
B) Other factors 1. Environment as source/sink
 
Source: Elite interviews and FG. Classification of categories and concepts adapted from Roberts (2004) 
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 1. Definition 
According to the EU Integrated Maritime policy (2007:4): 
‘Increasing competition for marine space and the cumulative impact of human 
activities on marine ecosystems render the current fragmented decision-making 
in maritime affairs inadequate, and demand a more collaborative and 
integrated approach. For too long policies on, for instance, maritime transport, 
fisheries, energy, surveillance and policing of the seas, tourism, the marine 
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environment, and marine research have developed on separate tracks, at times 
leading to inefficiencies, incoherencies and conflicts of use.60  
The above quote is a faithful reflection of the views most elite interviewees held 
regarding oil spill management in Spain.  
The most salient finding as regards the definition of SD is the vague, partial and at 
times shallow understanding of the term sustainable development by elites, especially 
when non-academic interviewees or interviewees that were not directly involved in 
natural resource management were asked about SD. This contrasts with the views of 
both academic interviewees and civil servants or politicians that work in nature 
conservation related areas. Answers obtained from elite interviews suggest the 
existence of a lack of horizontal integration among different departments in natural 
resource management. Sustainable development is generally perceived to be an issue 
to be dealt with by environment departments alone. The main comments from elites 
are summarised in the table 3.4.2 below: 
                                               
60
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF: (pp.4) 
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Table 3.4.2 Elite interviewees’ comments on sustainable development 
Interviewee Definition & Comments
NL27SC04A In the oil spill pollution area sustainable development implies enacting mitigation and prevention schemes. No detailed analysis beyond this general statement was offered
FM09M02A
First reference made solely to economic sustainability. ‘Objectives and plans’ cited as 
needed to achieve sustainability. No precise information provided regarding what the 
objectives or plans should entail.
LD26SC04B
Marine resource management is perceived to be short sighted and short term. 
Acknowledgement of a turning point for fishermen after the Prestige whereby limiting 
activities was considered one possible solution to have enduring fishing activities
NJFMG10M04C
The term is not used in the CEPRECO. The competence is seen as lying with the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economy rather than being a horizontal 
guiding principle in natural resource management strategies
GL26C01F
The sustainable development indicators being developed are more an academic 
endeavour rather than a policy strategy. There are no funds devoted to using these 
indicators
VS26M07J The State’s Merchant Navy’s Office said they cooperate with other departments in SD issues but no concrete data was provided.
PM09M05J
Sustainable development strategies are routinely included in the reports produced by 
the Spanish Oceanographic Institute. This implies not only looking into environmental 
sustainability but also into economic criteria that may lead to increases in consumption 
of certain species. They even consider an ecosystem’s approach in which all organisms 
and the use they make of the environment are considered. The difficulty of this 
approach is the very large amount of variables that have to be fed into the models. The 
workable solution for the Spanish Oceanography Institute is the development of 
indicator species that will allow the implementation of management strategies with 
the goal of having ‘sustainable stocks within healthy ecosystems’. 
AQL&GA23C03J References made to reducing unnecessary resource use based on economic efficiency grounds rather than on sustainable development criteria. 
TA25C04O
P25C04E
U25C04J
ML27C01R Acknowledges the theoretical relevance of the sustainable development concept and the lack of implementation of SD strategies alluding to lack of long term strategies.
FD01SC08R
A clear idea of limits, critical natural capital and developing within system limits 
permeated the answers of this interviewee who works within the natural areas and 
biodiversity regional government in Galicia. Urban and territorial planning schemes are 
seen as the basic policy instruments to achieve this. The process followed: Identify 
habitats, identify activities that can affect those habitats, analyse the interaction 
between habitats and activities. This approach could provide a guide for encouraging 
beneficial activities whilst prohibiting damaging activities.  
From a business perspective sustainable development issues are dealt with only by big 
firms. 
Demands for voluntary measures and incentives were voiced 
NR&MTC21C03X
General statements about prevention and mitigation were said to be the strategies to 
ensure sustainable development was pursued by the CEPRECO. The career of the 
interviewee (in the field of environmental issues) is said to be the reason for taking into 
account sustainability issues. No further data was provided.
Civil defence services interviewees do not consider the environment or the concept of 
sustainable development as one of their priorities. No horizontal integration of natural 
resource management in their plans.
SG27SC04S
 
Source: Elite interviews 
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The composition of the focus groups (i.e. citizens of all walks of life) plus the expected 
limited amount of data generated by focus groups, compared to elite in-depth 
interviews, resulted in less detailed information regarding theoretical concepts. 
Although no focus group discussed the definition of sustainable development 
spontaneously, indirect references to the concept were made by three of the eight 
focus groups. These references included the notions of long lasting development which 
was to be balanced with economic development. Humans were seen as responsible for 
the preservation (and able to preserve) environmental resources.  
The common features among elites and FG participants regarding the definition and 
use of SD highlight the virtually non existent knowledge of the term in an academic 
sense. That is, no distinction was made when defining sustainable development among 
different sustainability paradigms, the possibility of substituting different forms of 
capital or compensation issues. This was so for elite interviewees who were not 
directly involved in marine resource management or nature conservation initiatives, 
and for FG participants.  
Within elite interviewees who dealt with maritime resource management (PM09M05J) 
or who dealt with nature conservation initiatives (FD01SC08R), the definition and 
requirements for achieving sustainable development were clear. Limits, indicators and 
influence of political wrangling and human activities were all acknowledged to be 
important in SD. In addition to this, the academic perspective regarding the fact that 
sustainability indicators were being developed but were not being used added a 
further insight into the difficulties in the uptake of this type of indicators.  
FG participants provided broad and arguably less detailed information of sustainable 
development (SD). They nevertheless recognised some of the main building blocks of 
the term. References to system limits, human induced threats, the need to balance 
economic development and preservation of resources were voiced. These ideas were 
complemented with references to the wellbeing of both present and future 
generations.   
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 2 Resources  
Mitigation and prevention strategies are seen, by elite interviewees working in oil spill 
management, as the core elements to arrive at sustainable development. According to 
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elite interviewees the resources that facilitate the design and implementation of oil 
spill management strategies include two main concepts: control and cooperation. The 
concept of control encompasses information and inspection (physical control). 
Cooperation refers to national and international cooperation as well as cooperation 
with private firms and R&D centres.  
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 2 Resources i. Control  
Within information requirements, interviewees asked for the development, update 
and diffusion of baseline data on maritime assets at risk of oil spills. Additional 
information needed on spills would entail deploying ongoing air and satellite61 
surveillance of maritime corridors. Strategies to determine whether it is best to bring 
vessels into ports or to send them off into high seas are needed (TA25C04O, 
P25C0406E, U25C04J). Data was also demanded on the sensitivity of environmental 
assets exposed and thresholds in order to establish protection priorities. Risk and 
sensitivity maps were seen as a useful tool (in theory) to manage future spills. In 
practical terms however these maps were seen as little more than an academic 
exercise when they interfere with economic activities that would reduce local and 
regional government funding. The challenge in this area is to ensure this information is 
effectively used by policy makers62. This information should be coupled with real time 
and 24h available data on tides, water temperature and information protocols 
(GL26C01F). This information should be understandable and easily accessible to 
decision-makers.  
Data on available pollution fighting means, suppliers, delivery times and replacement 
needs in a continuously updated database was also seen as essential in guiding 
planning and response efforts in future spills. According to PM09M0506J, P25C04E and 
U25C04J, it is important to continuously check there are enough means available to 
respond to ‘daily emergencies’ (P25C04E)63. Providing effective communication 
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 Please note that the EU’s CleanSeaNet satellite surveillance was set up by the EMSA in 2007 
(http://www.emsa.europa.eu/) 
62
 INTECMAR which is the Spanish acronym for Instituto Tecnológico del Mar through its RADIALES 
project and the analysis of the consequences of the Prestige spill on Plankton is said to be equipped to 
undertake this information task. A further project developed along these lines is the ESEOOS. Its aim is 
to create a Spanish Operational Oceanography System to be used in oil spills and location of drifting 
objects. Experts from Universities and decision-makers are involved. (NR&MTC21C03X). 
63
 Note that by daily emergencies the interviewee meant crisis situations contained within the 
geographical boundaries of the autonomous community (region), the response to which could be dealt 
with by existing regional emergency services.    
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channels to ensure any incident is swiftly known by all potentially affected parties is 
also seen as a potential action driver in future oil spill management situations. This 
could be articulated by improving radio communication systems to provide 24h 
coverage via 16VHF channel64.  
Information strategies enacted by the government and media communication are seen 
as vital in future oil spill management. Contradictory information provided by the 
government, media and other countries research centres was seen by interviewees as 
driving outraged responses and demonstrations. The importance of providing credible, 
updated and continuous information that is adjusted to what citizens could contrast 
with alternative information sources seemed clear from the answers obtained. 
Although interviewees criticised (GL26C01F, ML27C01R, TA25C04O, P25C04E, 
LD26SC04B and U25C04J) or alternatively were supportive of the information strategy 
followed (FM09M02A), they all assigned communication a high value in crisis 
management. This could signal towards the need for planned, coordinated and 
homogenised information protocols in crisis management situations. According to 
NJFMG10M04C communication protocols were being developed. 
Physical control through inspections was seen as the second, although equally 
important, tier within the ‘control’ concept. Increasing the amount of on-site vessel 
inspection was said to be essential in reducing the risk of spills. According to 
interviewees these inspections were to be coupled with an increase in the number of 
tug and patrol boats and with lager number of ship inspectors. According to 
LD26SC04B there were only 149 coastguards for over 1,000 Km of coastline at the time 
of the interview, which significantly limits the vessel inspection capacity of Galicia.  
An added control measure requested is the monitoring and revision of management 
strategies through for example full scale oil spill management drills involving all 
government departments and administrative levels. According to NL27SC04A, partial 
drills (i.e. response in land or response in high seas but not all responses combined) are 
executed. Whether the coordination problem has been resolved (often quoted by 
interviewees) will not be known until oil spill response plans are fully tested or, a 
future spill occurs.  
                                               
64
 According to LD26SC04B this is the emergency and salvage channel used by vessels and seafarers.  
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Throughout the focus groups participants repeatedly stated there was a lack of 
information regarding oil spills on which to base policy decisions. Some focus group 
participants regarded this information gap as a driver of reactive policy-making (FG3). 
The demands voiced by focus groups included investing in increasing the data available 
regarding oil spills (FG1). Additionally, the sharing of this information with 
communities affected by oil spills was another request to enhance oil spill 
management by involving government and citizens. 
Inspections were also seen as a significant element in the oil spill control process by FG 
participants. There were calls for inspections as well as concerns regarding the 
trustworthiness of the civil servants that conduct these inspections. Participants in FG1 
stated that these inspectors could be bribed to overlook lack of safety in vessels. 
Another focus group (FG4) however saw the inspection system as a trust builder that 
would increase their willingness to pay for oil spill prevention. On site (on board) 
inspections as well as satellite surveillance was demanded by FG participants. A further 
demand revolved around the need for an international effort to coordinate and 
homogenise inspections to ensure risk of oil spills is minimised. The risk of oil spills was 
acknowledged as ‘inevitable’ due to current demand for hydrocarbons but FG 
participants demanded ‘all efforts’ to reduce the risk as well as increased awareness 
and alert by the government.   
Focus groups overall had a negative attitude towards government actions when 
referring to the technical means available for oil spill preventions and management. 
This attitude was expressed as concerns regarding a lack of equipment (tug boats, 
surveillance material and equipment for volunteers such as masks and suits). 
Additionally the government was seen as unaware of this lack of oil spill response 
equipment and slow in responding to oil spills (FG7). The demands made therefore 
included an increase in surveillance and pollution fighting equipment for civil servants 
as well as for volunteers.  
Lack of personnel was also perceived as a shortcoming in the government’s response 
to oil spills. Focus group participants therefore thought an increase in the number of 
ship inspectors was needed. Trust issues arose when discussing the need for further 
ship inspectors. The suspicion voiced regarding the possibility of inspectors receiving 
 106 
bribes was only seen in FG1 and therefore seems overall of marginal relevance for 
other participants.  
When comparing elite interviews with focus groups in the analysis of control, baseline 
information that was requested by elite interviews as background for policy decisions 
was acknowledged to be important by FG participants who requested expert input to 
‘improve everything’. In addition to the importance of data, FG participants in La 
Coruña demanded information on the desirable management actions to be shared 
with citizens pointing towards a demand for specialised information to reach affected 
communities (i.e. civic science in its weaker sense, see  Bäckstrand, 2003 for a 
depiction of ‘thin’ civic science). This information sharing was perceived as important 
by elites too. Elites viewed communication with citizens more as a way to build trust 
and foster transparency, thus reducing outrage, rather than as a participatory tool for 
social action.  
Elites doubted whether risk and sensitivity maps would be used to determine priority 
protection and sacrifice areas. These doubts were motivated by the fact that risk and 
sensitivity maps could limit economically beneficial activities (e.g. building 
infrastructures that raise local government’s revenues, in flood prone areas). FG 
participants on the other hand believed these tools were good and did not perceive 
the conflict between the use of these maps and revenue raising activities.   
Inspections were seen as primordial by FG and elites. The former group expressed 
some suspicions on the possibility to bribe inspectors whereas elites voiced no 
concerns regarding the professional integrity of those civil servants.  
Regarding the need for further oil fighting equipment such as tug boats and barriers, 
both elites and FG participants agreed on the need for further investments. FG 
participants perceived the government to be unaware of the lack of means and did not 
acknowledge any improvements in the aftermath of the Prestige.   
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 2 Resources ii. Cooperation 
According to elites, national and international cooperation and coordination are 
further resources by which oil spill management action can be facilitated. The main 
issues within international cooperation are: the existence of International 
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Environmental Agreements (IEA’s) and legislation, cooperation among private 
international firms and sharing international research findings among countries.  
A polycentric policy system makes unified decision-making in oil spill management in 
Spain a complex task. This is arguably one of the reasons for the ongoing competence 
delimitation and cooperation problems among institutions and government 
departments that were stated by all elite interviewees except for the conservative 
party representative65 interviewed. Fear of losing control and power over resources 
and decisions was acknowledged by elites to hinder daily cooperation among different 
departments. Leadership and personal relationships across departments are seen as 
key drivers to smooth cooperation and coordination according to SLLG14M07F and 
VS26M07J. Training and simulation exercises were acknowledged to hold the potential 
to improve cooperation (TA25C04O, P25C04E, U25C04J). In fact, all oil spill drills from 
2005 onwards stress the need for coordination among different institutions66. 
Surprisingly however, some interviewees admitted that cooperation and coordination 
among departments was easier in crisis situations (TA25C04O, P25C04E, U25C04J). 
At the institutional level, competences in oil spill management are clearer while the 
spill is in the sea as it is the State Merchant Navy Office that is in charge. Once the spill 
reaches the coast the local government would react but there may be instances in 
which the State Coastal Office or the Ministry of Environment have to take action. This 
creates a complex institutional structure (SLLG14M07F). Despite the ‘paper-based’ 
requirements for coordination in contingency plans, this is an unresolved issue for 
interviewees. Fostering cooperation could come from either expanding civil defence 
services scope for action including oil spills in their competences67 or creating a 
National Crisis Management Agency with regional and local agreements to ensure 
cooperation that is sensitive to local realities and knowledge (NJFMG10M04C, 
SLLG14M07F, VS26M07J and FM09M02A). Political leadership is seen as key in 
fostering coordination and communication strategies.  
The international dimension of hydrocarbon transport was also acknowledged by elite 
interviewees. This resulted in demanding further international cooperation and 
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 Then in power. 
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 http://www.salvamentomaritimo.es/index.asp?lan=SP&acc=no&menu=B6 
67
 As of the 13th of January 2010, civil defence is awaiting the passing of legislation that may expand its 
competences in the area.  
 108 
regulations regarding inspections, maritime traffic control, homogenised paperwork 
(e.g. ship dispatch data), technical means, liability regimes (NR&MTC21C03X) and R&D 
initiatives (FD01SC08R). These demands result from the acknowledgement of the 
limited effectiveness of a single country’s oil spill prevention strategies (ML27C01R, 
SLLG14M07F and VS26M07J). Research efforts undertaken by international institutions 
are also seen as paramount in implementing adequate management strategies for 
species recovery FD01SC08R. This was coupled with the need for cooperation with 
privately owned multinationals such as Repsol that extracted hydrocarbon from the 
Prestige and sealed the leaks of the vessel that was 3,800 metres deep.  
Focus group participants exhibited overall a negative attitude towards what is seen as 
a complex myriad of institutions operating within national borders in oil spill situations. 
These institutions are perceived to lack coordination and cooperation among them. 
Additionally FG5 acknowledged a lack of competence delimitation parallel to that 
voiced by some of the elite interviewees. The normative belief put forth was the need 
for an institution in charge of coordinating all agencies involved. This demand is also 
similar in nature to those voiced by a significant number of elite interviewees.  
Comments and demands from focus groups when discussing cooperation and 
coordination at an international level also showed a negative perception of EU and 
world wide level of cooperation regarding oil spill management (FG1, FG5). The main 
concerns were the lack of EU action as well as the need for further competence 
delimitation stating there was a ‘legal mess’ after the Prestige (FG5). Focus group 
participants thought there was a need to strengthen control of oil tankers at an EU and 
world wide level. FG participants also expressed their doubts on the trustworthiness of 
other governments to effectively exercise control over vessels. This statement 
indirectly referred to countries that licence vessels under unsafe conditions (the so 
called flags of convenience68). 
In contrast to elite interviewees, no focus group discussed the potential cooperative 
role of private firms in oil spill management. On the other hand, comments regarding 
the cooperation by research institutions and organisations (overall referred to as ‘the 
                                               
68
 According to Osieke (1979) the concept of ‘Flags of Convenience’ was coined in the aftermath of the 
First World War. It refers to countries that registered non-national ships in order to reap the economic 
benefits of these registries without exercising due control over the safety conditions of the vessels.  
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experts’) were put forth. The main normative beliefs discussed included the idea that a 
myriad of experts should be involved in oil spill management (FG7). The demands 
regarding the role of experts were multi-faceted including knowledge generation, 
making policy recommendations, aiding in solving problems, sharing their findings and 
making recommendations on how citizens should manage these spills. Regarding the 
production of knowledge in the area of oil spill management scientists were called to 
‘improve everything’ (FG8) indirectly assigning a prescriptive role to science in line with 
the overall call for expert decision-making in oil spill management voiced by elite 
interviewees. Additionally, experts were expected to reach out to civil society, 
informing potentially affected citizens of what to do in future oil spill situations.   
Comparing elite interviewees and FG participants views on cooperation it is clear that 
they voiced similar concerns and demands. The complex institutional structure that 
entails moving towards governance (in the government – governance policy 
continuum) is seen as a barrier to effective oil spill management.  Additionally, both 
elites and FG participants coincided on demanding a single institution with power and 
resources to coordinate all emergency situations. 
Both elite interviewees and FG participants acknowledged the relevance of 
international coordination. FG participants demanded coordination regarding vessel 
safety requirements, expanding liability and on defining competences when talking to 
FG participants. Elite interviewees added more technical and operational matters to 
their requests pointing towards the desirability of homogenising all ship dispatch 
paperwork. Again, some FG participants were more sceptical than elites regarding the 
effectiveness of governments in achieving this coordination.  
Where cooperation between governments and private firms in oil spill management 
was seen as fundamental by elites, focus groups failed to mention this potential 
partnership. Finally cooperation among scientists and governments was seen as 
beneficial for oil spill management as long as expert-led decision-making is not 
interfered with by political interests.  
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 3.Outputs 
Following Roberts’ (2004) framework explaining policy outputs, the interaction among 
resources, context, support and demands of stakeholders have resulted in: Prevention 
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and management plans and compensation strategies. Elite Interviewees’ overall 
assessment of these outputs could be summed up in what Richardson (1982, in Viñas, 
2009) calls a reactive-consensual response whereby a crisis spurs government 
reaction. This reaction is then shaped by the consensus and pressure exercised by the 
main agents involved in the crisis. 
Examples of reactive behaviour in oil spill management are analysed by Xunta de 
Galicia (2005b) where the Green Book on Maritime Policy states there was a new 
organisational impulse after the Prestige. At an institutional level, the CEPRECO69 was 
the institution created to coordinate pollution fighting, foster legislative homogeneity 
and encourage R&D in oil spill management; its birth 2 years after the spill also 
illustrates the reactive nature of policy-making. A further example of this reactive 
behaviour is the development of the basic legal framework for the later development 
of regional contingency plans in Galicia (decree 438/2003). Another example of 
reactive policy in oil spill management in Spain is illustrated by monetary 
compensation schemes that are developed ad hoc after spills take place (see for 
example the Royal Decree 4/2003 that regulates compensation schemes to be paid 
after the Prestige). No strategy exists regarding compensation schemes before spills 
occur according to SG27SC04S and even though the specific cases and particularities 
may be legislated when the spill takes place, a general agreement would be desirable 
before hand according to NJFMG10M04C and NL27SC04A .  
This reactive behaviour however is not unique to Spanish oil spill management 
strategies. At a European level the adoption of the Erika packages to increase maritime 
safety is a further example of reactive policy-making in the oil spill management field. 
According to the EU ‘following the Erika accident, in March and December 2000 the 
Commission presented two sets of measures intended to improve maritime safety’70. 
At an international level and going back to the Exxon Valdez oil spill the US 
government enacted the OPA 1990 which ‘was signed into law in August 1990, largely 
in response to rising public concern following the Exxon Valdez incident’71. 
 
                                               
69
 The 12th of November 2004 by the Royal Decree 2182/2004 (almost 2 years after the spill) 
70http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/01/353&format=HTML&aged=1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en (emphasis added) 
71
 http://www.epa.gov/oilspill/opaover.htm (emphasis added) 
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I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 3.Outputs i. Prevention and management  
These include the National Salvage Plan (Plan Nacional de Salvamento) and the 
Contingency Plans (Planes de Contingencias). The main goal of the plans was to 
improve pollution management and prevention of oil spills.  More specifically, the 
National Salvage Plan 2006-2009 (henceforth NSP) focused on two areas. First, the 
prevention of maritime emergencies and pollution mainly via increased inspections 
and training. Second, the management of maritime emergencies multiplying by six the 
government investment (reaching 1,022M€ at the end of the plan). These funds were 
essentially assigned to acquiring technical means such as boats and helicopters and 
reducing response times. The increase in resources brought about by the NSP was 
overall acknowledged by all elite interviewees who saw this as a significant 
improvement compared with the previously available pollution fighting means. Further 
demands in terms of prevention were nevertheless voiced. These demands (see table 
3.4.3 below) included increased control, improvement in communications and 
increasing R&D to account for economically or environmentally sensitive areas.  
Table 3.4.3 Elite Interviewees’ demands on prevention of oil spills 
Concept Demand
Increase the number of ship inspections over and above what is required by 
international agreements and by  the Spanish law
Expand satellite and aerial coverage to increase vessel control
Further personnel to ensure 24hour ship dispatch along the coast to prevent self-
dispatch of sub-standard vessels
24 hour coverage through channel 16 VHF is needed 
Improve training in English via international and national agreements and regulations 
to ensure all maritime personnel can communicate in case of emergency
Redesign maritime corridors to take into account potential damage to economic 
activities and natural resources
Define tailor-made protection for areas of special economic relevance and 
environmental sensitivity that are to be integrated horizontally across policy areas and 
institutions (maritime salvage, economics, environmental protection, etc). 
Provide cost estimates for prevention and management efforts but take into account 
‘other’ (social) criteria to make decisions
Agreements to share available means are essential to ensure adequate monitoring 
and response to spills in light of the expected increases in maritime traffic
Increase liability and compensations
Control
Communications
R&D
International 
cooperation
 
Source. Elite interviews 
Oil spill prevention strategies are complemented by Contingency Plans. These plans 
work at various institutional levels and are interconnected. Their main goal is to 
 112 
prevent and manage maritime pollution. Their scope and activation are succinctly 
summarised in table 3.4.4 below. 
Table 3.4.4 Oil spill management plans 
Plan Scope Activation
International 
Contingency Plan International
When two or more countries are affected and the 
National Contingency Plan is insufficient to deal with the 
spill
National 
Contingency Plan
National. Applicable to territorial 
seas and exclusive economic 
zone of a country
When the spill takes place at the sea or when the 
consequences of a spill cannot be managed by the 
territorial or interior contingency plan
Territorial 
Contingency Plan
Regional. Autonomous 
Communities
Pollution affects the coastline and cannot be managed 
with the means available for the Interior Contingency Plan
Interior 
Contingency Plan Harbour or port installations Pollution affects the port/harbour installation
 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2001) 
Although international cooperation was mentioned as vital in oil spill prevention and 
management strategies, only one elite interviewee made reference to International 
Contingency Plans and to specific international agreements that inspired the National 
Contingency Plan (the OPRC72). At a national level, the main goals of the National 
Contingency Plan, Ministerio de Fomento (2001), are the development of operational 
guidelines for oil spill management, which would define the criteria for the 
development of regional and interior contingency plans and develop coordination 
across institutions73. The most salient comments from interviewees include 
coordination concerns, demands for further specification in contingency plans and 
demands for assigning priority protection to economically relevant areas.  
Coordination among institutions began in earnest in 2006 according to some elite 
interviewees. This coordination refers to institutional integration of decision-making 
processes. All interviewees demanded a single National Emergency Agency à la 
Spanish civil defence services that dealt with all emergencies. This would imply having 
local and regional plans including risk and sensitivity maps. These plans would be 
integrated into the national plans so that a compatible and homogeneous operational 
response could be offered. Similarly, a CEDRE74 type centre was called for by some 
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 The Protocol on preparedness, response and coordination to pollution incidents by Hazardous and 
Noxious substances.  
73
 http://www.cedre.fr/project/erocips/wp4/sp/orga/plan_nacional_de_contingencias.ppt 
74
 The CEDRE is the French centre for research and analyses of accidental water pollution. It is the 
reference R&D centre for oil spill analyses in the EU.   
 113 
elite interviewees in order to ensure continuous monitoring and swift operational 
decision-making (GL26C01F). Experts detached from political pressures are called for 
as decision-makers by some interviewees as well as by international institutions such 
as the CEDRE (GL26C01F). Other interviewees limit the role of experts to an advisory 
one (FM09M02A). In any case, the role of experts in providing information in oil spill 
prevention and management is overall seen as very important.   
Priority protection to sensitive areas was firstly assigned according to economic criteria 
(e.g. fishing areas and tourist areas). The environmental concerns (e.g. damage to 
natural parks) are taken into account after economic concerns are considered. Priority 
protection entailed fundamentally sending more boats and barriers. There is no tailor-
made approach (i.e. analysing what means would be the most appropriate for a given 
sensitive area in order to ensure its specific protection requirements are met 
(FM09M02A)). One of the interviewees even stated that ‘No one knows in sensitive 
areas what they have to do in these cases’ (GL26C01F). The territorial contingency plan 
was not developed in Galicia at the time of the interviews. Interviewees’ assessment of 
the existing contingency plans at the time of the interviews will be presented in table 
3.4.5 below and compared to the later approved regional Contingency Plan for Galicia.  
Table 3.4.5 Elite interviewees’ demands on contingency plans  
Concept Interviewees’ demands pre-territorial contingency plan Territorial Contingency Plan Remaining concerns
Define competent bodies Competences defined
Create a National Emergencies 
Agency
National Emergency Agency has not 
been created
Increase technical means
Increase personnel
Ensure decision-makers can 
request additional means
Legal requirements should be 
developed to ensure regional 
contingency plans are developed
EU & Spanish legislation leave to 
international (voluntary) agreements 
compensation and restoration. 
Damages not covered by these are 
borne by citizens. 
As a second best option the civil 
defence plan was used
Limited liability regimes hinder 
precautionary approaches. Pollution is 
‘cheap’
Data on available means and 
deployment times should be 
available and updated. 
Will risk and sensitivity maps be used? 
Cost data on contingency plans 
should be available
Data on sensitivity and risks is 
needed to reduce uncertainty of 
decision-makers
Competences
Clarification should be provided 
regarding who should develop 
regional contingency plans
The regional government 
developed the territorial plan 
through its fisheries and maritime 
department 
Are all competence intricacies 
sufficiently clear?
Coordination Needs to improve CECOP (Centre for operational coordination) was created
A myriad of institutions is still involved 
and there has been no full scale drill. 
Coordination problems may persist
Will this mean not only more but also 
better protection?
Policy 
Instruments
The Territorial Contingency Plan for 
Galicia was finally presented in 
2007 five years after the spill. 
Information Risk and sensitivity maps were starting to be developed
Institutions The amount of institutions may make coordination difficult 
Resources National salvage Plan has increased available means significantly
Given the expected increase in 
maritime traffic, will the available 
means be enough to control traffic 
and respond to emergency situations?
 
Sources: Elite interviewees and Xunta de Galicia.  
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Focus group participants expressed a generalised belief that prevention and 
effectiveness were largely missing in government response to oil spills ( in accordance 
with theoretical predictions discussed above by Birkland, 1998; Birkland and Nath, 
2000; Birkland and Lawrence 2002). Preventing oil spills was seen as a worthy 
investment with some respondents from FG2 stating that it was cheaper and more 
desirable to prevent spills rather than having to manage their consequences. One of 
FG’s (FG1) argued that citizens were both responsible and able to prevent 
environmental damage. FG participants reiterated the acknowledgement of the 
impossibility to eliminate the risk of oil spills but continued demanding all efforts 
should be made to minimise the risk of these accidents. One of the participants in FG5 
broadened the framing of the issue and proposed a cost benefit analysis of maritime 
transport of oil as a decision-making tool to regulate (by limiting) vessel traffic. The 
main demands regarding prevention and management are summarised in box 3.4.1:  
Box 3.4.1 Focus groups’ demands on oil spill prevention and management  
1. R&D on oil spills, areas that may be affected by spills and citizen actions. 
This R&D was to be integrated into interdisciplinary team of experts that was 
expected to include local institutions.
2. The establishment of sacrifice areas was overall seen as a desirable option 
along with the proposal of using previously degraded areas for this purpose.
3. Investments in oil pollution fighting equipment such as tug boats, safety 
measures for volunteers, barriers and aerial surveillance.
4. More personnel to inspect and control vessel traffic.
5. Additional involvement of other civil servants such as trained personnel 
from the army to respond to major oil spills.  
Source: Focus groups 
In order to further analyse prevention and to help bridge the gap in the literature as 
regards the analysis of the benefits of sustainability (e.g. analysing WTP to preserve 
natural capital) as stated by Atkinson et al. (1997), focus groups were asked about 
their WTP to prevent future spills. The analysis of the responses to the valuation 
question is divided into three parts: clarifications requested by participants, choices 
made and determinants of WTP. Clarifications sought by FG participants underlined 
the relevance of payment specifications. Questions formulated included whether the 
payment vehicle would be coercive or voluntary despite the fact that FG participants 
were told that they would pay for improved oil spill management through taxes. As 
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expected, there were participants who opposed an increase in taxation stating ‘I would 
not pay extra taxes as I believe I pay enough for the government to do what it is 
supposed to do’ or ‘I would not be willing to pay because I don’t know exactly where 
the money will go to’ whereas others were less concerned about the payment vehicle ‘I 
would pay both via taxes or donations’. Some participants demanded an 
environmental fund that would serve to manage a bundle of environmental problems 
rather than funding a specific problem such as oil spills, signalling the possibility of 
finding biased answers in the final questionnaire.  
With few exceptions, voluntary payments did not raise opposition and one of the 
participants stated his higher WTP subject to a voluntary payment. Doubts remain on 
whether voluntary payments would be effectively made as free-rider behaviour has 
been observed (Bateman et al. 2002). Despite the fact that the scenario stated 
everyone would pay, focus group participants asked whether everyone would pay or 
only some citizens and whether payments would be progressive (i.e. higher taxes 
would be paid by wealthier citizens). They were also concerned about the timing of the 
payments, whether these would take place before the spill or after and whether the 
payment would be done in one go or in small instalments. The payment frequency 
(whether it would be a one-off payment or a repeated contribution) was also asked 
during the FG session. In the development of the survey these concerns were taken 
into account and a fully specified payment vehicle was presented (see annex A.3.1). 
The second concern regarding the WTP scenario was related to how the money would 
be spent. That is, greater specification than that initially offered in the exercise was 
demanded regarding which investment options would be included in the prevention 
and management plans, whether these would include prevention and safety measures, 
which mitigation measures would be pursued, whether compensation would be paid 
and what would happen to an annual payment if there were no accidents in a given 
year. These issues were addressed in the survey and tests of the main options were 
undertaken in the pilot.  
A further question regarding the purpose of the exercise voiced by FG5 in the following 
statements (‘Sula - I didn’t understand what you want; Sus - Neither did I) pointed 
towards the need to stress the rationale of the whole exercise. These comments 
signalled the need for further work on the valuation question as it was clear from the 
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discussion in the focus groups that there were problems in understanding the purpose 
of the exercise as well as its relevance. The researcher explained the purpose of the 
exercise FG participants answered the valuation question.  
The majority of FG participants (80%) were willing to pay to prevent medium and large 
spills75. The main reasons to pay were that investment in prevention and management 
plans would avoid future spills, that the effort was not unreasonable or that they were 
concerned about these spills. Demands for control and law abidance were repeated for 
example in FG3. The remaining 20% stated they would not pay. The reasons given for 
not being willing to pay were either the lack of resources, that others should pay or 
that they already paid enough taxes.  
The percentage of protest bids in this exercise was 12%. This figure is lower compared 
to protest responses reported in the CV literature (see for example Brouwer et al. 
2008, Atkinson et al. 2008, Jorgensen et al. 1999, Halstead et al. 1992, Strazzera et al. 
2003). A possible reason for this lower protest rate can be the limited number of FG 
respondents, the fact that FG participants self-selected themselves and hence may be 
more willing to engage in valuation-type exercises or the fact that the valuation 
question was placed near the end of the FG session and hence respondents may have 
been influenced by the information received.  
Protest answers were excluded from the calculations (Bateman et al. 2002). Answers 
were considered as protests if their WTP was zero plus participants stated as a 
motivation not to pay that others should pay (either vessel owners or the government) 
or they ranked consequences to the environment first in the sort card exercise 
(showing a high concern for the environment). As FG results cannot be generalised no 
broader conclusions can be drawn at this stage although the following chapters will 
analyse the issue in greater detail. 
Regarding the amounts respondents were willing to pay 59% stated they would pay 
50€ per year and 9 participants (18%) stated they would be WTP 400€ to manage 
future spills. Out of the 9 participants who stated they would be willing to pay 400€, 
seven (14% of the total amount of participants) chose a strong sustainability scenario 
in the compensation exercise and awarded very high or maximum concern to oil spills 
in the 1-10 concern scale explained below. These participants could be considered as 
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 Compared to a lower percentage of survey respondents (just above 54%) were willing to pay. 
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exhibiting strong sustainability preferences. The fact that these participants were not a 
representative sample means these results were only indicative of what may have 
been found when the final survey was administered. The main motivations of FG 
respondents’ answers on the willingness to pay question are summarised in table 3.4.6 
below: 
Table 3.4.6 Reasons for FG respondents’ answers to the willingness to pay question 
Variable Comment
Income Higher disposable income was acknowledged to be positively related to WTP answers by FG participants
Communication strategies
The greater the payment effort requested from participants, the greater 
demands for explanations on how the funds would be allocated. To 
illustrate, one FG participant said ‘I think we have to do something about 
the spills but there has to be information about where the money is 
invested and we have to see results’
Trust
FG participants were overall concerned with politicians’ trustworthiness 
when managing public funds. One of the participants stated ‘I don’t trust 
politicians to be honest and use the money appropriately. Once the money 
is paid we could find someone could steal the money and say there is no 
more money to manage the spill'. Providing information on who is spending 
the money and how the money is allocated and controlled were concluded 
to be confidence builders
Law enforcement and 
abiding
Participants were willing to pay for accidental oil spills provided law had 
been abided by agents in the maritime business. One FG participant 
illustrated this by saying: ‘I would be happy to pay if it is an accident but not 
if regulations have been ignored’
Payment and payment 
vehicle
As expected taxes were opposed by some of the interviewees. Interestingly 
other interviewees were supportive of earmarked taxation to manage spills 
yet others were indifferent regarding the payment vehicle. Questions 
regarding the duration of payment and the possibility of paying in small 
instalments were also raised. As is the case in income taxation in Spain 
progressive taxation was demanded by FG participants 
Convenience Some interviewees stated their WTP was subject to convenience and this payment is seen as satisfying the will to ‘do something’ about the issue
Decay effect Time decay and geographical distance were acknowledged to reduce WTP of FG participants  
Source: Focus groups 
In sum, the elite interviews and the focus groups were conducted in the midst of the 
regulatory development of oil spill management. This means that some operational 
and legislative initiatives such as the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and the salvage 
plans were in place whereas others (such as the Regional Contingency Plan, RCP) were 
still in the making. Elite interviewees and FG participants coincided on their demand 
for further R&D efforts as well as on their requests for further control.  
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Elites’ demands highlighted their expertise regarding the ongoing prevention and 
management strategies. Thus theirs alone is the demand for improvements in 
communication channels as well as demands for training seafarers and other technical 
personnel to be able to communicate in English. Elites also demanded international 
cooperation in sharing pollution fighting equipment and the development of 
continuously updated databases to keep track of available equipment and deployment 
times. FG participants on the other hand explicitly mentioned the need for 
interdisciplinary teams of experts that would include local authorities to manage oil 
spills.  
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 3.Outputs ii. Compensation strategies 
Two main concepts were discussed regarding compensation. First, the monetary 
compensation strategies and second the recovery strategies (Plan Galicia and Plan de 
Dinamización Economica de Galicia). International compensation mechanisms under 
the IMO76 limit the amount and the concepts for which any agent or institution can 
receive compensation (Mason, 2003). As Théaud et al. (undated: 2) state ‘a significant 
part of the estimated costs may not be internalized via the liability system under which 
the compensation of damages is carried out’. According to these authors two factors 
have traditionally limited compensation. First, the difficulty in calculating global cost 
estimates of spills. The second factor is the asymmetric power of maritime agents who 
behave strategically. Beyond limits in compensation and following a strong 
sustainability paradigm, there might be losses that cannot be compensated (Spash, 
1993). 
A schematic representation of compensation amounts along with a timeline of 
different spills is provided in figure 3.4.1 below.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
76
 The international framework applicable for compensation in Spain (Olmo García and Pintos Ager, 
2003) 
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Figure 3.4.1 Evolution of the Compensation Limits under CLC and IOPC77 Funds 
Source: González Laxe (2005) 
In Spain laws and royal decrees have been passed after major spills to regulate 
compensation78. The vast majority of claimants after the Prestige spill received money 
from the Spanish government. Then the government claimed before the IOPC Funds79. 
Claimants in Spain forfeited their right to future compensations when they accepted 
the governments’ funds. This is an interesting feature of the way compensation is 
claimed which is different from that of other European countries such as France for 
example where affected parties did not receive compensation from their government 
and claimed compensation directly from the international funds available under the 
CLC 92 and the IOPCF when the Erika spill happened.   
The existing compensation process means that Spanish citizens, through their tax 
payments end up funding compensation that is not paid for by the international 
instruments at hand. Hence, compensation for non-use values lost is not included in 
compensation schemes. This is illustrated by one of the elite interviewees involved in 
the coordination of prevention and management plans who stated ‘the issue is that the 
IOPCF compensated for 15 to 30% of the damages suffered and the Spanish 
Government paid compensation for 100% of the damages’. It therefore seems 
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 CLC is the acronym for Civil Liability Claim and IOPC is the acronym for International Oil Pollution 
Compensation 
78
 The legislation passed alter the Prestige included the Real Decreto Ley 4/2003 de 20 de junio and Real 
Decreto Ley 4/2004 de 2 de julio 
79
 http://www.iopcfund-docs.org/ds/pdf/92exc32-4-1_s.pdf 
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reasonable from a policy perspective to ask citizens whether they would want 
compensation and if so what type of compensation they would want. 
Elite interviewees all agreed that monetary compensation when an oil spill happened 
was a vital policy outcome. The speed in distributing these funds among affected 
parties was seen as both a political move to appease citizens (ML27C01R) and as a 
significant improvement compared to previous compensation paid in earlier spills. In 
contrast to what happened after the Prestige, agents affected by the Aegean Sea spill 
waited for over 10 years to receive compensation (FM09M02A, NL27SC04A). In any 
case, some environmental losses such as biodiversity losses could not be compensated 
according to (ML27C01R). 
Elite interviewees voiced concerns over the lack of a clear institutional framework that 
determines how oil spill compensation should work in future spills and raised the 
question of which Ministry (perhaps the Ministry of Economy) should channel this 
compensation. The recommendation in this area would be to have some sort of 
National Compensation Strategy that is an overarching compensation framework. This 
framework would be further specified and developed as plans or specific strategies 
once a spill takes place.  
The economic recovery plans (Plan Galicia and Plan de Dinamización Económica de 
Galicia) developed after the Prestige oil spill were also discussed in the elite 
interviews. These plans were modified and diluted with the change of government 
after general elections and regional elections80 (ML27C01R and SG27SC04S).  Again the 
views of the conservative government representative versus political opponents and 
other stakeholders were divergent. The main argument voiced by the conservative 
party representative was the adequate analysis of the needs of Galicia after the spill. 
He claimed that this resulted in investments by the government according to ministries 
requirements. The Plan Galicia was in his view a ‘well thought out plan in which the 
budget entries (headings) corresponded to the demands made by each ministry’ (ibid.). 
This statement is backed by the information obtained from a regional civil servant in 
the pollution fighting area (NL27SC04A) who confirmed he was asked about his needs 
before the Plan Galicia was approved. Neither of these representatives were however 
                                               
80
 See for example the testimonial reference made in the PEIT with regards to the Plan Galicia.  
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able to provide any factual data or internal memos that explained the decision-making 
process with regards to the economic recovery plans.  
Industry representatives, although showing a positive attitude towards the economic 
recovery plans, did highlight the political nature of these plans subject to lobby 
pressure, subject also to an international situation (that of the renegotiation of EU’s 
structural funds) that could halt infrastructure investment in Galicia, a less developed 
region in Spain according to the industry representative interviewed. ‘It was seen as 
the opportunity to incorporate Galicia to Spain’s development path. The goal of the 
Plan Galicia was to pay the ‘historical debt’ by the state (that includes among other an 
infrastructure deficit) and provide funds before the EU considered the adhesion of new 
member states and thus the structural fund flow to Spain ceased’ (SG27SC04S).  These 
factors shaped, according to this industry representative, the outcome of the 
economic recovery plans. Critical views regarding the economic recovery plans (voiced 
by GL26C01F, NR&MTC21C03X, ML27C01R and NJFMG10M04C) state that these plans 
were only a political marketing strategy. Furthermore, according to NL27SC04A, 
GL26C01F and NR&MTC21C03X, investments that were planned and approved before 
the Prestige oil spill were ‘repackaged and relabelled’ as the Plan Galicia. This 
statement is backed by González Laxe’s (2003) analysis of the economic recovery 
plans. 
The overwhelmingly higher investment in the economic recovery plans compared to 
the damage claims presented to the IOPC fund suggest there were additional (mainly 
political) reasons for these plans other than the damages that could be valued in 
monetary terms. Investing in inland infrastructure more than half of the National Plan 
when the spill occurred on the coast did not make sense according to GL26C01F, 
ML27C01R, TA25C04O and LD26SC04B. The most representative statement of this line 
of argument was given by LD26SC04B who stated that ‘after analysing the Plan Galicia 
we concluded it was the first black tide that had no environmental consequences’. This 
surprise regarding the scant references and actions (of the Plan Galicia and the Plan de 
Dinamización Económica de Galicia) to invest in environmental projects could point 
towards demands for stronger version of sustainable development compared to that 
exhibited by industry representatives or politicians interviewed.  
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The businessmen representative interviewed (SG27SC04S) as well as maritime 
businessmen representatives (AQL&GA23C03J) welcomed the investment, possibly 
exhibiting a weak sustainability approach to the solution given by the government. The 
absence of economic and environmental analysis and the lack of data explaining why 
the money was allocated the way it was also pointed towards the political nature of 
the response. A summary table of the main findings is provided below in table 3.4.6. 
Table 3.4.6 Economic recovery plans: main comments according to elite interviewees 
Opposed/partially opposed to the economic recovery plans: 
Political opponents (nationalist and socialist party 
representatives), civil servants and NGO’s
Well thought out plan. Not 
improvised Political response to the spill
Investment planned according to 
ministries requirements
Previous investment ‘repackaged’ as Plan Galicia without 
economic or environmental analysis
‘Investments are good although 
they are the result of a Historical 
debt’ 
Government response to historical infrastructure deficit in Galicia 
(known as the ‘historical debt’) thus not solving the damage or 
reducing the risk
Investments are good although 
there are no execution dates (they 
lack specificity)  
Investment was much greater than damages caused and scant 
funds were allocated to worst affected areas (only 0.7% of the 
budget was allocated to these areas). No explanation was offered 
regarding how the funds were allocated. 
Investments in infrastructures and unrelated marine activities. 
‘After analysing the Plan Galicia we concluded it was the first 
black tide that had no environmental consequences’LD26SC04B
The economic recovery plans were a tool used to counteract the 
bad communication strategy of the government. Thus ‘everything 
was Plan Galicia’ TA25C04O
Historical debt + Prestige + EU 
structural fund renegotiation + 
lobby pressure = Plan Galicia
Funds coming from National Budget and only partially recovered 
by recourse to IOPC funds. 
Largely backing the economic recovery plans: 
Conservative party representative, businessmen 
representative & ship agent
Conservative party
Industry 
representatives Investments are good but infrastructure investment 
responded to industrial lobby 
pressure and threat to take 
business from Galicia if railway 
infrastructures were not built
 
Source: Elite interviews 
Two broad issues were discussed when analysing compensation strategies in FG 
sessions. Initially, monetary compensation paid to directly affected parties was 
discussed. Later on, FG participants were briefed about how compensation schemes 
work. Finally, the hypothetical compensation packages were presented for participants 
to choose from.  
The main comments regarding monetary compensation paid to directly affected 
agents (e.g. fishermen) was greeted by FG participants with positive attitudes as they 
were seen as an effective mitigation measure for economic losses (FG4). Some FG 
participants however judged payments as excessive compared to the money recipients 
would have made in the absence of a spill (FG5, FG6). There was nevertheless a 
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generalised feeling that this money had also been used to ‘calm people down’. This 
comment coincides with some of the elite interviewees’ assessments of compensatory 
payments provided by the government in the aftermath of the Prestige spill. In 
addition, trust issues were voiced regarding the allocation of compensation funds with 
participants in FG1 stating that they would not trust the government to provide 
compensation in future spills.   
During the FG sessions participants were asked to choose their preferred 
compensation ‘package’. The compensation exercise presented three hypothetical 
compensation options, one in which after the spill the government would invest in 
infrastructures (assuming man-made capital could substitute natural capital), another 
one in which there would be a replacement of natural capital for lost natural capital 
(replacing like-for-like) and finally a scenario in which preventive measures to protect 
certain areas is ensured (surveillance and vessel transport limits are set to protect 
especially valuable areas).  
The compensation options included in the FG protocol were believed to be 
theoretically feasible scenarios given the fact that the plans for investment in 
infrastructures in fact took place in the aftermath of the Prestige81, replacement 
strategies were suggested by elite interviewees as well as by experts from the ITOPF82, 
and that the third compensation package (that of prevention through surveillance, 
establishment of sacrifice areas and push for unlimited liability) was also suggested by 
experts consulted in the elite interview process and move towards satellite vigilance 
has been advanced by the EMSA83.  
Focus group participants overwhelmingly preferred the strong sustainability 
compensation options. Replacing like-for-like or preserving natural capital through 
prevention programs were chosen over receiving compensation in the form of 
investments in man-made capital.  FG participants even suggested getting rid of this 
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 Plan Galicia and Plan de Dinamización Económica de Galicia. The national and regional economic 
recovery investment plans approved in the aftermath of the Prestige.  
82
 http://www.itopf.com/environ.pdf 
83
 EMSA is the acronym for European Maritime Safety Agency.  It should be noted however that in the 
final survey this last preventive option was taken out of the compensation scenarios and replaced by the 
theoretically driven proposal by Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) who proposed that when faced with 
environmental losses, monetary compensation may not be adequate but compensation in say schools or 
hospitals may be more appropriate. Focus group comments as well as the pilot interviews conducted for 
this thesis backed the change in compensation scenarios. The information on prevention was nevertheless 
used in the final questionnaire to build the WTP exercise in stating the provision of prevention to 
respondents.   
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policy option (investment in man-made capital) or the possibility of allocating all 
investment funds to prevention or restoration programs. FG participants did however 
state that they would have preferred that the exercise had allowed them to choose ‘a 
bit of everything’ rather than forcing them to choose just one compensation option. 
The main reasons given for choosing each option are as follows. For the few FG 
participants that chose investments in man-made capital as the preferred 
compensation option, the main reason was that the economy was the most ‘important 
thing’.  
When choosing replacing like-for-like FG participants stated that the investments in 
restoring and replacing the damaged environment would help minimise the damage 
caused by the spill. Restoration was said by some participants to be the most 
important initiative once a spill has taken place, ‘I would choose restoration in both 
cases as I think the most important thing to do once a spill has happened is to restore 
first and then, in the medium term, to prevent’.  
The main reasons for choosing the third compensation option (i.e. investments in 
safety and prevention) included that it was the cheapest option, it would save money 
(in terms of not having to manage future spills) and it was seen as an effective tool to 
prevent further oil spills. The prevention option was also seen as an efficient ‘insurance 
policy’, ‘I would choose option 3 in both cases because advances on safety measures 
for boats should entail fewer accidents and the government would not have to invest so 
much in these accidents’. Additionally, the consequences of a large spill with 
potentially irreversible losses and the consideration of the environment as the basis for 
all other activities (primary value) were also mentioned by some of the FG participants 
when asked about the reasons for their choice. One of the FG participants said ‘I would 
choose option 3 in both scenarios as I believe it’s the basis of everything. I think we 
could have a little bit less ‘modernity’ of these things (infrastructures) that are so 
expensive in order to help other things to which we assign little importance such as 
flora, fauna, the sea’.  
It must be highlighted that in order to avoid further politicization over past 
government investment initiatives, FG participants were not told that the 
compensation option that entailed investing in infrastructures largely corresponded to 
the bulk of the investment plans approved by the Spanish regional and national 
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governments in the aftermath of the Prestige spill. The technical nature of budget 
entries and the fact that the spill happened in 2002 and the FG took place in 2007 
makes it unlikely that FG participants would link the policy option that implied 
investment in infrastructures to past government investment initiatives. In fact no one 
in the FG’s was aware of the budget passed by the government. Thus the possibility of 
dismissing policy option 1 (investments in infrastructures) by respondents due to 
outrage or opposition of the previous government could be discarded. That policy 
option was retained in the final survey as the status quo compensation package.  
Both elites and FG participants viewed monetary compensation as a needed and 
positive response by the Spanish government in the aftermath of a spill. The positive 
outlook was qualified by elites and FG participants as they acknowledged the political 
move to appease citizens, which was partially engineered through these payments.  
Budget entries for the economic recovery plans were analysed by elites and then used 
in the FG sessions as one of the compensation packages offered.  Elite interviewees 
answered in line with either their political or professional persona. Support for the 
economic recovery plans was voiced by the conservative representative, business 
representative and civil servant in the regional fisheries department. Opposition and 
criticisms to the recovery plans were expressed by academics, nationalists, civil 
servants in the regional civil defence service department and the NGO representative.  
FG participants’ answers showed that most respondents preferred either the 
compensation scenario in which there was replacement of natural assets for damaged  
natural assets or the compensation package that was devoted to prevention. 
Investment in infrastructures was preferred by a fifth of FG participants in the first two 
FGs and by none of the remaining FG participants.  
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 4. Substitutability 
‘substitution is a matter of individual’s subjective preferences…if people belief in 
some principle such as avoiding the loss of a resource, then it would be wrong 
for experts to assume that one resource is a perfectly good substitute for 
another’ (Bateman et al. 2002: 75) 
Among elite interviewees a clear divide was shown with regards to the possibility of 
substituting man-made capital for damaged natural capital. Nationalist party and civil 
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society representatives favoured a strong sustainability stance. They stated either the 
limited substitution possibilities or the impossibility of substituting certain resources. 
In this sense, they questioned economic recovery plans that assumed substitutability 
across different types of capital and compensation in the form of man-made capital.  
Hence, nationalists, civil society representatives and the civil servant working in 
biodiversity and natural spaces management argued that biodiversity losses for 
example could not be substituted but that the loss of certain commercial species (i.e. 
fish and shell-fish) could be substituted through the restocking of species. This 
statement encouraged the possibility of exploring the substitution of ‘like’ natural 
capital for lost natural capital in the compensation question in the FG (and later in the 
survey). An additional asset that could not be substituted and for which no adequate 
compensation existed was cultural heritage according to elites.  
Other elite interviewees, including the businessmen representative, the civil servant 
working in the fisheries regional government and the conservative representative 
signalled a weak sustainability approach to environmental losses. They showed 
support for the economic recovery plans (that implicitly assumed substitutability 
among different types of capital) and they said compensation packages were 
adequate. 
The reasons for their support for the economic recovery (compensation) plans 
included the existence of a ‘historical debt’ in terms of a GDP and infrastructure 
development gap between Galicia and the rest of Spain. This was coupled with the re-
negotiation of EU structural funds that were expected to reduce the amount of EU 
infrastructure money received by Spain. In addition, a powerful lobby in Galicia (the 
automobile industry) threatened the government to relocate part of its business 
elsewhere if infrastructures were not included in the economic recovery plans. These 
findings plus the analysis of the economic recovery plans provided the rationale for 
testing a weak sustainability compensation scenario in the FGs as well as in the final 
survey.  
The focus groups explored the issue of substitutability of different types of capital 
through both the follow-up questions in the compensation exercise and as the general 
comments made throughout the focus group session.  
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A wide range of opinions were expressed regarding the substitutability of different 
forms of capital. Some respondents did not understand the rationale behind having 
roads and railways built as compensation for an environmental loss, ‘But what does 
this have to do with an oil spill?  If we have a spill in the sea what the hell do I want a 
motorway for?. Other respondents stated that all compensation packages were good, 
on different grounds, and therefore having a bit of everything seemed as an attractive 
option. Half of the FGs mentioned that money could compensate for economic losses 
but that other losses (flora and fauna) could not be made up for with money (FG3). 
This opinion pointed towards the existence of intra-category substitutability (i.e. 
substitution within, say, man-made capital) but to a lack of inter-category 
substitutability (i.e. no or limited substitution between different forms of capital). In 
addition, there was explicit recognition by participants in two of the focus groups of 
the economy being a subsystem of the environment, stating that economic activities 
depended on flora and fauna which were the ‘important things’ (FG2, FG8). 
Elite interviewees as well as FG participants showed a wide range of views regarding 
the possibility of substituting different types of capital. Pro economic growth 
respondents thought substitution of man-made capital for natural capital was 
desirable as boosting the economy would bring much needed economic growth and 
would bridge the development gap between Galicia and the rest of Spain. On the other 
hand some respondents both from the elite group and from the FG sessions did not 
understand and were opposed to the weak sustainability assumption made by the 
economic recovery plans. Within the respondents who opposed the man-made capital 
compensation package some of them considered replacing damaged natural assets 
with like natural assets thus walking the path of the softer version of the strong 
sustainability paradigm. This broad array of views among both elites and FG 
participants encouraged a further analysis of compensation options and attitudes 
towards substitutability in the survey.  
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 5.Limits and thresholds 
As was stated in the literature review chapter, sustainability entails development 
subject to nature’s limits both as a source and as a sink (Pearce et al. 1989). The use of 
natural resources beyond these limits can lead to situations in which there are 
irreversible losses. In order to manage marine resources in a sustainable manner these 
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limits would have to be respected. Elite interviewees were asked about natural 
resource management in order to develop within system’s limits and about irreversible 
losses that may affect marine resources.  
According to elite interviewees specialised in maritime resource management 
initiatives the divide between commercially relevant environmental goods and non-
market goods is notable. With international agreements in the background of 
management initiatives84, fishing activities have clearly established management 
guidelines that use the TAC85 system. This system is based on limiting the quantity of 
fish caught based on scientific research with the goal of maintaining non-diminishing 
fish stocks. Thus, following the guidelines of the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), precautionary biomass (Bpa) levels are established. 
These limits ensure the resources are not at risk even considering natural fluctuations. 
The ICES also establishes a limit reproductive biomass (Blim) below which the resource 
is in grave danger of having diminishing stocks. Between the precautionary biomass 
and the limit biomass the risk of having diminishing resources increases exponentially. 
There is also an equilibrium biomass (Beq) that provides information on fluctuations 
with regards to a reference year (which is normally the previous year). ‘This data 
provides information for decision-makers regarding the possible consequences of 
altering the fishing effort’ (PM09M05J).  
The problems related to fishing management initiatives are varied. Once scientists 
have determined these levels (Bpa, Blim and Beq) and once they have produced their 
reports and recommendations, the TAC system undergoes a political bargaining 
process. This process results in consideration of economic and social factors that lead 
to increases in the final catch which can lead to overexploitation according to 
GL26C01F and PM09M05J.  
Non-market environmental goods, including sensitive and environmentally relevant 
areas such as National parks, exhibit less concrete and less known management 
policies in Galicia with little or non-existent specific protection against oil spills 
according to GL26C01F, ML27C01R and FD01SC08R. The recommended approach 
towards especially sensitive areas would depend both on the characteristics of the 
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 See for example OSPAR agreements (http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html) and ICES 
guidelines (http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp)  
85
 Note TAC is the acronym for Total Allowable Catch.  
 129 
environment and the activities to be carried out in the area according to FD01SC08R. 
Thus, physical planning of these especially sensitive areas should entail firstly 
identifying habitats to be protected and the elements within them; secondly, 
identifying those activities that are expected to take place within the given areas or 
activities that may affect these areas (i.e. maritime traffic). Thirdly, physical planning 
should require the determination of the level of compatibility between the habitat and 
the activities. The final task will require designing territory planning according to 
compatibility criteria.  
According to elite interviewees and (WWF, 2010) the problem (in Galicia as well as in 
other coastal areas) is that environmental protection is very recent and marine areas 
are not effectively protected even if protection has been granted on paper. In fact 
there were no marine protected areas in Galicia when the elite interviews took place86. 
Protection of the sea as a public good is seen as the great challenge by FD01SC08R. On 
a more positive outlook, the implementation of Natura 2000 Network is expected 
(ibid.) to bring greater protection to environmentally relevant non-commercial species 
and areas.  
Furthermore, the Spanish Oceanographic Institute is currently working on ecosystem 
indicators although no further information was provided by PM09M05J, regarding 
those indicators. The aim of their ongoing research is to find ‘sustainable stocks in 
healthy ecosystems’ (PM09M05J) and find parameters in which to base management 
decisions. This, according to PM09M05J, is in line with the EU Water Directive and with 
the forthcoming maritime strategy which will consider salinity, ichtyoplankton, 
phytoplankton,87 the presence of invertebrates and biodiversity of marine areas as 
marine indicators.    
The above information highlighted the fact that protection is closely linked to economic 
importance of assets at risk. International Environmental Agreements (IEA’s), national 
laws and urban planning initiatives provide the legal framework for protecting non-
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 Proposals to designate marine protected areas (MPA) in the area of ‘Cachucho’ and ‘Banco de Galicia’ 
were being developed by NGO’s as well as by the Spanish Oceanographic Institute. As of February 2010 
only the former has been designated MPA.   
87
 Ichtyoplankton are fish eggs and larvae (http://csrd.lau.edu.lb)  
Phytoplankton. ‘These are tiny organisms with the ability to convert sunlight, warmth, water and minerals 
into protein, carbohydrates, vitamins and amino acids which marked the beginning of life. Phytoplankton, 
the single-cell plants are the basis of all other life forms on planet earth, they are the 'vegetation' of the 
ocean. Phytoplankton are responsible for making up to 90% of Earth's oxygen. Phytoplankton are the 
food utilized by the worlds largest and longest living animals and fish’. (http://www.whyplankton.com/)  
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market environmental goods. Growing citizen environmental awareness and 
government acknowledgement of this awareness bring conservation initiatives higher 
up in the policy agenda. The regulatory ‘thrill’ derived from the Prestige oil spill (Tan, 
2006) seems to suggest a future of increased protection and awareness. The speed and 
depth of policy-making and policy implementation will however depend on the 
pressing issues local, regional and central government institutions have to deal with. 
The fact that policy-making is reactive in Spain in this area (Viñas, 2009) even if spills 
are recurrent, suggests caution as regards environmental protection expectations in 
this area.  
The ideas of system’s limits to withstand shocks and the idea of thresholds and 
irreversible losses were analysed in FG’s explicitly through an exercise depicting a large 
oil spill that would imply trespassing system thresholds so that the ‘environment 
collapsed’. FG participants were asked to discuss how the threshold situation 
presented would affect them, if at all, and what they would do about it (if anything).  
The goal was to understand whether respondents were familiar with the idea of 
thresholds, limits and irreversible losses. By presenting a situation in which limits could 
be trespassed and irreversible losses could happen, the credibility of such a situation 
was to be gauged as well as FG participants’ beliefs, attitudes and intentions.  
As expected, there was a wide variety of responses and issues raised in this exercise. 
Some respondents stated that they expected a situation such as the one described to 
arise sometime in the future (FG3, FG7). Other respondents were more sceptical about 
the scenario presented and affirmed flora and fauna were resilient, especially in a 
dynamic environment such as the sea. As one of the FG4 participants stated ‘the spill 
would have to be huge to affect species’. Broader issues regarding lifestyle choices 
were mentioned by participants in FG3 as the real danger in terms of reaching 
thresholds rather than a single spill causing irreversible losses. Overall, FG participants 
regarded the hypothetical threshold and irreversibility situation as a plausible one 
either as a consequence of repeated spills or as a consequence of ‘other’ threats.  
Concern (worry) about environmental losses was shaped by the direct use FG 
participants made of the damaged environment, time and distance decay effect, 
biodiversity losses, economic consequences, governments’ actions and the repeated 
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nature of the spills. The determinants of FG participants’ concern in threshold 
situations are depicted in table 3.4.7 below: 
Table 3.4.7 Concern drivers in threshold situations 
Variable Comment
Use Direct use and contact with the affected environment increases concern regarding the threshold situation 
Trust
FG participants stated that trust issues had a bearing on their concern. As was the case in 
elite interviews, information and transparency as well as the possibility of verifying what 
was happening and control over allocation of funds were seen as elements that would affect 
their concern
Decay effects Both time and distance from the event reduce the concern expressed by FG participants
Biodiversity 
losses
Range of views. Some participants were highly concerned about biodiversity loss, 
mentioning the insurance value of biodiversity whereas others acknowledge biodiversity 
loss as a ‘natural and ongoing process’ 
Economic 
losses
Following a pro economic growth rationale some FG participants were mostly concerned 
about economic losses (that would mean fewer resources would be available to protect the 
environment). Other participants were however less concerned about economic losses 
Government 
actions
Government response if a situation such as the one described happened was said to 
increase FG participants’ concern (i.e. if the government was seen to be actively engaging in 
the management of the spill, citizens would be more worried). However, participants were 
sceptical about the government’s ability to provide an adequate response to such a spill.  
Repeated spills Previous spills were acknowledged to have increased awareness and concern of participants  
Source: Focus groups 
If a spill such as the one described happened participants’ intentions included seeking 
information from the media, volunteering subject to convenience, donating money, 
changing consumption habits and even migrating. Changes in consumption habits were 
discussed by participants from some of the FG’s without a university degree (FG3 and 
FG6). These groups discussed both the possibility of exploring alternative energy 
sources to reduce oil transport and the personal sacrifices they would be willing to 
undertake in terms of reducing their energy use. On this last point participants in FG3 
acknowledged that their behaviour would be contingent on the behaviours of others, 
indirectly referring to the ‘subjective norm’ and actions of others as drivers for their 
own actions.    
The demands expressed by FG participants in a threshold type situation included 
planning, prevention and mitigation strategies which were also the building blocks of 
part of the sustainability strategies voiced by elite interviewees. FG participants 
requested sufficient equipment and expert advice to respond to a potentially large spill 
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with irreversible consequences. Punitive and legal measures were also called for in 
order to ensure polluters were held responsible for the damage caused. 
Comparing elites and FG views on limits and thresholds we saw the expected expert 
versus non-expert knowledge divide. Elite interviewees working in the field of 
environmental protection and natural resource management provided a technical 
explanation on the framework for analysing and observing environmental limits. 
Analysis of limits is clearly linked to the commercial value of the species. The 
protection of non-commercial species and areas in the sea is acknowledged to be very 
recent and patchy (in the policy development front). Environmental indicators are 
being developed to analyse the state of ecosystems but work in this area is in its 
infancy in Spain. The basic threats to system limits were said to be related primarily 
with overexploitation of resources, habitat destruction and pollution. Oil spills were 
seen as a threat although recovery from oil spills such as the Prestige was expected to 
take about 15 years (GL26C01F).  
FG respondents overall had no problem in grasping the idea of system limits and even 
referred to the possibility of reaching these limits either as a consequence of repeated 
spills or as a result of other human induced threats (that largely coincide with the 
threats mentioned by elites). Other respondents were more sceptical about the idea of 
system limits being reached arguing that the environment, and especially the marine 
environment in Galicia, was dynamic, resilient and showed a remarkable recovery 
capacity.  
I. Sustainable development: A) Oil spills: 6. Equity  
Intragenerational equity concerns were repeatedly voiced by most elite interviewees 
who overall assigned great importance to people directly affected by oil spills. They 
called for compensation to directly affected parties, particularly fishermen, and saw 
monetary compensation as a priority in case a new spill happened (NL27SC04A, 
FM09M02A, LD26SC04B, TA25C04O and GL26C01F). 
Elite interviewees were overall more concerned about the immediate consequences of 
the spill than about the long term consequences (NJFMG10M04C, ML27C01R) 
although there were calls for more future oriented policy-making (ML27C01R). Some 
references to future generations were made when answering the last question of the 
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elite interview on sustainable development. The nationalist party and the NGO 
representative stated that concern about present generations was greater that 
concern about future generations although they qualified this by stating that after the 
Prestige some fishermen had started demanding measures to preserve certain 
maritime areas to ensure fishing resources for future generations. 
Most focus groups expressed a positive attitude about both people that might be 
affected in the present generation (e.g. fishermen) and by generations to come (e.g. 
their children and grandchildren). Bequest values, insurance values and existence 
values were mentioned as reasons to be concerned about present and future 
environmental losses derived from oil spills. In addition to this, there were broader 
claims to act at an individual level ‘for the common good’ (FG6), clearly signalling that 
some FG participants were stepping into the shoes of their ‘social persona’ when 
thinking about their intentions regarding environmental goods and services.  
Not all participants were concerned about others and future generations though. In 
fact one of the participants in FG2 was adamant about solving present problems and 
immediate damages rather than devoting any resources to future occurrences. 
Normative beliefs, regarding what had to be done regarding equity, included the need 
for monetary compensation to directly affected parties as well as a change in 
education and a more ‘environmentally friendly’ way of life for future generations.  
Elite interviewees and FG participants coincide in the high priority assigned to people 
within the present generation that were affected by the spill. Political responsibilities 
and the constraint of re-election may explain these concerns. FGs concern may be 
explained by the fact that the FG setting encouraged respondents to think about a 
broad range of consequences thus tapping into the social behaviour of participants.  
FG participants were more explicit about their intergenerational equity concerns 
compared with elites. FG participants repeatedly referred to their descendants and to 
the future when analysing oil spills and their consequences. Additionally, they 
expressed the worth on non-market environmental goods and services referring to 
their insurance and bequest value. This was interesting as none of the elite 
interviewees explicitly mentioned the relevance of these values for decision-making. 
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I. Sustainable development: B) Other factors affecting sustainability 
Accidental oil spills are visible, media-frenzy occurrences and policy accelerators. They 
raise environmental management in the policy agenda but they are not the only issue 
to consider when analysing sustainability of marine resources. Overexploitation of 
resources, habitat destruction, operational oil discharges, climate change and pollution 
dumped in the sea from urban areas threaten the coast. Elite interviewees were asked 
about these threats. The background and training of interviewees influenced, as was 
expected, the perception of what the main threats to marine natural resources were.  
With regards to oil pollution as a threat to natural resources, interviewees with 
experience in oil pollution management as well as nationalists, socialists and NGO’s 
that would include GL26C01F, ML27C01R, NR&MTC21C03X, LD26SC04B, SG27SC04S 
and NL27SC04A) said oil pollution as the main threat for Galicia88. Other interviewees 
acknowledged the fact that oil pollution was a recurrent threat in Galicia but its 
consequences were not perceived as irreversible, except for the loss of biodiversity 
(LD26SC04B), the loss of santiaguiños and guillemot (ML27C01R), or the decline in 
octopus and Dublin Bay Prawn as well as the country’s image loss (SG27SC04S). One of 
the interviewees with experience in oceanography (PM09M05J), stated however that 
pollution in Galicia’s waters is not a concern and that the situation had stabilised with 
regards to the water quality before the Prestige oil spill. This interviewee recommends 
caution however in the interpretation of data as only a limited amount of time had 
gone by since the spill and effects derived from the oil slick could still affect the marine 
environment.  
Overexploitation of fishing resources was seen as a serious threat by academics 
(GL26C01F), nature conservation experts (PM09M05J and FD01SC08R) and one of the 
nationalist representative (ML27C01R). On the other hand, when asked about 
overexploitation one of the civil servants interviewed with experience in oil pollution 
management (NL27SC04A) suggested that bans and adequate management were the 
solution to overexploitation given the outcrop phenomenon and great regenerative 
capacity of the sea in Galicia. 
                                               
88
 Note that on average since 1970 every 6 or 7 years Galicia experiences a major oil spill on its coasts. It 
is thus a ‘hotspot’ for accidental as well as operational oil spills. According to Tan (2006) spills may be 
accidental (non-intentional) such as the Prestige oil spill, and operational (intentional) that would include 
bilge cleansing activities or ballast water disposal.  
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Further factors that were mentioned to varying degrees of intensity as threats to 
Galicia’s marine environment were climate change according to PM09M05J and 
FD01SC08R, municipal urban waste disposal onto the estuaries according to 
NL27SC04A and habitat destruction89 according to PM09M05J.   
In addition to accidental oil spills, and largely coinciding with the main ideas voiced by 
elite interviewees, FG participants mentioned the following threats to maritime 
sustainability, in addition to accidental spills. These include: 
• Operational discharges from vessels 
• Overexploitation of fishing resources through the use of trawling boats 
• Urban pollution that may end up in the sea such as ‘cooking oil’ 
• Other accidental spills (e.g. fertilizers that are transported by sea) 
The fact that both elite interviewees and FG participants mentioned similar threats 
was relevant to the design of the valuation question as it provided background 
information and (hopefully) a credible setting to frame the willingness to pay question.  
In sum, elite interviewees and FG participants’ views on the threats to marine 
resources were very similar. In addition to accidental oil spills, operational spills, 
overexploitation of resources and urban pollution were mentioned by both elites and 
FG participants.  Elite interviewees mentioned climate change, which was not 
mentioned in FG discussions. FG participants on the other hand provided more 
practical and individual examples to illustrate their beliefs and demands regarding 
these threats.  
II. Context: A) Policy inputs & Environment 
Aprioku (2003: 99) argues that ‘oil-spill hazards are more than isolated engineering 
malfunctions. They can be alternatively understood as reflections of the social, 
economic and political contexts in which they occur’. Other scholars, Roberts (2004), 
reflect the same idea in a broader policy context as we have seen in section 3.2 above. 
Thus, the context in which oil spills take place was analysed in the elite interviews due 
to its policy relevance and the usefulness of contextual features in the development of 
credible valuation scenarios.  
                                               
89
 Habitat destruction caused by economic development of activities such as mussel production and its 
derived organic waste.  
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  II. Context: A) Policy inputs & Environment 1. Agents 
The context in which the maritime business develops is acknowledged to be a complex 
one by elite interviewees (GL26C01F and AQL&GA23C03J). In addition to this 
complexity in the maritime business we have to remember the polycentric, multi-level 
and multi-agent policy environment discussed above with regards to oil pollution 
prevention, management and compensation in Spain. The EU renegotiation of 
structural funds in the aftermath of the Prestige, also discussed earlier, provides the 
last element of the context within which policy-making takes place. To complement 
the institutional governance structure presented above a simplified illustration of the 
oil transport business is provided in figure 3.4.2 below: 
Figure 3.4.2 Agents in the Maritime Business 
Source: Gonzálex Laxe (2005) 
The perceptions of FG participants regarding government actions (e.g. prevention, 
management and compensation) in past oil spills was overall negative. These negative 
attitudes about the government included perceptions of an overly complex and 
inefficient institutional framework, lack of preparedness, slow response, insufficient 
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means, in terms of both, equipment and personnel, political rather than expert-led 
decision-making process, etc. A positive perception was expressed however when 
analysing monetary compensation paid to directly affected parties acknowledging 
these payments had helped minimise economic losses. Graphically, these attitudes are 
presented in figure 3.4.3  
Figure 3.4.3 FG views on government actions regarding past spills 
 Source: Based on Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Birklan and Lawrence (2002), Birkland (1998) and on information 
obtained in focus groups. 
 
On the other hand FG participants thought there should be changes in the behaviours 
of agents involved in oil spills. These changes are summarised in table 3.4.8 below: 
 
Prior: beliefs & attitudes & 
normative beliefs 
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Plus: 
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Table 3.4.8 FG participants’ views on the main agents involved in oil spills  
FG Agent Statement
Is the institution that should manage spills rather than rely heavily on volunteers but if 
volunteers help out, the government should be prepared to provide equipment, training 
and accommodation for them
Is expected to ‘make tough choices’ regarding for example sacrifice areas and design 
compensation mechanisms for these areas
Is seen as responsible for the protection of citizens
Expenditure in R&D, education, safety measures and more generally prevention should 
increase
Is expected to engage in a learning process after spills have happened 
One governmental institution should coordinate all means and responses
Suspected of mismanagement of funds by some and trusted by other participants
Is purported as a reactive institution still unaware of its lack of means to respond to oil 
spills
Is accused of being ‘shut off’ to citizens
Expected to provide truthful information to citizens
All governmental levels from local to national are expected to be involved in planning 
Army Should be properly trained if they are to respond to oil spills
Is expected to have a significant impact on civil society as well as on reactive policy making 
(see Downs, 1972)
Another main role is as information provider although suspicions of political bias are 
mentioned
Convenience and time available are expected to affect the willingness to volunteer
Some FG participants were against volunteering as they thought the government should 
have enough means to manage spills
Demands for the polluter pays principle to be established were expressed
Should insure their vessels (this is a legal requirement so the demand reflects the lack of 
specialised knowledge of FG participants regarding legal requirements)
Penal sanctions are requested over and above administrative sanctions and fines
Attitudes are influenced by the severity and proximity of the spill as well as by 
governments’ response to the spill
There is a ‘growing concern regarding environmental issues’
Co-responsible for environmental protection based on environmental resources that have 
been passed on from past generations
Other 
governments Reactive policy making is also perceived at the EU level
International 
institutions Other countries are expected to be informed about future spills as was the case in the past
6, 8 Experts Interdisciplinary teams of experts are expected to provide information and answers in oil spill situations
3, 6
1,2,3,4,
5,6,7,8
Spanish 
Government
Media
2,3,4,5,
8
Volunteers
Polluters
Citizens
 
Source: Focus groups 
These attitudes and demands were voiced throughout the FG sessions and were not 
explicitly sought by any single exercise.  
Contextual factors affecting sustainable development were hence discussed by both 
elites and FG participants. Both groups coincided on demanding better oil spill 
management, increased coordination and a unified decision-making institution, further 
expert-led de-politicised decision-making, investments in R&D to increase the 
information on the baseline state and evolution of the environment and more 
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technical and personal means to fight oil spills. Tougher sanctions were also requested 
by both groups with elites calling for increased liability and FG participants requesting 
penal sanctions to be established. 
A more permeable, transparent and bi-directional flow of information was also seen as 
vital in future spills by elites and FG participants alike. There is a more or less tacit 
acknowledgement of a growing pro-ecological worldview which is expected (by elites) 
to put some pressure on policy-makers. This is so despite the recognition that citizens’ 
behavioural changes were seen as partial and subject to convenience by FG 
participants.  
Elites and FG participants saw the international policy-making framework as a reactive 
one. The nationalist party representative called for a self-sufficient response 
independent of the aid (means) of other countries. This contrasts with the 
international agreements signed that consider calling on other countries in the events 
where Spanish oil spill management means are not sufficient to deal with the damage 
of an accidental spill.  
II. Context: A) Policy inputs & Environment 2. Resources 
The importance of fishing, shell-fishing and aquaculture was stated as the main 
relevant feature of natural resources. The economic relevance of these activities 
largely explains this consensus statement voiced by GL26C01F, ML27C01R, 
FM09M02A, NJFMG10M04C, SG27SC04S, NL27SC04A, LD26SC04B, PM09M05J and 
NR&MTC21C03X. The factual data provided to support this idea included: the 
percentage of Galicia’s GDP these activities yield, the number of people directly and 
indirectly employed by the fishing sector, the high percentage of Galicia’s private firms’ 
turnover provided by the firms located in littoral areas provide, the amount of 
population living near the coast and the weight of these activities in the international 
arena. The relevance of tourism activities was also mentioned although no factual data 
was provided. 
Environmentally trained interviewees (PM09M05J and FD01SC08R) as well as 
nationalists and NGO representatives (LD26SC04B and ML27C01R) stated other 
relevant features of natural resources in Galicia. These include the outcrop 
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phenomenon90 of Galicia’s continental shelf, the biodiversity contained in Galicia’s 
coastal waters, as well as the special areas (designated Natura 2000 Network, areas of 
special protection for birds species, areas of European interest, National Parks, etc). 
One of the interviewees (LD26SC04B) also mentioned the fact that Galicia was the 
most important area in terms of marine mammals in the EU. Socially relevant issues 
were also mentioned by some interviewees (LD26SC04B and ML27C01R) although the 
emphasis, without a doubt, in all the elite interviews was linked to fishing and related 
activities, their economic importance and dependence of these activities.   
The data provided by elite interviewees on the relevance of natural resources in Galicia 
is summarised in table 3.4.9 below: 
Table 3.4.9 Relevance of natural resources in Galicia 
Concept Data provided by interviewees
Provides 3% of Galicia’s GDP
Fishing and related activities are the 2nd most important after the car industry in Galicia
There are 3,552 mussel punts (located mostly in the Southern estuaries)
Galicia is the 2nd world wide mussel producer (after China) and the first EU mussel producer
13,000 jobs are provided in Galicia by the mussel industry
150,000 People are employed (directly and indirectly) by the fishing sector
Galicia provides 10% of EU jobs arising from fishing and related activities
84% of private firms’ income come from firms located on the coast
50,000 vessels cross Galicia’s waters every year
Institution created: Regional fisheries and Marine Council 
1,700 km of coastline
Outcrop phenomenon (nutrient and water temperatures increase the productivity of 
Galicia’s continental shelf)
Home to rare and endangered species such as the tridactile seagull or the guillemot
Natural parks and open spaces (i.e. The Atlantic Isles Natural Park)
Richest marine mammal area of the EU 
50% of the population in Galicia is located in the littoral
There are cultural heritage locations highly valued by the population in Galicia 
Environmental 
relevance
Social relevance
Economic 
relevance of 
fishing and 
related activities
 
Source: Elite interviews 
FG participants provided information on the beliefs and attitudes held towards the 
environment. These views largely coincided with those of elite interviewees. FG 
participants did not however provide any data on how the different environmental 
resources are monitored or the specific contribution of these resources to regional or 
national economic growth. Overall, the environment is portrayed as the source of life 
                                               
90
 The outcrop phenomenon is defined as the ‘vertical and ascendant movement in masses of water that 
transport sediments from the seabed to higher layers of water. These sediments serve as mineral nutrients 
that will, through photosynthesis, transform in primary productivity’. 
http://tarwi.lamolina.edu.pe/licochea/masas.html     
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and provider of the necessary goods and services in order to develop economic 
activities (with repeated references to fishing and tourism activities). Anthropogenic 
threats such as oil spills are recognised to be derived from economic activities such as 
oil transport and consumption. This in turn illustrates the trade-off between economic 
development and environmental preservation in a context in which the environment is 
known to be able to provide goods and services but which can exhibit limits. Going 
beyond these limits may lead to irreversible losses, with a FG participant stating ‘there 
will come a time when the planet cannot cope anymore’ or ‘there will come a point 
when these species disappear and we will suffer this’ or ‘if we have a Prestige every so 
often we can reach a ‘saturation point’…and this is dangerous for living organisms and 
for the fishing activity which is relevant in Galicia both for shell-fishing and for 
employment too’.  
Elites and FG participants saw natural resources and in particular marine resources as 
providing valuable goods and services. Elites also acknowledged the importance of 
biodiversity but the greatest detail and explanations were related to the relevance of 
natural resources as an input into the economic activity and as a driver for 
development.  
Thus, the view presented by elites is a more economically framed and policy-oriented 
one whereas FG participants discussed more broadly their beliefs, normative beliefs 
and (generally) positive attitudes towards natural resources.  
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3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This first empirical chapter has presented the beliefs, attitudes and intentions 
of elites and FG participants with regards to sustainable development in the context of 
oil spills. The rationale of the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), the 
adapted policy-making process heuristic by Roberts (2004) and the social context as 
regards environmental policies in Spain according to Jiménez (2007) have been 
presented as a framework for understanding the views of elites and FG participants 
relative to SD.  
As regards the question of whether experts and citizens view sustainability in the same 
way, the basic findings show that even though experts (either in the academic field or 
in nature conservation) offer greater technical knowledge and a broader, policy-aware 
(policy-feasible) perspective, the main topics mentioned by elites and FG participants 
as regards the definition of SD coincided to a certain extent. The latter explored equity 
concerns with more in-depth references to inter-generational equity (compared with 
elites). FG participants also acknowledged the existence of system limits as well as the 
resilience and restoration capacity of the environment. They were furthermore 
concerned about the need to establish trade-offs between economic development and 
environmental preservation.   
Neither elites nor focus groups explicitly distinguished between weak and strong 
sustainability in their definition of SD. Implicit references as regards the substitutability 
of different types of capital were made by both elites and FG participants. Elites’ 
beliefs about the substitutability of resources largely coincide with the political 
tendency of respondents. This finding was expected as reflected in Jiménez (2007) that 
shows left wing parties are known to have allied in certain circumstances with the 
environmental movement since the 90’s. FG participants also indirectly reflected on 
the substitutability of different types of capital although no direct relationship to their 
political tendency could be analysed as FG respondents were not asked about their 
ideology.  
Three distinct positions were drawn from respondents’ answers as regards the 
substitutability of different types of capital. There were elite interviewees and focus 
group respondents who implicitly accepted substitution between different forms of 
capital (hence accepting weak sustainability). Other elite interviewees stated that 
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losses in natural capital could be replaced by natural capital built in exchange. Finally, 
some elite interviewees and some FG participants stated there were some types of 
natural capital (e.g. biodiversity loss) that could not be substituted by other forms of 
natural capital (see Neumayer, 1999 or Spash, 1993, for example).  
As regards system limits and thresholds in the context of managing marine resources, 
both elites and FG participants were aware of these concepts. Elites provided detailed 
information on managing commercial resources according to ‘expert-determined’ 
criteria. Elite interviewees also acknowledge the still developing nature of non-
commercial marine resources protection, in line with Hassan et al. (2005) and WWF 
(2010). Focus groups explored, through an exercise, the issue of limits, irreversible 
losses and thresholds. The answers obtained show a wide range of views and opinions 
regarding these issues. The possibility of reaching systems’ limits and being faced with 
irreversible losses was overall credible for FG participants and was thus retained and 
refined in order to design the valuation scenarios that are presented in the next two 
chapters of the thesis.  
When analysing compensation, elites and FG participants expressed the need for 
monetary compensation that would help mitigate the economic losses of individuals 
and firms directly affected by the spill. Both groups of interviewees acknowledged the 
‘political’ nature of these payments. Some elite interviewees and some focus group 
members claimed that monetary compensation was swiftly and generously paid to 
appease citizens. The context in which the spill happened (close to pre-election time 
and during the second term in power of the conservative party) could be seen as one 
of the drivers of the monetary compensation as contemplated in the policy-making 
process heuristic used (Roberts, 2004).  
Additional compensation in the form of investment ‘packages’ was analysed both with 
reference to the economic recovery plans that were de facto implemented after the 
last large spill (Plan Galicia and Plan de Dinamización Económica de Galicia) and with 
reference to the compensation options that were suggested by elite interviewees. Elite 
interviewees’ perceptions of the compensation packages were very much in line with 
their political tendencies and professional persona (Jiménez, 2007). Thus conservative 
representatives and business representatives favoured past actions that fundamentally 
entailed a weak sustainability response, largely investing in man-made capital 
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(infrastructures). On the other hand, nationalists and the NGO representative showed 
discontent with those investments (that were largely geared towards building 
infrastructures) and advocated for replacement of damaged natural capital with ‘like’ 
natural capital.  
FG participants showed a wide range of opinions regarding the preferred 
compensation option and none of the respondents protested against these 
compensations or failed to answer the compensation exercise. The acceptance of 
additional compensation can be indicative of the theoretical ‘compensatability’ of the 
environmental losses depicted (Humphrey 2001). Overall, however, FG participants 
preferred either replacing damaged natural capital with similar natural capital to be 
built in exchange (intra-capital substitutability) or a compensation package designed to 
strengthen the prevention mechanisms. For FG participants however there seemed to 
be no or limited possibilities of substituting man-made capital (infrastructures) for 
damaged or lost natural capital. These findings on compensation encouraged further 
exploring this issue in the survey as a way to explore preferences for either weak or 
strong sustainability.   
Oil spill prevention strategies intended to preserve natural capital (in line with stronger 
versions of sustainability) were also analysed. Elites and FG participants demanded 
further R&D and control efforts to ensure that the risk of future oil spills was 
minimised. Again the expertise of elites led to more detailed and technical demands on 
equipment and training compared with the demands of FG counterparts. FG 
participants voiced demands for interdisciplinary teams of scientists and experts to 
provide tools and solutions. They also referred to the need to include local institutions 
in the training and decision-making process. All this shows a demand for further 
participatory approaches favouring civic science, at least in its weakest sense, 
(Bäckstrand, 2003).  
According to Kates et al. (2000: 641) ‘In a world put at risk by unintended 
consequences of scientific progress, participatory procedures involving scientists, 
stakeholders, advocates, active citizens and users of knowledge are critically needed’. 
One of the potential benefits from the use of economic valuation techniques (that are 
preceded by elite interviews, focus groups and pilot interviews) could be engaging in a 
reflexive and participatory interchange of information. The combined use of these 
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methods could also help to understand attitudes and to respond to the demands of 
citizens within the realm of what is politically feasible and scientifically advisable. In 
this sense, Chilton and Hutchinson (1999: 466) claim that ‘good CVM should combine 
quantitative and qualitative insight if it is to be utilised to its full potential’.  
This chapter has presented the qualitative part of the fieldwork conducted to hopefully 
present a reasonable CV in which sustainability criteria in oil spill management are 
tested.  The next two chapters will present the survey and the analysis of the main 
results.  
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CHAPTER 4. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF 
SUSTAINABILITY PREFERENCES: COMPENSATION 
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 4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter analysed whether elites and citizens who participated in 
FG discussions view sustainability similarly. Their views on monetary and project-based 
compensation were compared. It was argued that the results obtained from the 
previous analysis could provide logical conclusions and feasible compensation 
‘packages’ but they could not ensure results would be representative of what citizens 
at large would want when faced with environmental losses. This chapter will further 
explore the issue of compensation when environmental damages of varying severity 
occur and its link to the sustainability debate. This will be done by analysing the results 
obtained from the survey. 
While there remains debate about what sustainable development is and the standards 
against which the concept can be measured (Pezzey and Toman, 2002), a substantive 
proposition is that a sustainable path is one where wealth does not decline (see, for 
example, Hamilton and Atkinson, 2007; Mäler, 2007). This, in turn, has led to a focus 
on ensuring that asset values are maintained. That said, there is uncertainty about 
whether this involves keeping total wealth constant or whether there are certain 
assets that must be passed on in some form. In large part, removing this uncertainty 
must entail better scientific understanding of, for example, how much of nature must 
be conserved. However, there is also a need to better understand the preferences of 
individuals for different combinations of the assets that comprise the wealth of say a 
nation. For example, both Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) speculate that individuals 
may not view money as compensating for certain environmental losses whereas 
investments in social assets such as schools may offer a more acceptable 
compensation option for these same individuals. If so, this would appear to 
circumscribe in some way ‘Hartwick-like’ rules for reinvesting in the face of the loss of 
certain environmental assets.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide an empirical test of Aldred (2002) 
and Turner (2007), linking this with the sustainability framework as described by 
Pearce et al. (1989) and analysed by Atkinson et al. (1997) or Pezzey and Toman (2002) 
among others. This chapter provides a test of this by using the data obtained from the 
 148 
questionnaire91 in which different compensation options are offered to a sample of 
people from two Spanish cities (Madrid and La Coruña) faced with hypothetical future 
oil spills. The first option offers investments in man-made capital as compensation for 
the environmental damages caused by the spill. The second option presents a set of 
social investments (hospitals, education and so on). The third option offers restoration 
of like-for like, that is, investing in natural capital.  
It should be noted that the first compensation scenario (also called package or option) 
was designed with reference to official investment plans in the aftermath of the 
Prestige oil spill. Such plans largely followed a standard ‘Hartwick-rule’ policy response 
involving significant investment in man-made capital, especially in infrastructure 
projects. The highly politicised nature of past oil spills in Spain created a reactive and 
piece-meal set of ad hoc investment plans to boost the economy of the affected area. 
Those plans were heavily criticised by government opponents, NGO’s and civil society, 
as was discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the policy plans contrasted 
with an unprecedented ‘white tide’ of volunteers who invested over 327,000 days of 
their time in cleaning-up the oil slick. This altruistic behaviour plus the demonstrations 
demanding more prevention and protection against oil spills is at the very least 
suggestive of a shift towards stronger forms of SD in citizens’ demands regarding oil 
spill management that is not reflected in official plans.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 briefly presents an 
economic analysis of compensation as well as the more recent resource equivalency 
approach to compensation. It also analyses the basic features of the compensation 
exercise based on the information obtained from the elite interviews, focus groups and 
pilots. Section 4.3 critically discusses the results obtained. Summary statistics and 
parametric analyses (using a multinomial logit model) are presented in this section. 
Section 4.4 concludes.  
                                               
91
 See annexes A.3.1 and A.3.2 at the end of the chapter in which the questionnaire and the 
documentation distributed among survey respondents are presented.  
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4.2. COMPENSATION: THEORY AND DESIGN BASED ON SALIENT 
FINDINGS  
4.2.1 Compensation: Economic and broader interpretations 
As was argued in the introductory chapter, economic interpretations of welfare 
assume that losses can generally be offset by increasing the amount of other goods or 
money. Resources are assumed to be substitutable92 and compensation either in 
monetary terms or in alternative goods can make individuals return to their initial (no 
damage) level of utility or wellbeing. Project restoration approaches93 (that have been 
applied among others in the context of US natural resource damage assessments or 
EU’s Environmental Liability Directive), are based on the above economic 
interpretation and analyse the amount of resources required to offset environmental 
damages.  
This choice of compensation in-kind has been criticised on theoretical grounds as 
potentially inconsistent with welfare economics due to the fact that restoration 
projects may generate losers and/or gainers as a consequence of the public good 
nature of the restoration (compensatory) projects, Flores and Thacher (2002).  
For welfare economics-consistent measures of compensation, as Flores and Thacher 
(2002: 172) state ‘willingness to accept (compensating variation) by definition exactly 
satisfies the requirement that an individual can be returned to their preinjury level of 
utility’. Money will, from this perspective, be essential for ensuring damage 
assessment adheres to the principles of welfare economics. Empirical work has 
however found that in certain contexts the introduction of money in compensation 
scenarios reduces public acceptance of policies (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997 and 
O’Neill and Spash, 2000). These findings highlight the relevance of issues that 
transcend neoclassical welfare economic foundations when valuing costs and benefits 
of different compensation options. 
                                               
92
 Humphrey (2001: 146) highlights the divide between substitutability ‘as a functional concept’ and 
‘compensatability as a welfare concept’. The author conveys the relationship between lack of 
substitutability and hence lack of compensatability for basic goods (e.g. no amount of water will 
compensate for a lack of food). Conversely, for non-basic goods non-substitutability does not mean that 
their loss cannot be compensated and hence individual’s welfare restored (say by increasing the 
availability of other goods). This argument would probably be accepted by weak sustainability supporters 
but not by (all) strong sustainability advocates.  
93
 Compensation in the form of restoration projects is defined according to Cowell (2000: 690) as ‘the 
provision of positive environmental measures to correct, balance or otherwise atone for the loss of 
environmental resources’. 
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Returning to the economic interpretations of welfare94, if we assume that there are 
only two types of goods (market goods (x) and non-market – environmental – goods 
(q)) their relationship can be expressed through the depiction of indifference curves 
that assume substitutability of these goods (figure 4.2.1). The analysis of a project 
compensatory approach (in line with the ‘softer’ version of SS that allows the 
substitution of like-for-like) would present two types of environmental goods. In this 
case environmental damage remediating projects (q1) are seen as good substitutes of 
damaged environmental assets (q2), see figure 4.2.2. This assumption about 
substitution between environmental goods could however be rejected due to 
environmental or ethical reasons and indifference curves may be completely inelastic 
(or inelastic beyond a certain environmental threshold). 
Figure 4.2.1 Individual indifference curves          Figure 4.2.2 Social indifference curves 
Source: Ozdemiroglu et al. (2009: 14-15) 
When faced with environmental damages and when analysing the compensation 
required, welfare economics provides the framework for analysing how to measure 
losses and compensation. If we assume individuals hold the right to an unpolluted 
environment (as does the public trust doctrine and constitutional requirements in 
some countries such as Spain), then the compensation required to ‘make the public 
whole’, returning them to their initial utility level, will be given by the compensating 
variation in the form of other private goods or money. Additionally, compensation can 
also take place in the form of additional public goods (like-for-like), The appropriate 
                                               
94
 Based on (Ozdemiroglu et al. 2009) 
q 
u1 
x 
u2 
q1 
u1 
q2 
u2 
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amount of compensation is obtained by asking individuals how much resource they 
would need to return to their pre-damage level. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of compensation (in the form of environmentally 
restorative projects) in terms of meeting sustainable development requirements a 
number of questions have been raised regarding the acceptability and adequacy of this 
compensation (restoration) approach to environmental damage (Spash, 2000, O’Neill 
and Spash, 2000, Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). On a broader level Cowell (1997) has 
argued that compensation may devalue and capitalize nature without a widespread 
reflection on more substantive issues such as the scale of environmental degradation. 
The ‘traditional’ economic approach and the project restoration approaches explained 
above ask about the amount of compensation but fail to analyse the type of 
remediation that would make individuals whole, which would be of interest for 
furthering the sustainability debate. This chapter explores this empirically through the 
results obtained from the compensation question. 
 
4.2.2 Developing the compensation question: Elites, focus groups, pilot and expert 
opinions 
This subsection presents the main ideas, relevant to designing the compensation 
exercise, discussed in the elite interviews, the focus groups, the pilot questionnaires 
and offered by experts. Sustainable development was described as a popular yet much 
criticised concept in the literature review chapter. The idea of being able to keep on 
growing and preserve resources was hypothesised to be well accepted by decision-
makers. Practical difficulties in deciding where WS ends and SS starts (Azqueta, 2002) 
were also highlighted.  
As we have seen, proponents of WS assume all types of capital are perfectly 
substitutable as long as total capital remains at least constant. This means we could 
potentially compensate for losses in natural capital by investing in any type of capital. 
Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) however state that there may be losses for which 
certain types of compensation, say money or flowers, will not be appropriate but other 
types of compensation such as investing in social capital assets (e.g. schools and 
hospitals) will. Yet, if we ask proponents of SS, in its weakest sense, natural capital 
would have to be preserved and replacement of like-for-like, through shadow or 
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compensating projects, would be the way forward to ensure sustainability at a project 
and portfolio level.  
Previous chapters presented the issue of compensation that took place in the 
aftermath of the Prestige oil spill. The regulatory momentum spurred by the Prestige 
(Tan, 2006) was considered to be a policy relevant issue to analyse, both in terms of 
government funded compensation95 and government funded oil spill prevention and 
management plans. To sum up, compensation included on one hand cash payments 
(monetary compensation) paid by the Spanish government to directly affected parties 
(e.g. fishermen); on the other hand we have additional compensation packages 
(‘economic recovery plans’) that the Spanish government presented in the aftermath 
of the spill (Plan Galicia and Plan de Dinamización económica de Galicia).  
These were investments, mainly devoted to building infrastructures that were 
designed to boost the economy of the areas affected by the spills. An additional reason 
for these investments was argued to be the historical debt argument (the region of 
Galicia has traditionally suffered from a lack of infrastructures and a gap between its 
GDP and Spain’s mean GDP, thus Spain ‘owes’ Galicia). The EU structural funds were 
being renegotiated in the aftermath of the Prestige oil spill. This renegotiation would 
reduce the money available for future infrastructure projects. Finally, the industrial 
lobby exercised a significant pressure on the government to promote infrastructures 
that would improve the connexion between Galicia and the rest of Spain. All these 
pressures led to significant investment in man-made capital, which is argued to be a 
reflection of a WS stance towards compensation.  
The status quo option that had been promoted by the government was included in the 
compensation exercise in the survey as the first compensation option. The main design 
features of this first (WS) compensation option were shaped along the research project 
and the final version included investments in man-made capital (i.e. roads, railways 
and marketing campaigns to promote the area affected by the spill). Throughout the 
elite interviews, focus groups and the pilots, this option was well understood and thus 
it was expected that this would continue to be the case in the survey. The final version 
of the compensation question can be seen in annexes A.3.1 and A.3.2.  
                                               
95
 This compensation packages were additional to the compensation paid by insurers and by the IOPC 
Funds.  
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The second compensation option from which respondents could choose implied that 
government investments would be devoted to social capital (investments in education, 
health and R&D programs). The reasons for including this compensation option include 
the following. Firstly, empirically testing Aldred (2002) and Turner’s (2007) proposition 
partially motivated the inclusion of this compensation option. Secondly, the need for 
R&D mentioned by elite interviewees to fill in the knowledge gaps and develop 
practical oil spill management strategies provided additional reasons for having this 
compensation option. Finally, the follow-up questions in the pilot interviews revealed 
that respondents also thought about other possible investment options96 (e.g. in 
technology or other socially desirable goods) that would improve the wellbeing and 
the health of Spanish citizens.    
The third compensation option in the survey presented respondents with investments 
in shadow projects that would replace damaged natural capital with similar capital 
(like-for-like). This option was initially explored in the literature review chapter. The 
analysis of the elite interviews confirmed the attractiveness of including this option in 
future compensation plans as some of the interviewees suggested this possibility. 
Focus groups were faced with this compensation option and there seemed to be no 
credibility issues or problems in understanding this option. It was furthermore chosen 
as the preferred compensation option by a significant number of FG participants. The 
pilots conducted also included this possibility and again no major problems arose with 
this option97.  
Advice from CV experts98 plus meetings with the market research company hired to do 
the fieldwork resulted in the final versions of the questionnaires that are presented in 
annexes A.3.1 and A.3.2.  
The main changes made to the final questionnaire are summarised in table 4.2.1 
below: 
                                               
96
 In addition to the initially offered ones of monetary compensation, infrastructures or replacement of 
damaged natural assets for like natural assets. 
97
 It should additionally be noted that in the final version of the compensation question, the questionnaire 
did not include a possible cash payment for respondents. Cash payments were included in the pilot as a 
possible compensation option but interviewees stated this was morally repugnant and they did not deserve 
payment given the fact that their livelihoods had not been directly affected by an oil spill. The do-nothing 
option (i.e. no extra compensation action aside from the cash compensation paid to directly affected 
parties) was retained although in a different format in the final version of the compensation question. See 
annexes A.3.1 and A.3.2.   
98
 I am most grateful to Susana Mourato and Maria Loureiro for their help in the revision of the 
questionnaire. 
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Table 4.2.1 Changes made to the final questionnaire 
Suggestion Result
Shorten length of questionnaire Implementation time: 15 minutes 
Simplify explanations & questions Less information included in the exercises
Include question on socio-economic 
problems at the start
Inclusion of warm-up question. Socio-economic concern as possible determinant of compensation option 
chosen
Change the order of the two core exercises 
(first compensate and then ask for 
willingness to pay to prevent future spills)
Compensation question prior to valuation question. Rationale: the government compensates and would 
like your views on how to allocate this compensation among competing ends. In the future it would be 
better to avoid spills and in order to do this further investments will be needed. These will only happen if 
citizens are willing to pay for them. 
Eliminate economic consequences from 
the compensation and the valuation 
scenarios
Markets capture these losses. These have been fully compensated via cash payments by the Spanish 
government and IOPC funds
Inclusion of the social capital compensation 
option
Literature reviews, the analysis of the elite interviews, suggestions made by the FG and pilot interviewees 
and peers led to including an additional compensation option to empirically test Aldred (2002) and 
Turner(2007) hypotheses.
Swap close-ended follow-up questions for 
open-ended ones
This follow-up question format allowed respondents to explore the reasons for their answers rather than 
force them to choose from pre-determined categories decided by the researcher  
 
4.2.3 The compensation question in the survey 
The compensation exercise asked respondents whether they would want 
compensation (in addition to expected government & international clean-up and 
payments to directly affected people) and if so, the type of investment program they 
would prefer. These questions were complemented with an exercise in which 
respondents were asked to allocate hypothetical amounts (of different sizes according 
to the size of the spill) to the different compensation options thus expressing the 
strength of their preferences for the different compensation packages. Follow-up 
questions were included to understand the motivations for respondents’ answers.  
The initial background information that respondents were provided with in the 
compensation exercise is shown in box 4.2.1 below (see annex A.3.1 and A.3.2 for a full 
account of the entire exercise): 
Box 4.2.1 Initial background information on the compensation exercise  
In Spain we have had various oil spills (respondents were shown map C in annex A.3.2).
After an oil spill the government always cleans up affected areas and provides monetary
compensation for those people who are out of work
The government is analysing the possibility of investing in other projects additionally to the
cleaning-up and compensation activities. As we all know money is limited and if we choose
these additional investments there will be other things we won’t be able to do. 
The additional investment options include:
   1. Investing in things such as roads and railways
   2. Investing in things such as schools and hospitals
   3. Investing in things such as restocking and creating natural parks  
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Respondents were then asked whether they would want compensation and the 
reasons for their answer. Following this, for those respondents who did want 
compensation, additional information was provided. This is shown in box 4.2.2 below. 
Box 4.2.2 Additional background information on the compensation exercise 
As the funds for these investments come from our taxes I would like to know
how you would like this money to be spent.
Focusing on the environmental and health effects I am going to show you three
spills with very different consequences and I would like you to tell me how you
would like the government to spend the money.
Remember there are other areas in Spain and elsewhere that will not be affected
by these spills.  
The main features of the compensation exercise are shown in table 4.2.2 below. 
Table 4.2.2 Summary of the main features in the compensation exercise 
Section Elements Question/information provided
In the past: Cash always received by affected parties after a spill
In the future: Compensation is expected to continue
Additional compensation packages are planned 
Agents
Compensarion provider : central government and regional government
Beneficiaries : affected areas and directly affected people (monetary 
compensation)
All citizens in Spain (project compensation)
Opportunity cost reminder If we undertake these investments there will be others we can’t undertake
Substitutes reminder Other areas in Spain and elsewhere will not be affected
Man-made capital (infrastructures) 
Social capital (schools and hospitals)
Natural capital (restocking, create natural parks)
Allocation exercise Allocate X€ to the different compensation options according to what you prefer if e.g. a small spill happened
Preferred option Which is your preferred option?
Follow-up questions Can you tell me why?
Compensation
Compensation options
Clean-up & compensation 
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4.3. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This section will analyse the main results obtained from the analysis of the data that 
are relevant to the analysis of the compensation question. The first subsection (4.3.1) 
will present the summary statistics of questions that are relevant to the compensation 
topic. The second subsection (4.3.2) will present the parametric analysis of the 
compensation exercise. 
4.3.1 Sampling and Summary statistics  
Sampling: process and sample characteristics 
A superior semi-probability sampling process99 was followed to select questionnaire 
respondents. This entailed a multi-stage approach in which initial random selection of 
postcodes in the city of Madrid and in the city of La Coruña was followed by the 
interviewer discretionary selection of respondents according to income, age and 
gender quotas. The sample size was calculated according to simple random sampling 
formulae under the assumptions of similarities of quota sampling and stratified 
random sampling with proportional allocation, and the equivalence of the latter to 
simple random sampling formulae. The final number of usable interviews amounted to 
663. This number of usable responses is reasonable for this type of studies according 
to the literature reviewed and the experts consulted.  
Age and gender quotas were reasonably well met in the sample and thus population 
characteristics and sample characteristics are close. The income quota was the most 
problematic one100. This meant both in the city of Madrid and in the city of La Coruña 
the percentage of respondents with lower income was higher that the population 
figure. Higher income groups are therefore under-represented in the sample.  
The population with lower educational level (no education at all or primary education) 
in the sample is under-represented. The sample also over-represents higher 
educational levels (secondary education and high school graduate). The sample and 
the population characteristics are reasonably close in the representation of 
respondents with university degrees or above (MSc of PhD) 101 for the Madrid sample. 
                                               
99
 Please see annex A.3.3.3 for a more detailed explanation of the sampling process. 
100
 Please refer to annex A.3.3.4 for a more detailed explanation of the implementation issues faced. 
101
 Please note that according to the statistics institute of the City Council of La Coruña data on education 
is known to grossly over estimate the percentage of people with lower educational levels. This is so for 
two reasons: the census data is outdated and people are known to underreport their highest educational 
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Higher educational level is over-represented in the La Coruña sample although the 
degree of over-representation is unknown due to the lack of precision of the 
educational attainment data in La Coruña.   
Table 4.3.1 below presents the sample characteristics in comparison to population 
characteristics. 
Table 4.3.1 Sample and population characteristics 
Sample 
(N=405)
Sample 
(N=258)
Frequency & 
(%)
Frequency & 
(%)
18-34 136 (34%) 36% 85   (33%) 32%
35-49 120 (30%) 26% 74   (29%) 27%
50-64 97   (24%) 20% 58   (23%) 24%
65-79 52   (13%) 18% 40   (16%) 17%
0-24,000 135 (34%) 25% 145 (57%) 40%
24,001-36,000 195 (49%) 55% 86   (34%) 48%
≥ 36,001 66   (17%) 21% 25   (10%) 12%
Female 211(52%) 53% 136 (53%) 53%
Male 194 (48%) 47% 122 (47%) 47%
Primary education 22 (5%) 24% 21   (8%) 51%
Secondary education 103(25%) 18% 53   (21%) 18%
High school graduate 137(34%) 23% 77   (30%) 16%
Higher education 143 (35%) 34% 104 (41%) 15%
Age
Income
Gender
Education
Socio-economic 
characteristics
Range of values or 
categories
Madrid La Coruña
Population 
(%)
Population
(%)
 Sources: Institute for Fiscal Studies (IEF, 2008), 2001 census for Madrid, http://www.feccoo-
madrid.org/servlets/VerFichero?id=4031, 2007 Census data for the city of La Coruña provided by the City Council of 
La Coruña. Please note these figures have been rounded up and do not add up to exactly 100%. 
 
Summary statistics 
This subsection presents the summary statistics for the significant independent 
variables that were later used in the multinomial logit models. Following the initial 
questions on basic socio-economic characteristics, interviewees were presented with a 
set of common socio-economic problems and they were asked to state the most 
important problem for them.  
The results are presented in graph 4.3.1: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
level because people with higher educational attainment are more frequently selected for citizen duties 
such as monitoring polling stations on elections.  
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Graph 4.3.1 Respondents’ perception of socio-economic problems 
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Just under half of the respondents stated the state of the economy was the most 
important problem for them. This was followed at a fair distance by the number of 
respondents who stated other problems (crime, education, the state of health services 
and finally the state of the environment) were their main concern. Interestingly for the 
interpretation of the model results, more people from Madrid thought environmental 
problems were the most important problem (12.8%) compared to respondents in La 
Coruña (7.8%). These results over-represent the environmental concern of Spanish 
citizens as only 1.6% of people interviewed by the CIS (Spain’s Centre for Sociological 
Research) stated the environment was the first or the second most important problem 
in Spain102 (CIS, 2008).  
Following these questions, respondents were asked about their concern about various 
environmental problems. They were asked to state which of the environmental 
problems were the most important for them.  
The results are presented in graph 4.3.2 below. 
                                               
102
 http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2700_2719/2705/e270500.html 
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Graph 4.3.2 Respondents’ perception of environmental problems 
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Under 50% of respondents in Madrid and over 30% of respondents in La Coruña stated 
water scarcity was the most important environmental problem. Spain’s geographical 
location with repeated droughts in recent years can help explain this perception. This 
was followed by approximately 25% of respondents in both cities stating air pollution 
was the most important environmental problem. The concern about air pollution can 
arguably be attributed to the inclusion of climate change in the issue attention cycle, 
see Downs (1972), Roberts (2004), Carter (2007) or Connelly and Smith (2003), among 
other. According to Noya (Pers. Comm.) air pollution and climate change more 
specifically have been in ‘society’s mind’ in Spain since both the IPCC and Al Gore 
received the Nobel Prize. A further 20% of respondents in La Coruña (vs. 14% in 
Madrid) stated wild fires were the most important environmental problem. The many 
wild fires suffered each year in Spain103 during the summer months are a likely cause 
for this answer. Oil spills were chosen as the most important environmental problem 
by only approximately 10% of respondents in both cities. Finally, over-exploitation of 
resources (e.g. over-fishing) was chosen as the most important environmental problem 
by 8% of respondents in La Coruña and only 3% of respondents in Madrid.  
Whether people thought oil spills were the most important environmental problem 
was not significant in the compensation exercise and therefore it was not included in 
the multinomial logit model that will be presented and analysed below. The 
                                               
103
 More so in Galicia than in Madrid. See 
http://assets.wwfspain.panda.org/downloads/incendiometro_09_informe.pdf 
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information provided by respondents’ answers to this question is nevertheless 
interesting as it informs about the relatively low relevance of oil spills compared with 
other environmental problems.   
The number of oil spills known by respondents is not significant in determining the 
choice of compensation option but if this variable is transformed into a dummy 
variable (people who know about oil spills vs. people who don’t) then the variable 
becomes significant in the choice of preferred compensation option. It is nevertheless 
interesting to analyse the mean differences in knowledge among the two survey 
locations. The box plot representation of this information is provided below in graph 
4.3.3.  
Graph 4.3.3 Number of known spills: survey results 
 
As was expected, the mean knowledge regarding oil spills of people in the city of La 
Coruña is over three spills whereas this figure goes down to under two spills on 
average for respondents from Madrid. There is therefore a ‘distance decay effect’ in 
the average number of known oil spills. 
The next question that is relevant in our analysis is respondents’ pro-ecological 
worldview as captured by the aggregate New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEP). This 
attitudinal exercise provided respondents with the 15 statements that make up the 
revised NEP scale (see Dunlap, 2000). The use of the NEP scale is based on the idea 
that this multi-attribute scale provides a better indication of pro-ecological world view 
of respondents compared with single attribute questions (Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). 
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This scale fits well with the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) in 
which attitudes, among other variables, influence intentions which can be good 
predictors of behaviour under certain circumstances. The statements included in the 
questionnaire and answers are provided in table 4.3.2 below.  
Table 4.3.2 Summary statistics of the percentage distributions for the NEP 
Number Statement STAª A U D STD
1 We are approaching the limit in the number of people the earth can support 10.86 34.09 15.84 28.51 7.69
2 Humans have the right to modify the environment to suit their needs 8.01 23.41 10.12 37.31 20.39
3 When we interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences 32.22 57.64 5.75 3.16 0.3
4 Our ingenuity will ensure we do not make the earth unliveable 15.02 41.12 15.93 21.4 5.77
5 We are severely abusing the environment 51.96 43.05 1.96 2.11 0.91
6 The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to use them 28.81 53.24 7.39 8.9 1.36
7 Plants, animals and humans have the same right to exist 44.19 44.19 6.49 4.68 0.45
8 Nature is strong enough to resist impacts of humans 3.79 18.18 14.7 45.61 17.27
9 Despite our abilities we are still subject to the laws of nature 28.85 58.61 5.89 5.44 0.91
10 Environmental problems have been greatly exaggerated  4.68 15.23 12.37 46.3 20.36
11 The earth has very limited space and resources 13.16 42.21 16.94 22.39 4.08
12 Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature 6.18 23.83 14.63 39.52 14.63
13 Nature’s balance is very fragile and it can be easily upset 18 61.27 6.96 10.74 1.36
14 We will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it 4.68 32.28 19.31 32.58 9.65
15 If things continue as they are we will soon face a large scale ecological crisis 41.48 47.06 4.52 5.28 1.06  
ª STA stands for strongly agree, A means agree, U means unsure, D means disagree and STD means strongly 
disagree. Figures have been rounded up and thus may not add up to 100%104.   
 
In order to reduce the number of variables to be included in the parametric estimates 
of the compensation choices, Dunlap’s (2000) instructions were followed. The nominal 
categories (strongly agree, agree, etc.) were assigned a number in a five point likert 
scale where agreement or strong agreement with statements numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 
11, 13 and 15 and disagreement with statements numbered 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14  
showed a pro-ecological worldview. An aggregate score was then used as an 
independent variable in both the compensation question and in the valuation 
question.  
                                               
104
 Please note the wording of the statements was adapted to clarify the statements’ meanings following 
the pilot. This was done to ensure interviewees understood the statements. 
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Once the scores were obtained Cronbach's alpha (α105), which is a measure of the 
ability of a set of questions/statements (variables) to measure a given construct (i.e. 
the pro-ecological worldview106), was computed. It is generally stated that for social 
science studies an acceptable value is α ≥ 0.7. Values between 0.6 and 0.7 are also 
accepted; see for example Sturmey et al. (2005), Moss et al. (1998) Nixon and 
Saphores (2007) even though they provide less conclusive evidence in terms of single 
construct measurement. The α obtained for the present study is 0.63 and therefore 
within the acceptable range in terms of using the aggregated NEP score to measure 
the pro-ecological worldview of respondents.  
The representation of respondents’ aggregate NEP scores is shown in graph 4.3.4 
below:  
Graph 4.3.4 Aggregate NEP Scores 
 
The last independent variable used in the analysis of compensation preferences is 
ideology. This variable was introduced by a question on nation-wide right wing and 
nation-wide left wing newspapers read by respondents as there is evidence that 
newspapers read can be a good proxy of ideology (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). The 
summary statistics of the newspapers read by survey respondents is presented in the 
following table. The data is then compared to the last municipal election results in 
order to see whether respondents’ ideology is related to population characteristics. 
                                               
105
 Calculated as:  where N is the number of items (15 in our case), c-bar is the mean 
inter-item covariance and v-bar is the mean variance (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/faq/alpha.html) 
106
 That can be formed by different dimensions (Loureiro and Ojea, 2007) 
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Graph 4.3.5 and table 4.3.3, present the percentage of respondents who read right and 
left wing newspapers as well as the population’s ideology according to the latest 
municipal elections. The data is disaggregated by cities. 
Graph 4.3.5 Right and left-wing newspapers read by survey respondents 
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Table 4.3.3 Population characteristics according to the last municipal elections 
Main Right political party 
(PP) voters in %
Main left political party 
(PSOE) voters in %
La Coruña 30.09% 44.70%
Madrid 55.50% 30.80%
 
In Madrid the data in the tables above clearly shows that the sample contained a 
higher proportion of left wing respondents compared with population characteristics, 
assuming that the newspapers read are a good proxy political orientation of 
respondents. In Coruña expected right wing voters within the sample are only 
marginally over-represented by the sample compared with population characteristics 
but left wing voters are grossly over-represented. So, there is an overall over-
representation of left wing respondents in the sample.  
The dependent variable in the compensation exercise was respondents’ choice of 
compensation option when faced with spills of different sizes and consequences. The 
first question asked was whether respondents wanted additional compensation (i.e. 
over and above the compensation paid). Respondents were reminded of the 
opportunity cost of receiving compensation in terms of public projects forgone as well 
as of the existence of unspoilt substitute sites. The results from this question are 
shown in the table 4.3.4 below. 
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Table 4.3.4 Respondents’ willingness to accept compensation if a new spill happened 
Frequency Percentage
Not willing to accept additional compensation 55 8.30
Willing to accept additional compensation 608 91.70
Total 663 100.00
 
So, the vast majority of respondents were willing to accept additional compensation. 
As regards those respondents who did not want additional compensation, the main 
reasons given in the follow-up questions were primarily that these spills should be 
prevented, rather than compensated for. This explanation could be indicative of a 
demand for preservation of natural capital and a potential move towards strong 
sustainability preferences. It could theoretically signal a limit in the type of damages 
can be compensated (Humphrey, 2001; Neumayer, 1999; Spash, 1993) and it could 
help explore further issues of compensatability, Humphrey (2001). The small number 
of respondents not willing to accept compensation implies any conclusions should be 
treated as preliminary and in need of further studies to test this idea in empirical 
terms.  
Other respondents who did not want compensation stated the reason for their answer 
was that there were other more important problems. Over 20% of those who didn’t 
want compensation said others should pay, arguably acknowledging the opportunity 
cost of additional compensation. This answer could also signal that respondents are 
protesting, in line with valuation classifications of protest answers (Bateman et al. 
2002) in contingent valuation exercises. The following chapter further explores protest 
responses in a CV setting. 
Interviewees who did want additional compensation in case a new spill happened 
were shown the three spills (small, medium and large) with their consequences and 
they were asked to allocate a hypothetical amount of money among the three 
compensation options (investments in man-made capital, investments in social capital 
and investments in natural capital). This amount was equal to 100€ per person for the 
small spill, 500€ for the medium spill and 1,000€ per person for the large spill.  
The results are shown in table 4.3.5 below. 
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Table 4.3.5 Summary of additional compensation allocation preferences107 
 Spill / quantity to be 
distributed among the 
investment programs 
Investment 
program Mean %
Man-made capital 16.57 16.57
Social capital 47.49 47.49
Natural capital 36.09 36.09
Man-made capital 94.85 18.97
Social capital 227.19 45.43
Natural capital 186.55 37.31
Man-made capital 166.83 16.68
Social capital 459.05 45.9
Natural capital 389.05 38.9
Small / 100€
Medium / 500€
Large / 1,000€
 
Overall, respondents allocated more investment to social capital. This was so across 
the three spills. Respondents to the questionnaire show that, on average, they would 
allocate between 16.5% and 18.9% of additional compensation investment funds to 
man-made capital. They would allocate between 45.4% and 47.4% to social capital. 
Finally, they would allocate between 36% and 38.9% of compensation investment 
funds to natural capital. Graph 4.3.6 below illustrated this:  
Graph 4.3.6 Compensation funds assigned to different types of capital across spills 
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In order to test whether there were statistically significant differences between the 
quantities allocated to the different compensation options across the three different 
spills a repeated measures ANOVA test was undertaken. The dependent variable was 
the compensation amount assigned in percentage. The two factors, or independent 
variables, were the type of capital and the size of the spill. These factors or 
                                               
107
 Note figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding up.  
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independent variables had three levels each (small, medium and large for the spill; 
man-made capital, social capital and natural capital for the type of capital).  
The results obtained indicated there are statistically significant differences according 
to the type of capital (Pillai’s trace = 0.599; p-value < 0.001) with a very large size effect 
(Cohen’s d = 2.44). Equally, the percentage of compensation allocated to each type of 
capital varies significantly according to the size of the spill (Pillai’s trace =0.071; p-
value<0.001) with a medium size effect (Cohen’s d=0.55). The output is presented in 
table 4.3.6 below: 
Tale 4.3.6 Multivariate contrasts: Spill, type of capital and spill*type of capital 
Value F P-value
Spill Pillai’s trace 0.005 1.518 0.220
Capital Pillai’s trace 0.599 412.249 0.000
Spill * Capital Pillai’s trace 0.071 10.52 0.000
Effect
 
 
The results for the pairwise comparisons for the type of capital are as presented in 
table 4.3.7 below:  
Table 4.3.7 Pairwise comparisons: Type of capital 
Mean 
differences
(I-J)
Social -28.475(*) 1.17 0.000
Natural -19.363(*) 1.158 0.000
Man-made 28.475(*) 1.17 0.000
Natural 9.112(*) 1.595 0.000
Man-made 19.363(*) 1.158 0.000
Social -9.112(*) 1.595 0.000
Man-made
Social
Natural
(I) Capital (J) Capital SE P-value(a)
 
* Mean difference is significant at the 0, 05 level. 
(a)  Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
The results show that we reject all the null hypotheses tested in table 4.3.7 above. This 
means that we reject that the mean amount assigned to man-made capital is equal to 
the mean amount assigned to social capital. We also reject that the mean amount 
assigned to social capital is equal to the mean amount assigned to natural capital. 
Finally, we reject that the mean amount allocated to man-made capital is equal to the 
mean amount allocated to natural capital.  
Interactions among the two independent variables (i.e. whether one factor had a 
bearing on the other, in our case whether the size of spill led to a different amount of 
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say natural capital demanded as compensation) were analysed using graphical 
representation of the data. According to (Hinton, 1995: 155) ‘a significant interaction 
occurs when the effect of one factor is different at the different conditions of the other 
factor’. When the lines are not parallel, we can say there is an interaction effect (ibid.). 
In our project, a small yet significant interaction occurs when the allocation of 
compensation to one type of capital (say natural) is different (higher or lower) when 
the other factor (size of spill) changes (say from small to medium).  
More specifically, looking at graph 4.3.7 below we see that even though the allocation 
of compensation funds to social capital is higher across the three spills, indicating a 
significant main effect of social capital (red line), less compensation is allocated to 
social capital as the spill sizes changes from small to medium. When the spill size 
changes from medium to large, there is a slight increase in the amount of 
compensation funds allocated to social capital108.  
The second most ‘popular’ compensation option is natural capital (green line). We see 
that as the spill size changes from small to medium and from medium to large there is 
an increase in the amount of compensation allocated to natural capital. This means 
that as the environmental damages increase, more natural capital is demanded as 
compensation despite the fact that compensation in social capital is the option to 
which overall more resources would be allocated. 
Man-made capital is the compensation option to which fewer resources were 
allocated. The slight ‘hump’ in the orange line indicates that we find interactions. As 
the spill size changes from small to medium there is an increase in the amount of 
compensation allocated to man-made capital. When the spill size changes from 
medium to large, there is a reduction in the amount allocated to man-made capital. 
Graph 4.3.7 below is a representation of the moderate interaction effects:   
 
 
 
 
                                               
108
 The help of David Arribas Águila is greatfully acknowledged. 
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Graph 4.3.7 Interaction of factors in the analysis of variance 
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Finally, respondents were asked to choose their preferred compensation option 
(investment in infrastructures, in social capital or in natural capital). The analysis of the 
data using a multinomial logit required having information on the preferred option. 
The summary table 4.3.8 below presents these results: 
Table 4.3.8 Frequency & percentage of respondents choosing compensation options 
Spill Compensation option Frequency Percentage
man-made capital 48 8.08
Social capital 354 59.6
Natural capital 192 32.32
man-made capital 49 8.19
Social capital 348 58.19
Natural capital 201 33.61
man-made capital 39 6.77
Social capital 325 56.42
Natural capital 212 36.81
Small
Medium
Large
 
 
As table 4.3.8 shows, the majority of respondents chose investment in social capital as 
their preferred compensation option. More specifically, between 56.42% and 59.6% of 
respondents chose social capital as their preferred compensation option. Between 
32.32% and 36.81% of respondents chose natural capital and finally between 6.77% 
and 8.08 % of respondents chose man-made capital as their preferred compensation 
option.  
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A possible reason for the high percentage of respondents preferring social capital may 
be that respondents were told that the government was the provider of additional 
compensation109 and questionnaire respondents may think that, irrespective of the 
problem analysed, the government should be investing in social capital. Future studies 
could test whether the provider of the compensation package has a significant effect 
on the choice of compensation option using a split sample design whereby different 
groups of respondents are presented with different institutions (the government, the 
oil transport sector, NGO’s, etc.) as providers of compensation.  
The questionnaire contained open-ended follow-up questions to help understand the 
motivations behind respondents’ compensation choices. The reasons for choosing 
each type of capital are presented below.  
The main reasons for choosing man-made capital as the preferred compensation 
option are presented in table 4.3.9: 
Table 4.3.9 Main reasons for choosing man-made capital as compensation 
Spill Small spill Medium spill Large spill 
I choose this option because:  %  %  % 
it is the most important 39.58 26.53 25 
it is a good substitute 18.75 8.16 5 
it is beneficial for others 0 4.08 5 
it will prevent spills 0 8.16 10 
it mitigates the damages 12.50 16.33 12.5 
of the consequences of the spill 0 2.04 2.5 
of the economic consequences 4.17 10.20 5 
I am concerned about future generations 4.17 0 0 
of normative criteria (we should, it is our 
responsibility) 6.25 6.12 0 
 
According to respondents, the core reason for choosing infrastructures was that this 
option was the most important, the most logical or the best. Prevention or mitigation 
of the damages were both seen as other important reasons for choosing man-made 
capital as the preferred compensation option. A further reason given was that these 
infrastructures benefit others or that they may constitute a good substitute for the 
damaged or lost natural capital. This last statement could arguably back the Hartwick 
rule regarding perfect substitutability of different types of capital, although the fact 
                                               
109
 The government has provided compensation in past spills (e.g. the Prestige) and it is expected to 
continue to be the case in the future given current quantitative and qualitative limitations in international 
compensation mechanisms. 
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that this reason was decreasingly mentioned as the spill size and consequences worsen 
could signal limits to this substitutability as environmental thresholds are trespassed. 
The fact that a very small number of respondents chose infrastructures and an even 
smaller number mentioned the substitutability of infrastructures for damaged natural 
capital could caution policy-makers against assuming substitutability for the 
population at large. Further studies may benefit from larger sample sizes to be able to 
generalise these results to the population.  
 The reasons for choosing social capital are presented in table 4.3.10 below: 
Table 4.3.10 Main reasons for choosing social capital as compensation 
Spill Small spill Medium spill Large spill 
I choose this option because: % % % 
it is the most important 32.59 26 24.03 
it is a good substitute 0.56 0.28 0.59 
it is beneficial for others 3.06 1.43 3.56 
it will prevent spills 10.58 6.86 4.15 
it mitigates the damages 11.42 12.28 21.06 
of the consequences of the spill 1.11 2 3.26 
of the economic consequences 0.28 0.57 0.59 
I am concerned about future generations 3.06 1.72 2.37 
the damages are permanent/irreversible 0 0 0 
of its use values (food, recreation, etc.) 0.28 0.29 0 
of normative criteria (we should, it is our 
responsibility) 2.22 2.87 1.48 
of education  25.62 22.28 13.64 
of research 5.57 5.71 5.04 
of hospitals 0.83 0 0 
 
In table 4.3.10 we can see that once again, respondents stated that the compensation 
option chosen was the best or the most logical/important one. The belief that this 
compensation option would help mitigate the damages or would even help prevent 
them in the future (arguably through the R&D programs) followed in popularity as the 
reason provided by respondents for choosing social capital as the preferred 
compensation option. Very few respondents stated investment in social capital would 
be a good substitute for lost natural capital hence shying away from the Hartwick-type 
assumption of perfect substitutability. 
The reasons for choosing natural capital as the preferred compensation option are 
presented in table 4.3.11 below: 
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Table 4.3.11 Main reasons for choosing natural capital as compensation 
Spill Small spill Medium spill Large spill 
I choose this option because …  %  % % 
it is the most important 14.07 15.31 13.77 
it is a good substitute 1.51 0 0 
it is beneficial for others 0 0.47 1.33 
it will prevent spills 0.5 0.47 1.33 
it mitigates the damages 55.27 39.23 40 
of the consequences of the spill 3.01 7.65 8 
of the economic consequences 0.5 0.95 0 
I am concerned about future generations 1.50 0.47 0 
the damages are permanent/irreversible 2.51 3.34 2.66 
of its use values (food, recreation, etc.) 1 0.95 2.22 
of normative criteria (we should, it is our 
responsibility) 14.07 10.04 9.33 
 
The main reasons for choosing natural capital are: the belief that this type of 
compensatory projects will help reduce the damages caused by spills; the fact that the 
natural capital compensation package is perceived by respondents as the most 
important; finally, respondents stated it was their responsibility or their duty to invest 
in natural capital when future spills take place. If we compare tables 4.3.9, 4.3.10 and 
4.3.11 we can see that explanations differ. A larger proportion of respondents who 
chose natural capital as the preferred compensation option stated something different 
to ‘it is the most important’ option. Very few respondents explicitly stated that 
investments in natural capital were a good substitute for the lost natural capital. This 
precludes any conclusion as regards intra-capital substitutability, in contrast with the 
information obtained from the FG sessions. The fact that over a third of respondents 
chose natural capital as the preferred compensation option is suggestive of a potential 
demand for strong sustainability.  
 
4.3.2 Compensation exercise110 
Model 
As we have seen in the previous section, respondents were asked to choose between 
three different compensation options in case a new spill (small, medium or large) 
happened. The aim of this exercise was two-fold. First, to test whether weak 
sustainability (either in its traditional Hartwick-type approach or in the modified Aldred 
                                               
110
 The main results presented in this section were presented in a preliminary state of the analysis at the 
UKNEE the 20th of March 2009 (see 
http://www.eftec.co.uk/UKNEE/envecon/2009_documents/envecon2009_POLICY_INSTRUMENTS_La
zaro-Touza_presentation.pdf). Questions and comments from attendants to this conference are gratefully 
acknowledged.  
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(2002) and Turner (2007) proposal) or strong sustainability (in the form of replacement 
of like-for like) is preferred in terms of compensation when a new spill happens. 
Second, to analyse the characteristics that determine the compensation choice of 
respondents. The present section focuses on this latter goal through the parametric 
analysis conducted via the use of multinomial logit models111.  
When faced with these types of questions, the analysis of the characteristics that 
determine the choice of one option over another is done through multiple choice 
models. The polychotomous categorical variables with no pre-established order plus 
the fact that the covariates (regressors or explanatory variables) refer to individual 
characteristics, led us to choose a MNL model112.  
These models are based on the assumption of rational agents that will choose the 
option that yields higher utility. In our compensation exercise, we have three 
alternatives and ten individual characteristics and we assume that the utility functions 
are linear. We would therefore have113: 
 
Ui1 = α1 + X’iβ1 + εi1         (1) 
Ui2 = α2 + X’iβ2 + εi2         (2) 
Ui3 = α3 + X’iβ3 + εi3         (3) 
 
 
                                               
111
 The help, insight and knowledge of Mercedes Gracia Díez (Professor in Econometrics at Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid) is gratefully acknowledged. 
112
 Although the multinomial probit was also considered, computational ease and the theoretical 
similarities between logit and probit estimations led us to choose the MNL model (see Cabrer Borrás et 
al. 2001). Additionally, the MNL had a larger (less negative) log pseudo likelihood value than the 
multinomial probit for the medium and the large spills.  
Given the nature of the questions asked (i.e. all respondents answered three compensation questions) a 
multivariate probit model was also considered. This was due to the possibility that respondents’ choices 
could be closely related and according to Giraud, Loomis and Johnson (1999) this could lead to 
correlations between the statistical disturbances of the responses. A probit for the compensation exercise 
was run to compare the results of the two. As of 2003, ‘accurate functions for the evaluation of trivariate 
and higher-dimensional normal distributions do not exist in Stata’ (Cappellari, 2003: 278) so the 
compensation answers were transformed into dichotomous type responses for each type of capital for the 
comparison of the multivariate probit and the multinomial probit results. The outputs of these analyses 
showed that the results of these two models were very similar. The reason for this similarity according to 
Rubinfeld and Pindyck (1981), Zellner (1963) and Judge et al. (1988) is that if we have three equations to 
estimate and these equations all have the same regressors then the estimator that takes into consideration 
the possible correlation is the same as the OLS estimator. The above-mentioned authors demonstrate this 
for a linear model and analysing the results when trying out the multivariate probit and the multinomial 
probit led us to assume this was also the case in non-linear models. We therefore used the multinomial 
logit model for the analysis of the compensation exercise data.  
113
 This explanation is adapted from Cabrer Borrás (2001). 
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Where: 
Yi  : Choice 
Ui1, Ui2, Ui3  : Utilities of each alternative for respondent i 
α1, α2, α3  : Constant  
X’i  : Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i 
β1, β2, β3 : Column vector of coefficients 
εi1, εi2, εi3 : Error terms 
 
And therefore, each respondent will choose according to the following logic: 
Yi= 1(man-made capital) if Ui1 >Ui2, Ui3      (4) 
Yi = 2 (social capital) if Ui2 >Ui1, Ui3      (5) 
Yi = 3 (natural capital) if Ui3>Ui1, Ui2      (6) 
The expected value of choosing a given option is quantified through the probability: 
      P (Yi = j)              eX’ijβ 
        ∑ eX’ijβ 
       
j=o 
Where: 
j = Index for each alternative for respondent i 
X’ij = Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i 
β = Column vector of coefficients 
If the regressors (Xij in general notation as it includes respondent characteristics (i) and 
characteristics of the alternatives (j)) refer to respondent’s characteristics, which is the 
case in the present research project, then the Multinomial Logit Model should be used. 
The specification for this model is as follows114: 
 
                            eX’i βj      
             ∑ eX’iβj 
               
j=0 
Where: 
Pij = Probability that respondent i will choose alternative j 
j = Index for each alternative which include J-1 alternatives 
X’i = Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i 
βj = Column vector of coefficients for the alternative being analysed (j) 
                                               
114
 Medina (2003:22) 
= 
J 
      P (Yi  = j)= Pij = 
  J-1 
(8) 
  (9) 
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Given the existing indetermination of the MNL when estimating the parameters, the 
model is standardised assuming that the coefficients of the baseline alternative are 
equal to zero (β0=0)115: 
  
                                1      
              1+  ∑ e X’i βj  
               
j=1 
Where: 
j = Index for the alternative being analysed (= 0 or base outcome in this case)  
X’i = Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i 
βj = Column vector of coefficients for the alternative being analysed (j) 
 
                            e X’i βj  
             1+  ∑ e X’i βj  
               
j=0 
Where: 
j = Index for each alternative which include J-1 alternatives 
X’i = Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i 
βj = Column vector of coefficients for the alternative being analysed (j) 
 
In our case, in which we have three alternatives from which respondents were asked 
to choose, the probability of choosing each option would be116: 
                                1       
              1+  ∑ e X’iβj  
               
 
                            e X’i βj  
             1+  ∑ e X’iβj  
                
 
                            e X’i βj     
             1+  ∑ e X’iβj           
Subject to Pi0 +Pi1+Pi2 =1 
 
 
 
                                               
115
 ibid. 
116
 Adapted from Medina (2003) when there are more that one explanatory variable.  
              P(Yi  = j) = 
  J-1 
for j = 1, 2, …, (J-1) 
             P (Yi  = 0)= 
  J-1 
            for j = 0 
                Pi0=              for j = 0 
                          Pi1= for j = 1 
                 Pi2= for j = 2 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(10) 
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Regresors 
The independent variables that were to be included in the model were selected 
following the literature review, analysing the information obtained during elite 
interviews and focus groups and and studying the cross tabulation data. The theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) that is described in chapter 2 was (loosely) 
used as a model to understand behavioural intentions in the compensation and in the 
valuation exercises. Stated preference techniques literature and manuals were also 
used to determine the independent variables that were to be used in the models (see 
Bateman. et al.  2002). Socio-economic variables, variables related to beliefs and 
attitudes related to the environment (e.g. the aggregate NEP score) were therefore 
included in the MNL model. A summary table of the independent variables is presented 
in table 4.3.12 below: 
Table 4.3.12 Independent variables. Compensation exercise, multinomial logit model 
Independent variable Possible values 
City 0= if resident of La Coruña  1= if resident of Madrid 
Age 18-79 
Income Midpoint of the income band 
Education 
= 1if illiterate 
= 2 if no education but can read 
= 3 if Nursery school 
= 4 if Primary education 
= 5 if High school or equivalent (up to 14 years of age) 
= 6 if Secondary school certificate (up to 18 years of age) 
= 7 if Graduate 
= 8 if Postgraduate 
Concerned about the economy 0= if No  1= if Yes 
Concerned about the environment  0= if No 1= if Yes 
Known spills 0= if none 1= if one or more 
Aggregated NEP score 15 – 75117 
Number of right wing newspapers read 
= 0 if none 
= 1 if one 
= 2 if two 
= 3 if three 
Number of left wing newspapers 
= 0 if none 
= 1 if one 
= 2 if two 
 
                                               
117
 Although 74 was the maximum aggregate NEP score obtained by any respondent 
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There are, to my knowledge, no previous studies of the choice between different 
compensation options in terms of the type of capital preferred when faced with oil 
spills of varying severity in order to test respondent preferences in terms of weak and 
strong sustainability. This means that the expectations as regards the signs of the 
variables were exploratory and guided by other scales (e.g. the NEP) that unveil the 
pro-ecological worldview. Expectations were also guided by other valuation studies as 
it was hypothesised that there might be some similarities among the independent 
variables and expected signs in the compensation question and the valuation question. 
For example, people who have a more pro-ecological worldview (higher aggregate NEP 
score) might be more likely to choose natural capital when faced with environmental 
losses and might also be willing to make extra sacrifices in terms of higher WTP to 
prevent future oil spills. Contextual information obtained from elite interviews and 
from the focus group discussion additionally shaped the expectations regarding the 
signs of the independent variables chosen (see discussion in chapter 3). 
 
The sign of the city variable was unclear as, in principle, the distance decay effect 
according to which ‘benefit values are inversely related to the distance from a site’ 
(Georgiou et al. 2000:3) may in principle have also been applicable to the 
compensation exercise and it was hypothesised that this may have led respondents in 
La Coruña to prefer social capital or natural capital over the status quo 
(infrastructures). The fact that some elite interviewees and some focus group 
respondents mentioned the lack of infrastructures in Galicia as a reason for supporting 
investment in infrastructures in the additional compensation packages designed in the 
aftermath of the Prestige, put that expectation on hold.  
 
There were little a priori expectations regarding the sign of age in the choice of 
compensation option (social capital or natural capital over infrastructures). According 
to Olofsson and Öhman (2006) younger people tend to show more pro-environmental 
attitudes compared to older people, but it is older people (up to retirement age) who, 
on average, will have more financial resources and hence will be able to make 
commitments to protect the environment. In the compensation exercise, where 
income does not a priori limit the compensation received, it may be expected that 
younger interviewees show a more pro-environmental attitude and perhaps choose 
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natural capital as their preferred compensation option. Older people however tend to 
be more risk averse. If this risk aversion is translated into environmental damages 
caused by spills, older respondents will be expected to want to avoid loosing natural 
capital and hence they may choose natural capital over the status quo (man-made 
capital). Hence, it was not clear whether age would be significant in determining the 
preferred compensation option. In fact, the results from the compensation exercise 
show that age does not discriminate in the choice of social capital or natural capital 
over infrastructures.   
 
As regards income, although the general expectation from an economic growth 
optimist perspective is that richer people care more about the environment (Pearce, 
1980, Beckerman, 1974), there is a counter argument that claims that low income 
individuals can value the environment highly (Neumayer, 1999; Kriström and Riera, 
1996). Additionally, losses such as those depicted in the compensation exercise could 
also be less significant for people who are better off as they can be argued to have 
greater substitution possibilities. So, income could in principle be expected to be either 
positive or negative. Regression results show that the sign is negative in the 
compensation exercise, indicating that individuals who are worse off have higher 
probability of choosing social capital or natural capital over infrastructures.  
 
Regarding education, Dunlap et al. (2000) and Markandya and Perrings (1991) claim 
better education makes individuals more aware of environmental damage and allows 
them to voice their demands for environmental quality. Hence, education is expected 
to have a positive sign in the choice of natural capital over infrastructures. The same 
reasoning applies to the variable ‘information about previous oil spills’ that was 
expected to be significant and positive in determining the choice of natural capital over 
infrastructures.   
 
Concern about socioeconomic problems (such as the state of the economy or the state 
of the environment) was included as contextual information in the form of warm-up 
questions at the outset of the questionnaire. Belief-attitude-behaviour models could 
point to the possibility of having individuals who are more concerned about the 
environment being more likely to choose natural capital as their preferred 
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compensation option. Additionally, the analysis of the information obtained from elite 
interviewees led to the hypothesis that individuals who were more concerned about 
the state of the economy would prefer man-made capital to social or to natural capital. 
This was so as man-made capital was seen by some elite interviewees and focus group 
respondents as boosting the economy (i.e. infrastructure projects tend to require 
substantial labour force which in turn drives the demand for goods and services in the 
surrounding areas).  
 
Higher aggregate NEP scores (that indicate a more pro-ecological worldview, Dunlap et 
al. 2000) were hypothesised to lead to higher likelihood of selecting natural capital 
over infrastructures. Finally, as regards political orientation the above mentioned 
authors state that there is evidence that more progressive people (characterised in the 
thesis as reading more left wing newspapers) would have a more ecological worldview 
and this in turn may me related to a greater probability of choosing either social capital 
or natural capital over infrastructures.  
 
Results 
This subsection presents the output of the multinomial logit model used to analyse the 
characteristics that have a significant impact in the compensation choices of 
respondents. These results will then be critically discussed.  
The model simultaneously estimates the choice of social capital and natural capital 
over infrastructures. The STATA outputs are however divided into two tables in the 
present chapter to improve clarity in the presentation of results. Thus, table 4.3.13 a) 
presents the first part of the MNL output in which the significance of regressors and 
their sign are described in the choice of social capital over man-made capital. Table 
4.3.13 b) presents the second part of the MNL output in which the significance of 
regressors and their sign are depicted in the choice of natural capital over man-made 
capital. The base outcome is chosen to be infrastructures as this option was the one to 
which a largest amount of funds were devoted in the aftermath of the Prestige. The 
STATA outputs show that the model is significant overall as the Wald Chi squared of 
78.63 for the small spill, 90.04 for the medium spill and 89.92 for the large spill all have 
a p-value of 0.0000 which means that the model proposed has a better fit than an 
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empty model (which would mean that all coefficients would be simultaneously equal 
to zero, the null hypothesis tested).  
Table 4.3.13a Multinomial logit. Compensation exercise 
a) Social capital over man-made capital 
Variables Small Medium Large
-2.485 -0.471 1.529
(2.11) (2.09) (2.29)
1.451*** 1.371*** 1.695***
(0.42) (0.42) (0.49)
0.003 -0.0001 -0.007
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.00002** -5.65e-06 -0.00001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
0.192 -0.030 -0.140
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
-0.973*** -0.353 -0.681
(0.41) (0.38) (0.43)
-0.507 0.124 -0.012
(0.39) (0.42) (0.46)
0.953 0.856 1.448*
(0.86) (0.84) (0.89)
0.053* 0.033 0.009
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.518 -0.875*** -1.004***
(0.33) (0.30) (0.35)
0.969** 0.976** 1.419***
(0.43) (0.42) (0.56)
Pseudo R2 0.0775 0.0821 0.0882
Aggregate NEP score
Right
Left
Education
Concerned about the  Economy
Concerned about the Environment
Konwn spills
Constant
City
Age
Income
 
Where :  Standard error in parentheses 
 *  =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 ***=The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
 
Key findings: 
Across the three spills, age, the educational level of respondents and being concerned 
about the environment do not discriminate between choosing social capital and man-
made capital. 
If responses came from people interviewed in Madrid the probability of choosing social 
capital over man-made capital increased across the three spills. When elite interviews 
were conducted the ‘historical debt argument’, whereby Galicia had comparatively less 
infrastructures to the rest of Spain, was repeatedly mentioned as an underlying reason 
for investments in man-made capital. It seems as though this is also reflected in the 
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Income is significant when analysing the small spill but for the medium and the large 
spills income does not discriminate between choosing social capital and 
infrastructures. The sign is negative, meaning that the higher the income the less likely 
to choose social capital over infrastructures. This may be due to the greater access 
wealthier people have to alternative education and healthcare that may be provided 
privately. The existence of substitution possibilities for these goods may therefore 
make them less desirable than the availability of infrastructures that tend to be 
publicly provided. 
Concern for the economy is only significant when analysing the compensation choices 
for the small spill. For the medium and large spill, the concern for the state of the 
economy does not discriminate when choosing between social capital and 
infrastructures. For the small spill, also as expected, respondents who stated they were 
concerned about the economy were less likely to choose social capital over 
infrastructures. One possible explanation for this, mentioned in the focus group 
discussions, is that investments in infrastructures are seen as boosting the economy.  
Whether or not respondents had prior knowledge about oil spills was only significant 
in determining the choice of social capital over infrastructures in the large spill. The 
sign is positive meaning that knowledge increases the probability of choosing social 
capital over infrastructures.  
The aggregate NEP score is only significant for the small spill. For the medium and 
large spill, the NEP score does not discriminate between social capital and 
infrastructures. In the small spill, higher NEP scores increase the probability of 
choosing social capital over infrastructures. There were no prior expectations 
regarding the sign of this variable as there is no direct relationship between a more 
pro-ecological worldview and a preference for social capital. Concern for other species 
and for the environment may nevertheless be related to social capital investment 
which could further help confirm Aldred (2002) and Turner’s (2007) theoretical 
proposal that when an environmental damage is suffered investment in schools and 
hospitals may be appropriate as compensation. 
The political inclination is overall significant when determining the choice of social 
capital over infrastructures. With the exception made of the small spill, reading more 
right wing newspapers has a significant and negative effect on the probability of 
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choosing social capital over infrastructures. Conversely, reading more left wing 
newspapers has a significant and positive impact on choosing social capital over 
infrastructures for all spills. That is, an increase in the number of left wing newspapers 
read increases the probability of choosing social capital over infrastructures. This was 
also expected due to the traditional left wing ideological underpinnings in Spain that 
tend to advocate for government investment in public goods such as health care, 
education and, although maybe to a lesser extent, R&D programs.  
Overall the variables chosen are significant and they have the expected signs. This is a 
sign of theoretical validity which is defined as results that ‘conform to the predictions 
of economic theory’ (Pearce et al. 2006: 119).  
The coefficients, sign and significance in the choice of natural capital over 
infrastructures is presented in table 4.3.13 b) below: 
Table 4.3.13b Multinomial logit. Compensation exercise 
b) Natural capital over man-made capital 
Variables Small Medium Large
-3.890* -2.415 -1.103
(2.19) (2.18) (2.36)
1.187*** 0.859** 1.350***
(0.44) (0.43) (0.50)
-0.008 -0.018 -0.017
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.00003*** -0.00001 -0.00002**
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
0.258 0.085 0.122
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
-0.424 0.091 0.014
(0.42) (0.39) (0.44)
0.015 0.723* 0.353
(0.40) (0.43) (0.46)
1.093 0.938 1.677*
(0.92) (0.91) (0.95)
0.071** 0.059** 0.024
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.760** -0.908*** -1.33***
(0.36) (0.33) (0.37)
0.564 0.647 1.18**
(0.44) (0.43) (0.57)
Pseudo R2 0.0775 0.0821 0.0882
Aggregate NEP score
Right
Left
Education
Concerned about the Economy
Concerned about the Environment
Known spills
Constant
City
Age
Income
 
Where :  Standard error in parentheses 
 *  =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 ***=The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
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Key findings: 
Neither concern for the state of the economy nor the age of respondents, nor the 
educational level discriminate when choosing between natural capital over 
infrastructures. This is so across the three spills. Whether respondents are concerned 
about the environment as one of the main socio-economic problems is only significant, 
with an expected positive sign, in choosing natural capital over infrastructures for the 
medium sized spill. 
The variable city is significant with a positive sign across the three spills. Respondents 
in Madrid are more likely to choose natural capital over infrastructures. The reasons 
for this may be two-fold. First, respondents in Madrid are not expected to perceive a 
lack in infrastructures. Second, respondents in Madrid have less access to coastal 
areas. Thus the choice of natural capital over infrastructures seems logical. Moreover 
as mentioned previously, there is a ‘historical debt’ argument and a lack of 
infrastructures acknowledged by elites and by FG respondents in La Coruña. 
Income is significant in the in the small and the large spill. The negative sign indicates 
that higher income reduces the probability of choosing natural capital over 
infrastructures. Two reasons may help explain this. First, people with higher income 
are less dependent on specific natural resources for either their livelihoods or their 
enjoyment (they tend to be employed in the tertiary sector (services) and they may 
choose alternative holiday destinations). This could provide support to the growth 
pessimists’ arguments that state that lower income people may be more concerned 
about environmental degradation than wealthier people as they are more dependent 
on natural resources for their livelihoods or their wellbeing (Neumayer, 1999). As this 
is a somewhat unexpected finding that may contradict optimist views on economic 
growth and the environment, future research could test this further to ensure this 
finding is robust across different environmental problems and compensation options.  
Previous knowledge of oil spills is significant and increases the probabilities of choosing 
natural capital over infrastructures for the large spill. Again resorting to the precepts of 
the theory of reasoned action more information and therefore understanding of an 
event (descriptive beliefs in Fishbein’s and Ajzen’s parlance, 1975: 132) will influence 
attitudes and these in turn will affect intentions under certain circumstances.  
 183 
The aggregate NEP score which has long been used as a good predictor of pro-
ecological world view, (Dunlap, 2000; Dunlap and Xiao, 2007 and Kotchen and Reiling, 
2000) is significant for the small and medium spill. It also has the expected positive 
sign. Thus, the higher the NEP scores, the higher the probability of choosing natural 
capital over infrastructures. People who have a more pro-ecological worldview are 
expected to prefer natural capital over infrastructures.  
The right wing ideology of respondents, inferred through answers to the newspapers 
read, is significant across the three spills. The sign is negative, indicating that the more 
right wing newspapers read, the less likely the respondent will be to choose natural 
capital over infrastructures. This finding is also in accordance with prior expectations 
(Jiménez, 2007).  
Reading left wing newspapers does not discriminate in the choice of natural capital 
over infrastructures in the small spill or in the medium spill. It is however significant 
when we look at compensation choices in the large spill. The sign for the large spill is 
positive. So, the more left wing newspapers read, the larger the likelihood of choosing 
natural capital over infrastructures. It should be noted however that these ideological 
variables may only be reflecting what respondents would expect the government to 
invest their money in, irrespective of the issue being analysed. Future research could 
test whether this is the case. 
Except for the a priori counter-intuitive finding as regards income in the choice of 
natural capital over man-made capital (explained and nuanced above), the remainder 
of the independent variables are overall significant and have the expected signs.  
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4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has analysed the compensation exercise in the questionnaire. The 
main findings and their relationship to sustainability are discussed below. 
Firstly, the most important problem for respondents was the state of the economy 
followed by crime. Within environmental problems water shortages were seen as the 
most pressing problem followed by air pollution and wild fires. Oil spills only came 
fourth (out of the five main environmental problems). So, there is still a low concern 
for environmental issues as well as for oil spills when other socio-economic problems 
and other environmental problems are presented to respondents. This finding 
coincides with the barometer conducted by the Spanish Centre for Sociological 
Research in June 2008 where only 1.6% of respondents stated that the environment 
was the first, second or third most important problem (CIS, 2008)118.  
Survey respondents had heard of, on average, two oil spills. In Galicia, as expected, this 
knowledge was higher than in Madrid, arguably due to distance decay effects (i.e. 
knowledge and concern is higher, the closer we are to the event). 
The majority of survey respondents would want additional compensation over and 
above the pre-existing clean-up and compensation funds traditionally paid through 
existing compensation schemes. This is so despite reminders of the opportunity cost of 
accepting compensation (i.e. other government-funded projects would no longer go 
ahead) and despite reminders of the existence of unaffected substitute sites.  
A small number of survey respondents did not want additional compensation. The 
main reasons given for rejecting compensation were that these spills should be 
prevented (arguably calling for preservation of natural capital and hence for stronger 
versions of the sustainability paradigm) or that others should pay (perhaps 
acknowledging the opportunity cost of additional compensation packages). 
Overall, the compensation option chosen by respondents who did want additional 
compensation does not change across spills, signalling stable preferences in terms of 
compensation for environmental losses. The hypothetical nature of the exercise plus 
the fact that the government was purported as the provider of additional 
compensation may have influenced the choice of compensation options, reflecting 
                                               
118
 http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2760_2779/2766/e276600.html 
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what respondent would want the government to invest in irrespective of the issue 
analysed. Future research using split sample designs and various compensation 
providers could also test this matter.  
The most popular compensation option is the investment package in social capital (i.e. 
building schools, hospitals and undertaking R&D) thus providing empirical support for 
Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007). Roughly a third of respondents would choose natural 
capital as their preferred compensation option and less than 9% of respondents would 
choose investments in infrastructure projects. The fact that over 80% of the funds 
would be allocated to social capital plus natural capital compensation packages could 
arguably signal towards either a modified Hartwick –type rule or a stronger SD 
approach. Future oil spill analyses could explicitly test this.  
The main reason given by those who chose man-made capital as well as by those who 
chose investments in social capital was that their option was the ‘best’ or ‘the most 
logical one’. Interestingly, some respondents who chose man-made capital as their 
preferred compensation option also stated that investments in man-made capital 
would be a good substitute for losses in natural capital, pointing towards a Hartwick-
type reasoning as regards substitutability.  
The main reasons given by those who chose natural capital were the mitigation effects 
of this compensation package. Additionally, these respondents also stated that it was 
their responsibility to choose natural capital (i.e. there was a moral obligation to 
replace damage or lost natural capital with similar natural capital). Very few, if any, 
respondents who chose either social capital or natural capital stated these investments 
were good substitutes. This could back the claim by Humphrey (2001) who states that, 
for certain environmental losses, some compensation may be possible despite the fact 
that there may be no substitution for these environmental losses.  
The proportion of compensation funds per type of capital allocated to each 
compensation option is significantly different according to the statistical tests 
conducted. The proportion of additional compensation funds allocated to natural 
capital as the spill size increases could be indicative of some sensitivity to scope. This 
could mean more compensation for natural capital lost when thresholds are reached 
(mirroring expectations of higher prices and large welfare losses when analysing WTP 
scenarios). The caveat however is that the size of this effect is moderate, and social 
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capital is still the most preferred compensation option despite the hypothetical 
thresholds being described. This could be indicative of a lack of proportionality in 
terms of compensation in like-for-like and yet stronger support for Aldred (2002) and 
Turner (2007).  
The most salient findings of the parametric analysis through the use of Multinomial 
Logit Models provided the following information regarding respondent characteristics 
that best determine the probability of choosing one compensation option over the 
status quo (man-made capital). On the choice of social capital over the status quo, 
respondents with lower income, respondents from Madrid, those less concerned 
about the economy as one of the main socio-economic problems, individuals with 
higher pro-ecological worldview and a more left-wing ideology are more likely to 
choose social capital over infrastructures.  
On the choice of natural capital over infrastructures respondents from Madrid, 
younger interviewees, people with lower income, a higher educational attainment, 
interviewees concerned about the environment as one of the fundamental socio-
economic problems, knowing previous spills, having a higher ecological worldview and  
being more left wing oriented show an increased probability of choosing natural 
capital over infrastructures.  
These findings have to be interpreted with caution due to the limited sample size (663 
usable interviews analysed). Overall the determinants of the compensation option 
were significant and had the expected sign. The negative sign in the income data may 
be due to the greater need for social capital investments (in education such as schools 
and in health such as hospitals) compared with infrastructure projects of less wealthy 
respondents that chose social capital over man-made capital. Greater dependence 
(less substitution possibilities) on natural resources for either leisure activities or for 
the livelihood of respondents may help explain why lower income level increases the 
probability of choosing natural capital over infrastructures as the preferred 
compensation option. Conversely, wealthier respondents may have both greater 
substitution possibilities for leisure activities, they are a priori less dependent on 
natural resources for their work and they are more reliant on a publicly provided road 
and railway infrastructure system. 
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In sum, these preferences for a modified Hartwick rule compensation package with a 
significant amount of respondents moving towards stronger forms of sustainability are 
relevant in theoretical terms. This thesis presents a practical application and 
confirmation of Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) in their claim that when faced with 
environmental losses such as oil spills of different sizes and consequences money may 
not be the appropriate compensation but investments in social capital may be 
appropriate.  
Future research could potentially focus on ensuring the reliability of these results in 
various ways. First, larger sample sizes would be desirable subject to time and resource 
constraints. Second, it would be interesting to test, through split sample designs, 
whether changing the institution in charge of compensation packages alters 
respondents’ choices. The purpose would be to analyse whether respondents are just 
choosing what they would demand from the government regardless of the damage 
analysed.   
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CHAPTER 5. AN EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY OF 
SUSTAINABILITY: VALUATION 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three compared the views of elites and citizens as regards 
sustainability. Chapter four explored survey respondent preferences for different 
compensation ‘packages’ when environmental damages of varying severity occur. It 
also analysed the link between the results obtained and the sustainability debate. The 
findings from the compensation exercise provide evidence of a shift towards a 
modified Hartwick-type (weak) sustainability rule and confirmation of the 
aforementioned claim by Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) about social capital being 
accepted as compensation when environmental damages happen.  
As regards strong sustainability FG participants preferred replacement of like-for-like 
or prevention investments as compensation. Additionally, a third of survey 
respondents preferred natural capital as a compensation option when faced with 
environmental damages, again demanding a stronger version of sustainability. This led 
to the belief that survey respondents may be willing to pay significantly more to 
prevent large oil spills compared to the payment they would be willing to make to 
prevent smaller oil spills. Hence, this last empirical chapter explores survey 
respondents’ willingness to pay to prevent natural capital depletion in the context of 
oil spills of varying sizes.  
This is on the one hand a scope test, both internal and external and it contributes to 
the debate on scope sensitivity. Some of the most relevant literature on oil spills do 
not report external scope tests (see for example Carson et al. 2003 and Loureiro et al. 
2007, 2009 and Bonnieux and Rainelli, 2003). In the present thesis that implies using a 
split-sample design so that half of the sample is asked about their WTP to avoid a small 
and medium size spill and the other half of the sample is asked about their WTP to 
avoid a medium and large size spill. On the other hand this chapter provides an 
analysis of the potential link between strong sustainability and valuation techniques, 
following Pearce et al. (2006) as it has been argued that sustainability proponents have 
yet to explore the costs and benefits of sustainability (Atkinson et al. 1997).    
The analysis in this chapter also contributes to existing CV studies in oil spill 
management, taking up the recommendations by Arrow et al. (1993) as regards the 
usefulness of building a body of knowledge regarding WTP for spills of different sizes 
and consequences.  
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Additionally, this chapter complements the discussion in chapter 4 with a more in-
depth analysis of ‘protestors’ in a protest-prone setting such as a contingent valuation-
type exercise, which could help shed light on this issue (see Atkinson et al. 
forthcoming, Jorgensen et al. 1999, Halstead et al. 1992, Strazzera et al.  2003).  
Previous findings, as well as the above mentioned gaps in the literature, motivated 
complementing the analysis already undertaken with the analysis of a contingent 
valuation exercise that was included at the end of the questionnaire.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents a brief summary 
of CV and of the valuation scenario construction process based on the salient findings 
of the qualitative analysis techniques used as well as the pilot interviews and expert 
input. Section 5.3 presents the critical analysis of the main results obtained, starting 
with descriptive statistics of those questions relevant to the parametric analysis and 
followed by logit and interval data models. Section 5.4 concludes by discussing the 
main findings.    
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5.2 VALUATION: THEORY AND DESIGN BASED ON SALIENT 
FINDINGS 
5.2.1 Contingent Valuation and oil spill valuation studies 
When impacts from activities are not reflected in markets, their value can be 
obtained by asking people to value the merits (or otherwise) of different options 
through stated preference techniques. An example of this would include asking citizens 
about their preferences for natural capital preservation policies in the context of oil 
spill management schemes. It has been argued that there can never be a 
comprehensive valuation since current efforts cannot capture for example primary 
values of the environment. But if decisions regarding these issues are made, and funds 
are allocated to certain policies, implicit or explicit valuations will be made (Bateman 
et al. 2002). Making these valuations explicit will hopefully imply decisions are made in 
a more transparent and efficient manner. Equity considerations, complementary to 
efficiency considerations as well as sustainability constraints, may complete the 
valuation exercise. The final empirical contribution of this thesis will focus on 
understanding the value people assign to preserving natural capital which is, to a large 
extent, not traded in the market. This can help answer the call for further analysis of 
the benefits of preserving natural capital (and hence strong sustainability) as expressed 
by Atkinson et al. (1997). 
Stated preference (SP) techniques obtain data from individuals through survey 
methods. They ask individuals the amount they would be willing to pay (or WTA) to 
move from the status quo to an alternative situation. Alternatively they may ask 
individuals their ranking or rating of different situations proposed. SP techniques allow 
to include questions that uncover motivations for taking action (Arrow et al. 1993). 
Socio-economic characteristics that are expected to shape the outcome of the 
valuation exercise are also recorded. Stated preference techniques are useful in 
eliciting both use and non-use values and could potentially be used to evaluate any 
situation.  
Within stated preference techniques, the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is a 
questionnaire-based technique that directly asks a representative sample of citizens 
with standing in the policy decision the amount they would be willing to pay (or WTA) 
for a change in environmental quality that will affect their welfare. Bowen in 1943 and 
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Ciriacy-Wantrup first proposed this method in 1947 (for a comprehensive history of CV 
please refer to Carson and Hanemann, 2005) although its first practical application did 
not occur until 1963 by Davis. CV was developed as an aid to CBA in the analysis of the 
contribution of policies or projects to the wellbeing of society (Randall, 1997). In 1984 
Hanemann provided the theoretical foundations of future CV analyses (Carson and 
Hanemann, 2005). The early nineties gave public stance to CV with the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill. Since then CV has arguably become the most widely used non-market valuation 
technique. If properly executed, CVM is a useful tool in CBA (Carson, Flores and 
Meade, 2001).  Despite the discrete nature of CV analyses and the long-term and 
global requirements of sustainable development, it is assumed that CV-type studies 
can be a useful input into the enquiry of sustainability as it provides an explicit check of 
the social worth of projects and policies that may have long term consequences. 
Aggregate WTP is usually estimated using a valuation function. Econometric models 
such as logistic regression models (if respondents are asked to accept or reject a given 
bid price in the WTP question) or interval regressions models (if respondents are asked 
to decide on an interval payment that would be acceptable to them) provide 
information regarding the relationship between WTP and respondents characteristics 
(Boardman et al. 2001, Lesser et al. 1997 or Bateman et al. 2002).  
Arguably the basic disadvantage of CVM is that interviewees are asked to evaluate 
hypothetical situations and their actual behaviour might deviate from their sated 
intentions (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Furthermore, respondents might be asked to 
value goods they are unfamiliar with. To obtain a meaningful answer to a proposed 
change in an unfamiliar good, adequate information that depicts understandable, 
meaningful and credible valuation scenarios should be provided to respondents.  
Despite its critics (see for example Diamond and Hausman, 1994), the blueprint 
provided by the NOAA panel on how to conduct a reliable and valid CV study and 
various SP manuals (Bateman et al. 2002; Champ et al. 2003, among others) have 
helped develop contingent valuation studies. Given that the Exxon Valdez was a 
turning point in the theory and practice of CV, the reminder of this section will 
summarise the main findings of this and other recent CV studies conducted for oil 
spills.  
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The Exxon Valdez CV  
The worst oil spill in US history (Skinner and Rielly, 1989; Carson et al. 2003), up until 
the recent Deepwater Horizon spill off the Gulf of Mexico119, occurred in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska, in the spring of 1989. The amount of oil spilled exceeded 10 million 
gallons (equivalent to 37,000 tons according to the CEPRECO, 2007), 350 miles (563. 3 
Km) of beaches were affected and the environmental damage caused to a ‘pristine’ 
environment were the most serious consequences of this accidental spill. The 
evaluation of the consequences of the oil spill, with a significant proportion of 
damages potentially happening due to lost passive use values, was done with the aid 
of a CV study. The area affected by the spill can be seen in map 5.2.1 below: 
Map 5.2.1 Exxon Valdez oil spill 
 
Source: http://library.thinkquest.org/10867/intro/overview.shtml 
The main findings of the survey were that the median WTP was $31 per household. 
The mean was $94 per household. This implied that the estimates for the passive use 
values lost due to the Exxon Valdez spill was 2.8 billion dollars. In the updated analysis 
of the Exxon Valdez CV study by Carson et al. (2003) a mean value of 79.2$ is 
presented as a better estimate of respondents’ WTP to pay for their escort ship 
program to prevent future oil spills in Prince William Sound.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
119
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8655683.stm 
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The Erika CV 
Between the 12th and the 13th of December 1999 the Erika, a 24 year old single-hulled 
oil tanker120 spilled approximately 20.000 tons of heavy fuel oil off the coast of Brittany 
(France). It was, up to that date, the largest environmental ‘catastrophe’ according to 
the media. The CEDRE121 described the main consequences over marine birds as ‘the 
greatest impact on seabirds ever recorded due to an oil spill’122. Shell-fish, local salt 
production and tourism were the main economic activities affected by the oil spill. 
Approximately 400Km of coastline was affected by the spill. Map 5.2.2 below shows 
the main areas affected by the Erika oil spill. 
Map 5.2.2 The Erika oil spill. Main impacted areas (in purple) 
 Source: Bonnieux and Rainelli (2003: 10) 
Substantial existence values lost due to the oil spill could ‘only’ be unveiled through 
the use of CV (Bonnieux and Rainelli, 2003). A rough estimate of the damages 
amounted to 914M€ although this estimate excluded the loss of non-use values. Non-
use values were analysed using benefit transfer. 
The median value respondents were willing to pay to fish in a clean site (estimated 
using data related to the additional distance they were willing to travel to a ‘safe area 
for their activities) was 58€ annually if the baseline scenario was that of a fishing site 
that had suffered minor (limited) degradation (scenario 1) and 81€ annually if the 
baseline scenario was one in which fishing is banned (scenario 2) due to high likelihood 
                                               
120
 http://www.cedre.fr/en/spill/erika/dos.php#imp 
121
 CEDRE is the acronym for Centre of Documentation, Research and Experimentation on Accidental 
Water Pollution. It is one of the world-wide leading research centres for accidental oil spill analysis.   
122
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of severe illnesses if polluted fish is consumed (Appéré, 2002 in Bonnieux and Rainelli, 
2003).  Mean WTP values would go up to 133.68€ for scenario 1 and 168.72€ for 
scenario 2.  
The Prestige CV 
The Prestige oil spill took place in November 2002. Most of the 77.000 tons of heavy 
fuel oil carried by this old, single-hulled tanker were spilled off the coast of Galicia. 
According to Varela and Prada (2004) over 1,000 Km of coastline were damaged by the 
oil slick, which included 745 polluted sandpits, persistent pollution on cliffs, the seabed 
and mud flats. A large proportion of the affected environmental resources were 
protected by international environmental agreements such as the RAMSAR convention 
for wetland protection or the special protection areas for birds (SPA) agreement under 
Natura 2000 network. The Atlantic Isles National Park was also struck by the oil spill. 
These areas are migrating routes for birds and mammals and it is estimated that 
approximately 38 endangered species live in the Galician coast. Additionally 
Portuguese and French coasts were also affected123.  
Map 5.2.3 The Prestige oil spill. Main impacted areas (black arrows)     
 
      
                                               
123
 http://www.iopcfund.org/prestige.htm 
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Economic losses and government expenditure derived from the Prestige oil spill have 
not been fully estimated as ‘the economy will suffer the consequences at least until 
the ecosystem recovers its natural balance and even beyond, and it is clear that such a 
recovery will only ever be partial and in the very long-term. We are therefore facing a 
situation where economic and environmental recovery will take at least 10 years, or 
even 25 years for certain species’ García Negro et al. (2007: 59). Relatively recent 
figures for the damages suffered by Spain, France and Portugal amount to 1,100M€ 
(García Negro et al. 2007). Loureiro et al. (2006) also offered estimates of the short 
term (2002-2004) damages caused by the Prestige in Spain, including commercial, 
cleaning and recovery costs amounting to 770M€. Non-use values are not included in 
these calculations due to a lack of CV studies at the time these studies were published.  
More recently, the existence of a previous CV study on the Prestige spill in Galicia 
(Spain), Loureiro et al. (2009), is useful in terms of comparing the different approaches 
used by these authors to that of this thesis. It is also useful in terms of analysing the 
validity of the results obtained in the present thesis (external validity124) although this 
validity analysis is necessarily limited as the scope of the changes presented in the 
valuation scenarios in the Loureiro study is restricted to the Prestige case.  
The parametric estimate of the mean individual WTP to avoid another Prestige-type 
spill is over 40€ in the Loureiro et al. (2009) study which gives a lower bound aggregate 
WTP of just under 575M€ for the Spanish population. 
 
5.2.2 Getting to the valuation question: Elite interviews, focus groups, pilot and 
experts 
This section will present the basic ideas gathered throughout the elite interview 
process, the focus groups, the pilot interviews conducted and expert input in order to 
design the valuation question.  
In the valuation question respondents were presented with basic information 
regarding oil spill prevention plans (that would hypothetically preserve natural capital) 
and they were then asked whether they would be willing to pay and, if so, how much 
to prevent future spills. 
                                               
124
 This is defined as the inspection of the validity of the study’s results with reference to other studies 
(Bateman et al. 2002). Differences in the payment vehicle, the duration of the contribution and the oil 
spill prevention programs described will have a bearing on the estimates’ differences, but the comparison 
is a priori expected to be useful.  
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The literature review set the basic framework for constructing the valuation scenarios. 
Arrow et al. (1993), Carson et al. (2003), Bateman et al. (2002) or Champ et al. (2003) 
among others recommend the provision of information to respondents on the 
investment program (in our case the oil spill prevention initiatives) that would prevent 
(or, more realistically, reduce the likelihood and consequences of) future oil spills. In 
order to make the scenarios credible, understandable and realistic, elite interviewees 
were asked about prevention measures that would reduce or prevent future oil spills. 
The detailed information obtained from elite interviews was later synthesised to 
ensure that respondents’ cognitive burden was minimised when answering the 
valuation question. This summarised information was then ‘fed’ into the valuation 
question. 
The main areas where elite interviewees thought future prevention plans should be 
strengthened were classified under three headings: information, means and rules. The 
main requirements of each of these are described below. 
Information in elite interviews: Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). Baseline 
information on the state of resources at risk due to oil spills was one of the primary 
concerns expressed by elites. The available information tends to be better for 
commercial species and for areas that have a use value. Elites requested baseline 
information on ‘areas, species and activities’ of strategic importance as well as on 
areas at risk and especially sensitive areas.  Additional surveillance, mainly aerial, was 
also requested in order to dissuade boats from bilge cleansing and to enable civil 
servants to report any accidental spills as soon as they happen in order to minimise 
damage. Having more controls and inspections are also seen as priorities in future oil 
spill prevention initiatives. Communicating technical and political decisions to the 
public was also seen as fundamental by elites in future oil spills.  
Means in elite interviews. Personnel, technology and infrastructure. The main demands 
include: an increase in the amount of inspectors who are expected to be adequately 
trained, able to judge the risks posed by oil tankers and, furthermore, able to 
communicate in English. Communication channels that are up and running twenty four 
hours a day as well as updated and easily accessible databases containing information 
on the available pollution fighting means were also demanded for future prevention 
plans. These databases should include information on e.g. oil barriers, suppliers, 
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delivery times, distance between pollution fighting equipment and coastal areas at risk 
plus expected replacement needs.   
Rules in elite interviews. Operational protocols and regulatory framework. Operational 
protocols had yet to be finalised in Galicia when the elite interviews were conducted. 
Personnel involved in managing oil spills were interviewed. Their main requirements 
regarding prevention included the need for these protocols to be designed, tested and 
improved. This was especially the case inland as interviewees claimed that 
approximately 90% of the oil spilled at sea typically ends up on the beach and 
coastline. Ideally, these protocols were expected to provide information regarding the 
‘chain of command’ in which a quick response, according to technical (rather than 
political) criteria, should be provided. Flexibility and coordination among different 
administrative levels (mimicking the Spanish civil protection operational plans) was 
also seen as essential in the design of these protocols. These protocols were also 
expected to provide clear guidance regarding: special protection areas, sacrifice areas 
and recovery protocols (á la IUCN).  
A more demanding regulatory framework that was considered as needed in order to 
ensure future oil spill prevention entailed further development and strengthening of 
international environmental agreements (IEA’s). Suggestions for the future 
development of the regulatory framework also included exploring the possibility of 
establishing joint venture initiatives with private firms in oil spill management. Finally, 
horizontal integration of government initiatives at the national level, so that all 
government departments involved in oil spill prevention acted following the same 
guidelines, was also regarded as a top priority.  
Similarly to the topics discussed during elite interviews, the three recurrent topics 
discussed by focus groups regarding oil spill prevention included: information, means 
and regulation. An additional area of interest raised was the specification of the 
payment process.    
Information in focus groups. Trustworthy information was seen by focus groups as an 
important confidence builder. FG participants also demanded a re-structuring of the 
communication strategy between the government and citizens which was perceived as 
patchy and unreliable. Additionally, providing information regarding the use of funds 
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collected from taxpayers was seen as important in terms of encouraging people to pay 
for prevention schemes.  
Means in focus groups. Further need for personal and technical means were 
mentioned by focus group respondents in order to ensure adequate and timely 
response to future oil spills. As expected, the level of detail of FG answers was 
significantly lower compared to that of elite interviewees. Focus group participants 
also requested ‘expert advice’ in order to ensure technical (rather than political) 
decision-making.    
Rules in focus groups. Specific planning and prevention protocols were requested. This 
was coupled with a demand for ensuring that polluters are law-abiders (and therefore 
accidents were not due to negligence or wrongdoing). Ensuring oil carriers are law-
abiding parties was said to increase focus group respondents’ WTP.  
Specification of the payment process in focus groups. The questions and concerns 
regarding the payment process in the valuation exercise included various issues. Focus 
group respondents stated they would demand more information on the prevention 
programs for higher levels of payment requested from them. On the payment vehicle, 
some respondents wanted voluntary donations, other respondents demanded 
earmarked taxation and yet others showed no strong preference for or against any 
particular payment vehicle discussed. A general preoccupation was voiced regarding 
the need to have a progressive-type payment system for the prevention program 
whereby richer respondents were asked to contribute more towards these programs. 
Additionally, respondents wanted to pay for prevention in ‘small instalments’ rather 
than through lump sum payments. Furthermore, the payment frequency was also a 
concern for respondents as well as the use of these funds at times when no oil spills 
happened. Finally, the valuation exercise was said to be complex and thus efforts were 
made to simplify the task in the final questionnaire.  
 
5.2.3 The valuation question in the survey 
In order to obtain information on individuals’ preferences, one of the aims has been to 
purport policy changes that will avoid future oil spills in an accurate, feasible and 
understandable (yet comprehensive) manner. The information obtained from the 
qualitative methods helped in this endeavour. A further aim has been to motivate 
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respondents to unveil their preferences. According to Arrow et al. (1993), if 
respondents to CV exercises are expected to protest for having to pay for restoring the 
environmental damages caused by say oil companies or carriers, or if respondents 
have little faith in the environmental recovery possibilities, prevention scenarios 
should be used in the hypothetical valuation scenarios. This was the case in this thesis. 
The importance, consequences, the high visibility of past oil spills, the politicised 
nature of the public debate, the discussions in the focus groups and the comments 
made during the pilot, led to the conclusion that respondents could be unwilling to pay 
for clean-up scenarios.  
The typical structure of a CV questionnaire first includes a section in which questions 
on respondents’ attitudes and behaviours are registered. These are expected to help 
warm-up and enable the analysis of factors that may influence WTP answers. This 
section is usually followed by the presentation of the valuation scenario as well as 
follow-up questions that help determine the motivations for the answers to the WTP 
questions. Finally a section on the socio-economic characteristics of respondents is 
included to analyse their influence on WTP responses as well as to enable a 
comparison of sample characteristics to those of the population Pearce et al. (2006).  
As can be seen in annexes A.3.1 and A.3.2 the CV study in this thesis followed the 
typical organisation for a CV. The valuation question asked respondents whether they 
would be willing to pay to prevent future oil spills. In order to take into account 
respondents’ concerns as analysed above, the questionnaire included the following 
information presented in box 5.2.1:  
Box 5.2.1 Initial background information on the valuation exercise 
The sea gives us many things. Plants and animals live in it, we feed from it, we enjoy our holidays in the sea side, etc.
Oil spills damage the sea preventing us from enjoying these things
We have just seen that the government cleans up and compensates affected people when spills take place. A better
scenario however would be to avoid these spills. According to experts, in order to avoid these spills we should invest
in: 
o        Personnel and equipment to fight against spills
o        Implementing oil spill prevention plans all around the Spanish coast
o        Use maps to tell us which areas should be protected in case of a new spill
These investments will be undertaken by regional governments with coast and by the central government as
everyone in Spain enjoys a clean coast. 
A monitoring commission will ensure investments are used only for this purpose. Other EU countries are also
analysing these programs.  
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Once respondents had listened to the initial background information, interviewers 
read additional information signalling the need to focus on non-economic impacts of 
oil spills and asking interviewees to state whether they would be willing to fund 
prevention programs. This information is shown in box 5.2.2 below. 
Box 5.2.2 Additional information and WTP question. Version 1 of the questionnaire 
In order to avoid spill A and B, which are the most frequent ones, the government must undertake the above
investments. These are costly and will only be undertaken if citizens are willing to pay for them.
In this final exercise I am going to ask you to focus on the environmental and health consequences of spill A and spill 
B as shown in the documentation and I would like to ask you whether you would be willing to contribute to the
funding of this investment. The payment would be an annual increase in your income tax as these investments have
to be maintained in time. 
Spill A and spill B have different consequences and they need different investments. Taking this into account and
considering that each person will be asked to contribute according to their income, would you be willing to pay for
these investments in order to avoid these spills?  
 
For those respondents who said they would be willing to pay to prevent future spills, a 
reminder of their income constraints as well as of the existence of substitutes was read 
by interviewers following generally accepted CV scenario construction guidelines 
(Bateman et al. 2002). The reminder is presented in box 5.2.3 below: 
Box 5.2.3 Income constraints and substitutes reminder in the valuation question 
Please do not agree to pay any amount if you cannot afford it or if there are other things
on which you would rather spend your money! Remember there are other areas in Spain
and in other countries that will not be affected by the spill.  
The main elements of the valuation exercise are summarised in table 5.2.1 below: 
Table 5.2.1 Summary of the main features of the valuation exercise 
Section Elements Question/information
Personnel and equipment to fight against spills
Implementing oil spill prevention plans all around the Spanish coast
Use maps to tell us which areas should be protected in case of a new spill
Institution: regional and 
central government In order to avoid spill A and B the government must undertake the above investments
Opportunity cost reminder Do not agree to pay any amount if you cannot afford it or if there are other things on which you would rather spend your money
Substitutes reminder Remember there are other areas in Spain and in other countries that will not be affected by the spill
Payment vehicle Increase in annual income tax
Valuation question
Spill A and spill B have different consequences and they need different investments. Taking this 
into account and considering that each person will be asked to contribute according to their 
income, would you be willing to pay for these investments in order to avoid these spills?
Follow-up questions Can you tell me why?
WTP amount How much would you be willing to pay to avoid spill A?
Instrucons for interviewers: Tick (√) the quanty spontaneously menoned by the interviewee 
in the response column for spill A
Ask the interviewee whether s/he would be willing to pay the quantity immediately above the 
one mentioned spontaneously and keep raising the amount until the interviewee says no. Leave 
BLANK all quantities the interviewee agreed to pay after the spontaneous response
Cross (X) the quantity the interviewee said no. 
Can you tell me why you are willing to pay?
In the spills that we have just seen which consequences/damages have been more important in 
deciding your answer?
Valuation
Prevention program
Accounting for uncertainty
Follow-up questions
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5.3 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This section will analyse the main results obtained from the valuation question. The 
first subsection (5.3.1) will present the summary statistics of questions that are 
relevant to the valuation exercise. The second subsection (5.3.2) will present the 
parametric analysis for the valuation exercise. 
5.3.1 Key Summary statistics 
Part of the information is common to the previous chapter, hence, only the variables 
that are significant in determining respondents’ willingness to pay and different to 
those already presented in chapter 4 are analysed here.  
Summary statistics 
Whether respondents were influenced, or otherwise, by the environmental 
consequences of the spills (vs. the health consequences for example) was significant in 
determining WTP amounts. Table 5.3.1 below provides the basic information on 
interviewees’ responses to this follow-up question.  
Table 5.3.1 WTP influenced by environmental damages described 
Percentage of respondents
(out of those willing to pay)
WTP amount not influenced by environmental damages 67.27
WTP amount influenced by environmental damages 32.73  
For the logit and for the interval data model presented below, whether respondents 
had previously volunteered to protect the environment was also significant in 
determining the WTP amount. The main summary statistics data on the amount of 
volunteers within the sample is presented in table 5.3.2 below:  
Table 5.3.2 Volunteers by city 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
No 186 73.23 349 86.17 535 81.18
Yes 68 26.77 56 13.83 124 18.82
Total 254 100 405 100 659 100
Volunteered La Coruña Madrid Total
 
 
Over half of the respondents said they would be willing to pay to avoid future spills. 
Table 5.3.3 presents the results from the dichotomous type question (WTP/NOT WTP). 
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 Table 5.3.3 Respondents’ willingness to pay to avoid future spills 
Willingness to pay Frequency Percentage
No 303 45.7
Yes 360 54.3
Total 663 100  
 
Once interviewees had answered this dichotomous-type question, they were asked 
about the reasons for their answer. This was done to unveil the motivations for these 
answers and hence to analyse protest answers and invalid ‘yes’ responses. According 
to Bateman et al. (2002) invalid (protest) answers do not reveal the welfare change 
respondents would experience from the change in the hypothetical scenario. On the 
other hand, legitimate zeros are given by people who either do not have enough 
money to pay or have no desire to contribute to the change presented because it is of 
no value to them. The classification between protest answers and legitimate answers is 
however somewhat blurred in the literature (see Brouwer et al. 2008 or Atkinson et al. 
forthcoming). In order to be explicit about the choices made, calculations of protest 
answers according to the classification provided by Bateman et al. (2002) and 
according to Brouwer et al. (2008) will be presented. So, for those who said they would 
not be willing to pay, the main reasons are summarised in table 5.3.4 below: 
Table 5.3.4 Reasons for not being willing to pay 
Reason for NOT being willing to Bateman et al . ( 2002: 147) Brouwer et al . (2008: 16, 20) Frequency % / sample
I need more information to make 
my mind up Protest Protest 2 0.66
I already pay enough Protest Valid 101 33.22
Others should pay Protest Protest 96 31.58
The polluter should pay Protest Protest 49 16.12
This is not a serious problem/ 
there are no serious 
consequences
Valid Valid 2 0.66
I don’t have enough money to 
pay/I cannot afford to pay Valid Valid 29 9.54
They should manage the money 
better Protest Valid 5 1.64
Other reason Protest/valid Protest/valid 17 5.59
Protest/Valid
 
If we calculated protest responses according to the classification of protest answers by 
Bateman et al. (2002), we would have 38% of protest responses. If we calculate the 
protest response rate according to the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest 
answers, the percentage of protest responses would go down to 22%, which is just 
slightly higher than that of Brouwer et al. (2008) study. Protest answers when stating 
why respondents were not willing to pay (following the classification by Bateman et al. 
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(2002) Brouwer et al. (2008)) as well as biased answers (following the classification by 
Bateman et al. 2002) when asked why respondents were willing to pay were excluded 
from the calculations of the mean WTP values. Legitimate zero responses (4.3% if we 
calculate protests according to Bateman et al. (2002) and 21% if we calculate protests 
according to Brouwer et al. (2008) were retained to analyse the WTP data and its 
determinants.  
No generally accepted guidelines exist that tell us the percentage of protest responses 
that invalidates CV results but it is considered good practice to try to minimise these 
responses through careful pre-testing and assuring respondents that the polluters will 
pay part of the damage (ibid.). Should future CV’s use this or an improved version of 
this questionnaire, more emphasis should be put on these aspects to try to reduce 
protest responses. A small percentage of respondents provided biased yes answers 
when they stated the reason for which they would be willing to pay. Following 
Bateman et al. (2002), an analysis of valid and biased answers was done.  
The summary results of valid and biased answers are presented in table 5.3.5 below: 
Table 5.3.5 Valid & biased reasons for WTP: follow-up questions 
Valis / Bias Reason Frequency Percentage
It is important/necessary 53 14.76
It will benefit others 34 9.47
It will prevent future spills 44 12.26
It is the solution/mitigates 50 13.93
Due to the damages 5 1.39
Due to the economic consequences 3 0.84
It will benefit future generations 16 4.46
Due to the permanent damages/irreversibility 1 0.28
Use values (so we have food, beaches, etc) 3 0.84
It is our duty/it is our responsibility 104 28.97
It is only a small effort (i.e. it is worth it for me) 1 0.28
TOTAL VALID WTP RESPONSES 314 87.46
I am a caring person, I have a conscience (warm glow) 34 9.47
TOTAL BIASED RESPONSES 34 9.47
Other Other reasons for WTP answer 11 3.06
Valid
Bias
 
 
By looking at table 5.3.5 it is clear that the vast majority of respondents who said they 
would be willing to pay to avoid future oil spills did so for valid reasons.  
The tables below provide non-parametric mean for the maximum amount people were 
willing to pay. This was hypothesised to be below the amount they said they would not 
pay and above the last amount they said they would pay.  The non-parametric mean 
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WTP estimates using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest answers are 
presented in table 5.3.6 below: 
Table 5.3.6 Non-parametric mean WTP estimates: Bateman et al. (2002)  
Mean WTP to avoid spill Observations Mean (€) per year
Small 196 65.82
Medium 377 79.95
Large 180 98.22  
The non-parametric mean WTP using the classification of protest answers according to 
Bateman et al. (2002), ranges from under 66€ for the small spill to under 80€ for the 
medium spill and to under 99€ for the large spill. As we will see, these estimates are 
slightly higher than the parametric estimates obtained from the interval data models 
(in accordance with results obtained in other studies, Loureiro et al. (2009) or Atkinson 
et al. forthcoming). 
 If non-parametric mean WTP estimates were calculated using the protest classification 
by Brower et al. (2008), the results would be as shown in table 5.3.7:  
Table 5.3.7 Non-parametric mean WTP estimates: Brouwer et al. (2008)  
Mean WTP to avoid spill Observations Mean (€) per year
Small 246 52.44
Medium 482 62.54
Large 235 75.23  
The non-parametric mean WTP using the classification of protest answers according to 
Brouwer et al. (2008), ranges from over 52€ for the small spill to 62.5€ for the medium 
spill and to over 75€ for the large spill. These estimates are slightly higher than the 
parametric estimates obtained from the interval data models for the small and the 
medium spill. 
Comparing the non-parametric mean WTP amounts under the two protest 
classifications (Bateman et al. 2002 and Brouwer et al. 2008) we see that the latter 
provide lower WTP values, as was expected due to the fact that, by definition, they 
include more valid zeros. Simple t-test conducted to see whether these differences 
were statistically significant show that for the medium and the large spill non-
parametric mean WTP are not equal (p-value < 0.05) under different protest 
classification schemes. This finding underlines the relevance of choosing different 
protest classifications.  
 206 
Survival functions that describe the percentage of respondents who were willing to 
pay at least the amount can be seen along the x-axis, are presented below in figures 
5.3.1 (a), b), and c)) as well as in figures 5.3.2 (d), e), and f)). Note that these functions 
also take into account the different classifications of protests.  
Graph 5.3.1 Survivor functions. Protest classification from Bateman et al. (2002)  
a) WTP to avoid a small spill using the Bateman et al. (2002) protest classification 
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b) WTP to avoid a medium spill using the Bateman et al. (2002) protest classification  
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c) WTP to avoid a large spill using the Bateman et al. (2002) protest classification 
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The visual inspection of the survival functions (in graph 5.3.1 a), b) and c)) shows that 
as the spill size increases there is a more gradual and steady decline in the percentage 
of people willing to pay higher amounts. This finding agrees with prior expectations 
(Atkinson, Healey and Mourato, 2005) as payments to avoid greater damages are 
expected to be higher than payments to prevent smaller damages.   
Graph 5.3.2 below presents the survivor functions under the Brouwer et al. (2008) 
classification of protest answers. 
Graph 5.3.2 Survivor functions. Protest classification from Brower et al. (2002) 
d) WTP to avoid a small spill using the Brower et al. (2008) protest classification 
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e) WTP to avoid a medium spill using the Brower et al. (2008) protest classification 
WTP: Medium spill (Brouwer)
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f) WTP to avoid a large spill using the Brower et al. (2008) protest classification 
WTP: Large spill (Brouwer)
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The second set of survival functions (in graph 5.3.1.2 d), e) and f)) also shows that the 
right hand side tail of the distributions is larger for the large spill. The fact that the 
Brower et al. (2008) classification of protest answers includes more valid zeros explains 
the initial steeper drop in the number of people who stated they would be willing to 
pay (left hand side in graphs d), e) and f)).  
The wording of the valuation question gave rise to a significant number of respondents 
stating they might pay quantities above the spontaneously stated WTP amount, that is, 
respondents expressed some uncertainty about their stated WTP. In order to test 
whether there were order effects as regards the uncertainty amounts, variance ratio 
tests and mean difference tests under the two protest classification (Bateman et al. 
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(2002) and Brouwer et al. (2008)) were conducted. A new variable was created 
(uncertainb) that resulted from the subtraction of the amount respondents were not 
willing to pay minus the amount respondents spontaneously said they would be willing 
to pay. The hypothesis tested was whether the mean uncertainty amount was equal 
across respondents that were asked to state their WTP for the medium spill. 
Respondents of the first version of the questionnaire answered the WTP question for 
the medium spill after they had answered the WTP question for the small spill. 
Conversely, respondents of the second version of the questionnaire answered the WTP 
question for the medium spill prior to answering the WTP question for the large spill. 
The outputs can be seen in annex A.4.1.  
The results show that we do not reject the null hypothesis that the mean uncertainty 
amount in WTP to prevent the medium spill of respondents who answered the first 
version of the questionnaire is equal to the mean uncertainty amount in WTP to 
prevent the medium spill of respondents who answered the second version of the 
questionnaire. These findings indicate no order effects were found as regards 
uncertainty in the valuation question. This is so irrespective of the protest classification 
used.  
Criticisms to CV analyses question the validity of results in the absence of scope 
sensitivity (see Carson, Flores and Meade, (2000) or Diamond and Hausman, (1994) 
among others). In order to test whether there was both internal and external 
sensitivity to scope in the willingness to pay to avoid future spills, repeated measures 
ANOVA, variance ratio tests and simple t-tests were conducted (Carson and Mitchell, 
1993).  WTP data was analysed both within survey respondents who received the same 
version of the questionnaire (internal scope test taking into account the dependent 
nature of the answers) and across survey respondents who received different versions 
of the questionnaire (external scope test).  
The analysis of the outputs show that we can reject that the mean amount 
respondents who received version 1 of the questionnaire125 were willing to pay to 
avoid the small spill was equal to the mean amount they were willing to pay to avoid 
the medium spill. These results also show that we cannot reject that the mean WTP to 
avoid the medium spill for survey respondents who received version 1 of the 
                                               
125
 in which WTP to avoid a small and a medium size spill were presented.  
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questionnaire126 is equal to the mean WTP to avoid the medium spill for survey 
respondents who received version 2 of the questionnaire127. The final part of the scope 
test consisted in testing whether the mean WTP to avoid the medium spill was equal 
to the mean WTP to avoid the large spill. This test was performed for people who 
received version 2 of the questionnaire. The results obtained can be seen in annex 
A.4.2. These results show that we reject that the mean WTP to avoid the medium spill 
is equal to the mean WTP to avoid the large spill. Both protest classifications (Bateman 
et al. 2002 and Brouwer et al. 2008) were used, yielding the same results.   
Even though these results may appear reassuring, this exercise was not intended to 
resolve the debates surrounding scope sensitivity in CV studies. First, it may be that if 
the different hypothetical spills had depicted smaller changes, external scope 
insensitivity would have been found (Bateman et al. 2002). Additionally, all survey 
respondents were shown the three spills (small, medium and large) before asking them 
about their WTP to avoid only two of them, so they had a reference framework that 
gave them some baseline knowledge of the size and consequences of more spills than 
the ones they were finally asked about. This information may have constituted a 
decision-making aid that may distort the external scope sensitivity analysis. Hence, it 
could even be argued that there was no real external scope sensitivity test and that 
internal scope tests are easier to pass than the external scope tests. Variations of this 
external scope test for oil spill CV studies could clarify whether the findings described 
above are robust.  
A final follow-up question was asked in the valuation section of the questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked what factors influenced their WTP response. The summary of 
their answers is provided in table 5.3.8: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
126
 in which respondents are asked about their WTP to avoid the small and medium spill. 
127
 in which respondents were asked about their WTP to avoid the medium and large spill. 
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Table 5.3.8 Factors that influenced WTP answers 
Factor Frequency Percentage
All consequences presented in the scenarios 197 29.71
Quantity spilled 33 4.98
Area affected 54 8.14
Environmental consequences 217 32.73
Health consequences 165 24.89
Recovery time 54 8.14
Economic consequences 24 3.62
Lack of prevention/mitigation 15 2.16
The role of polluting companies 3 0.45
Repeated spills 2 0.3
Large consequences (size of damages) 2 0.3
Lack of political will 4 0.6
Other reasons 17 2.56
Don’t know 15 2.26  
The main factors that influenced the WTP figure were, firstly, environmental 
consequences of the spill as approximately 33% of respondents stated this as a 
relevant factor for their WTP answer. This was followed by under 30% of respondents 
stating that all the consequences described affected their WTP decision. Health 
consequences were also said to be relevant in the WTP decision for 25% of 
respondents. The recovery time, the area affected and the quantity spilled followed in 
terms of the percentage of respondents who cited them as significantly affecting their 
WTP answer.   
 
5.3.2 The Valuation exercise 
Models 
As was discussed in previous sections, in the valuation exercise respondents were first 
asked whether they would be willing to pay to avoid the spills and then, for those who 
said they were willing to pay, a payment card was shown. A logit model was run in 
order to analyse the characteristics that determine whether respondents were willing 
to pay. This is done under two scenarios. The first scenario eliminates protest answers 
following Bateman et al. (2002). The second one eliminates protest answers following 
Brower et al. (2008).  
As we discussed in the previous chapter when the dependent variable is a categorical 
variable, we resort to discrete choice models in order to analyse the characteristics 
that determine a given outcome (e.g. being willing to pay to avoid an oil spill/not being 
willing to pay to avoid an oil spill). In our case, we assume the distribution function of 
the answers is non linear and therefore we look at non-linear discrete choice models. 
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In these models we assume respondents are rational and they will choose the 
alternative that yields the highest utility. In this case, we only have two alternatives 
and we assume that the utility functions are linear. We would therefore have128: 
Ui0 = α0 + X’iβ0 + εi0         (1) 
Ui1 = α1 + X’iβ1 + εi1         (2) 
Where:  
Yi : Choice 
Uio : Utility of choosing option 0 (Not willing to pay)  
Ui1 : Utility of choosing option 1 (Willing to pay)  
α0, α1 : Constants  
X’i : Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i  
β0, β1 : Colum vector of coefficients  
εi0, εi1 : Error terms 
 
So, we assume each respondent will choose according to the following rationale: 
Yi=0 if Ui0>Ui1          (3) 
Yi=1 if Ui1>Ui0          (4) 
We know that the utility will depend on the characteristics of the alternative presented 
as well as on the characteristics of the respondent. Formally (Cabrer Borrás et al. 2001: 
97): 
P(Yi= 1) = P(Ui1>Ui0) = F(X’iβ)= F(Zi)       (5) 
Where:  
Zi  : is a linear combination of X’iβ 
F(Zi)  : is the distribution function associated to the decision process 
 
If we assume the distribution function is logistic, then: 
        eX’iβ 
 
     1+eX’iβ 
After using these models, an interval data model is run in order to understand the 
influence of respondents’ socio-economic characteristics, environmental attitudes and 
related pro-environmental behaviour on stated WTP amounts. Protest and biased 
answers are excluded from the model and valid zeros are included in the analysis. In 
this last exercise we also present WTP estimates according to two scenarios. The first 
one excludes protests according to the classification presented by Bateman et al. 
(2002). The second one excludes protests according to the classification depicted by 
Brower et al. (2008). According to Cameron and Huppert (1989) the parametric 
estimation of interval data (such as the one retrieved from the payment ladder used in 
                                               
128
 Cabrer Borrás  et al. (2001: 25) 
P(Yi=1) =                                                                                                                               (6) 
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the valuation exercise) can be done using the aforementioned interval data models. As 
we can see from the wording used in the valuation exercise (see annex A.3.1) 
respondents were allowed to express uncertainty in their stated WTP. This uncertainty 
implied that the upper bound of respondents’ WTP interval was assumed to be 
somewhere between the last quantity they say they would pay and the quantity they 
said they would not pay (rather than the quantity just above the quantity they said 
they would pay). The consequence of this is that intervals tend to be larger and vary 
significantly across respondents to reflect their uncertainty129. Bearing in mind this 
qualification and following Cameron and Huppert (1989) the probability of choosing a 
certain stated WTP amount P(tli) will be equal to the probability that this quantity lies 
in the interval: 
P(tli) = P(tli ≤ WTP ≤ tui)        (11) 
Where: 
tli : Lower threshold (what respondents spontaneously said they would pay) 
tui : Upper threshold (midpoint between last amount accepted and the amount rejected) 
The non-negative distribution implies using a log-normal conditional distribution 
(Atkinson et al. 2008: 434) and the WTP will be: 
 Log WTPi = x’iβ + εi130        (12) 
Where:  
X’i : Row vector of regressors or explanatory variables for respondent i 
β : Column vector of coefficients 
εi : Error term (disturbances) 
The probability that the WTP is in the interval is, according to Cameron and Huppert 
(1989: 232): 
 P(Yi  t1i, tui) = P((logtli – x’iβ)/σ < Zi <(logtui – x’iβ)/σ) = Φ(zui)- Φ(zli) (13) 
Where: 
Yi : Respondent’s ‘true’ valuation 
tli : Lower threshold (what respondents spontaneously said they would pay) 
tui : Upper threshold (midpoint between last amount accepted and the amount rejected) 
Zi : Standard normal random variable 
σ : Standard deviation 
Φ : Cumulative standard normal density function 
The log likelihood function is: 
                             n  
Log L = ∑ log[Φ (zui) - Φ (zli)]       (14) 
                i=1 
 
                                               
129
 This framing of the valuation question and analysis of the data is different to other payment ladder data 
analysis (Atkinson et al. (2008), Atkinson et al. (2005) or Håkansson (2008)) where it is assumed that if a 
respondent i chooses a certain quantity from the payment ladder, the chosen quantity is the lower bound 
of the interval and his/her hypothetical payment will be between this quantity and the next (higher) 
amount on the payment ladder. It is however similar to the one in Hanley and Kriström (2003). 
130
 εi is normally distributed N~ (0, σ) 
 214 
The mean and median values can be calculated as: 
Median WTP = exp(Xi’β*)       (15) 
Mean WTP = exp(Xi’β*) exp(σ2/2)      (16) 
Where: 
Xi’β* : Fitted values  
σ2 : Variance of error 
 
 
Regressors 
The independent variables that are significant in the models are presented below along 
with a brief comment regarding their expected sign. This information is firstly provided 
for the dichotomous question (are you willing to pay to fund the prevention programs 
described?). The information on the significant variables in the interval data model 
(answering the question of how much each respondent would be willing to pay) is 
presented following the dichotomous-type question.   
 
The main goals of the CV design process are: ensuring the quality of the design and 
yielding a reasonable set of results. Obtaining parameter estimates that are significant 
and have the expected sign is one way of validating the WTP data obtained. For the 
logit model the characteristics, their values and their expected sign are presented in 
table 5.3.9 below: 
 
Table 5.3.9 Description of independent variables valuation exercise: WTP Yes/No 
Independent variable Possible values
0= if resident of La Coruña 
1= if resident of Madrid
Age = (18-79)
Income = midpoint of the income band
= 0 if none
= 1 if one or more
Aggregated NEP score 15 - 75
= 0 if No
= 1 if Yes
City
Known spills 
Previously volunteered to protect the environment  
The expectations concerning the above independent variables included a possible 
distance decay effect (Hanley et al. 2003) whereby people in La Coruña were expected 
to be more likely to state they would be willing to pay due to the geographical 
proximity to future spills. Age was expected to be significant and to have a negative 
sign (Dunlap et al. 2000; Giraud, Loomis and Johnson, 1999; Carson, Flores and Meade 
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and Bateman et al. 2002) as younger people are known to state higher pro-
environmental attitudes (Olofsson and Öhman, 2006). Income was expected to be 
significant and to have a positive sign as following an economic optimist perspective 
higher income can imply higher willingness to pay for environmental protection 
(Giraud, Loomis and Johnson, 1999; Carson, Flores and Meade and Bateman et al. 
2002). Whether respondents have prior knowledge of oil spills was expected to be 
significant and positive in determining WTP. The pro-ecological worldview of 
respondents was also expected to have a positive and significant weight in determining 
whether interviewees are willing to contribute to oil spill prevention schemes (Kotchen 
and Reiling, 2000). Previous environmental volunteering was also expected to be 
significant and to have a positive sign since those individuals who have already 
allocated part of their resources (time) to protect the environment may be more likely 
to be willing to pay to protect the environment. 
 
The significant independent variables in the interval data model are presented in table 
5.3.10 below: 
Table 5.3.10 Independent variables. Valuation exercise, interval data model 
Independent variable Possible values 
City 0= if resident of La Coruña  1= if resident of Madrid 
Age 18-79 
Income Midpoint of the income band 
Known spills = 0 if none known = 1 if one or more spills known   
Aggregated NEP score 15 – 75 
WTP response influenced by environmental consequences 
described 
= 0 if No 
= 1 if Yes 
Previously volunteered to protect the environment = 0 if No = 1 if Yes 
 
In the interval data models the WTP to avoid spills was expected to increase as the spill 
size increased (Atkinson et al., 2008). Carson, Flores and Meade (2000) among others 
claim that, in CV answers, proximity to the event is expected to be related to higher 
WTP. This expectation was however put on hold as respondents in Madrid are, on 
average, wealthier and that they have no coast at all which may have resulted in a 
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positive relationship between respondents from Madrid and stated WTP. This is so due 
to the fact that higher income is expected to increase stated WTP (ibid.).  
 
Age was expected to be negatively related to stated WTP (Giraud, Loomis and Johnson, 
1999, Carson, Flores and Meade and Bateman et al., 2002). Knowledge of previous 
spills was expected to be positively related to the stated WTP. The aggregated NEP 
score that depicts the pro-ecological worldview was also expected to be positively 
related to stated WTP (Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). If respondents answered that the 
most salient consequences from the valuation scenario were the environmental 
damages that was expected to be positively related to stated WTP. Finally, 
volunteering to solve an environmental problem was also expected to be significant 
and to have a positive sign. 
  
Results 
The results of the logit models are presented and analysed before the interval data 
models. Models were run considering both the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of 
protest answers and the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers. The 
results are presented in table 5.3.11 below: 
Table 5.3.11 Logit model (WTP=yes/no)  
Variables Bateman et al.  (2002) Brouwer et al. (2008)
-1.007 -1.752
(2.15) (1.26)
-0.813** -0.691***
(0.42) (0.24)
-0.0007 -0.015**
(0.01) (0.007)
3.91e-06 9.47e-07
(0.00001) (7.78e-06)
1.386** 1.133**
(0.66) (0.51)
0.041 0.048***
(0.03) (0.02)
0.423 0.546*
(0.51) (0.31)
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.064
Number of observations 358 449
Income
Known spills 
Aggregate NEP score
Volunteered to protect the environment
Protest classification
Constant
City
Age
 
Where :  Standard error in parentheses 
 *  =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 ***=The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
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Using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest answers the likelihood ratio 
chi-square is equal to 12.71 (p-value = 0.04). This implies that the model specified fits 
significantly better than an empty model131.  Using the Bateman et al. (2002) 
classification of protest answers we see that only the city and whether respondents 
had prior knowledge of past oil spills are significant in determining willingness to pay 
at a 95% confidence level. A distance decay can be seen here where people from 
Madrid (city=1) are less likely to be willing to pay to prevent future spills. Finally, 
having prior knowledge of oil spills is significant and has the expected positive sign. 
Using the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers the likelihood ratio 
chi-square is equal to 30.56 (p-value = 0.0000). This implies that the model specified 
fits significantly better than an empty model.  The interpretation of the output above 
tells us that respondents from Madrid (city=1) are less likely than respondents from La 
Coruña to state a positive willingness to pay. An increase in one year in respondent’s 
age reduces the probability of being willing to pay to prevent future spills. Having 
previous knowledge about oil spills increases the probability of being willing to pay. A 
more pro-ecological worldview (measured by a higher aggregate NEP score) implies a 
higher probability of being willing to pay. Having undertaken previous voluntary work 
to protect the environment increases the probability of being willing to pay to prevent 
future spills.  
Comparing the logit models according to the different ways of classifying protest 
answers we see that the logit model run using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification 
of protest answers has a lower number of observations and only two independent 
variables in the model are significant. The pseudo R2 is lower compared to the logit 
model run using the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers. In the logit 
model run using the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers we use a 
higher number of observations and all the independent variables, except for income, 
are significant and have the expected sign.  
Once respondents had decided whether they wanted to pay (or otherwise) to prevent 
future spills, those who did want to pay were asked about the amount they were 
willing to pay. As stated earlier, each respondent was asked about their WTP for two 
                                               
131
 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/logit.htm 
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spills (the small and the medium spill in version 1 of the questionnaire and the medium 
and the large spill in version 2 of the questionnaire).  
Rather than ignoring uncertainty in WTP answers132 we considered the interval as it 
was defined by respondents (being their WTP somewhere between the quantity they 
‘spontaneously’ said they would pay and the quantity they said they would not pay) 
and then we calculated the midpoint between the last quantity accepted and the 
quantity rejected for each respondent’s WTP interval to parametrically estimate the 
factors that determine WTP.  
The interval data models for each of the three spills, small, medium and large, are 
summarised below. As was the case with the compensation exercise, the fact that each 
respondent answered two valuation questions implied that a high correlation among 
their answers was to be expected. As it was argued in the previous chapter however, 
the independent variables across the three spills (and hence for the three interval data 
models) are the same and therefore it is appropriate to undertake the parametric 
estimation through three separate interval data models (Judge et al. 1988).  
In our valuation exercise we have: 
X’iβ = β0 + β1City +β2Age +β3Income + β4Known_spills + 
 β5Aggregate_NEP_score +β6Environmental_consequences +β7Volunteer  (17) 
The results obtained from running the interval data models using the Bateman et al. 
(2002) classification of protest answers are presented in table 5.3.12 below: 
                                               
132
 By modelling the interval data assuming that the upper bound of the interval is the quantity just above 
the spontaneous WTP stated by respondents and then taking the midpoint of this as the upper bound of 
the interval. 
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Table 5.3.12 Interval data models. WTP. Bateman et al. (2002) classification  
Small spill Medium Spill Large spill
0.797 -0.232 -2.154
(1.67) (1.18) (1.41)
0.429* 0.527*** 0.616**
(0.24) (0.18) (0.27)
-0.013 -0.009* -0.007
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
6.81e-06 0.00001** 0.00002***
(9.54e-06) (7.18e-06) (9.53e-06)
0.495 0.985 1.597**
(0.91) (0.64) (0.79)
0.026 0.033** 0.054**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
0.313 0.485*** 0.511**
(0.27) (0.18) (0.24)
0.632** 0.445** 0.318
(0.29) (0.20) (0.29)
σ 1.588 1.565 1.558
Log pseudo likelihood -410.87 -823.73 -405.01
N 168 331 162
Known spills
Aggregate NEP score
Environmental consequences
Previously volunteered to protect the environment
Constant
City
Age
Income
 
Where:   Dependent variable: log WTP 
 Standard error in parentheses 
 *   =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 *** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
The results obtained in the interval data models for the three spills largely confirm 
prior expectations. The analysis of the main results obtained are summarised below.  
Key findings: 
The interval data models predicting the WTP to avoid the spills are statistically 
significant. The Wald Chi-squared was equal to 24.21 (p-value =0.001) for the small 
spill; the medium spill had a Wald Chi-squared of 52.94 (p-value = 0.000) and the large 
spill had a Wald Chi-squared of 40.26 (p-value = 0.000). This implies that the null 
hypothesis that all parameter coefficients are jointly equal to zero133 is rejected. 
Testing the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero (H0: βi=0) in each of 
the three spills, we reject the null hypotheses for city, as the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero across the three spills. Previous logit models showed that people 
from La Coruña (with coast and more exposed to spills) had higher probability than 
people from Madrid of answering positively to the WTP question thus showing a 
distance decay effect. The findings from these interval regressions show that focusing 
                                               
133
 (H0: β0=β1=β2=β3=β4=β5=β6=β7= 0) 
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on those who said they were willing to pay, people from Madrid (who are wealthier on 
average and have less coast) would be willing to pay more. 
For the rest of the independent variables, rejection of the null hypothesis (H0:βi=0) 
depends on the size of the spill. Age is significant and has the expected negative sign 
for the medium spill. Income is significant and has the expected positive sign for the 
medium and large spill. Whether the respondent had prior knowledge of oil spills is 
significant for the large spill and has the expected positive sign. The coefficient for pro-
ecological worldview (higher aggregate NEP score) is significantly different from zero 
and has the expected positive sign for the medium and the large spill. Whether 
respondents had been influenced by environmental consequences of oil spills is also 
significant and has a positive influence on the amount they said they would be willing 
to pay for the medium and large spills. Finally, having previously volunteered to 
protect the environment is significant and has a positive sign for the small and medium 
spills.  
Interpreting the coefficients: 
• If the interviewee comes from Madrid the willingness to pay will increase by 
42.9%, 52.7% and 61.6% for the small, medium and large spills respectively. 
• An increase of one year of age will reduce willingness to pay by 0.9% for the 
medium spill. 
• An increase of 1,000€ in income will increase the willingness to pay by 1% for 
the medium spill and by 2% for the large spill. 
• Having prior knowledge of oil spills will increase the WTP by 159% for the large 
spill.  
• An additional point to the aggregate NEP score will increase the willingness to 
pay by 3.3% and by 5.4% for the medium and for the large spills respectively.  
• If respondents’ attention was drawn by environmental consequences in the 
valuation exercise the WTP increases by 48.5% and by 51.1% for the medium 
and large spills respectively.  
• If respondents have previously volunteered to protect the environment the 
WTP will increase by 44.5% for the medium spill.  
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In order to calculate the parametric median and mean WTP we use equations (15) and 
(16) and we obtain the results presented in table 5.3.13: 
Table 5.3.13 Parametric estimates. Mean and median WTP(€). Bateman et al. (2002) 
Small Spill Medium spill Large Spill
Median = exp(Xi'β*) 15.95 20.49 25.79
Mean = exp(Xi'β*).exp(σ^2/2) 56.26 69.75 86.48  
The parametric mean values are lower than their non-parametric counterparts. As was 
stated earlier, this finding was to be expected (Loureiro et al. 2009 and Atkinson et al. 
forthcoming).  
The results obtained from running the interval data models using the Brouwer et al. 
(2008) classification of protest answers are presented in table 5.3.14 below: 
Table 5.3.14 Interval data models. WTP. Brouwer et al. (2008) classification  
Small spill Medium Spill Large spill
-0.593 -0.691 -.0879
(1.56) (1.10) (1.56)
0.105 0.242 0.345
(0.25) (0.18) (0.28)
-0.017** -0.017*** -0.018**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
9.21e-06 0.000012* 0.00001
(8.89e-06) (6.62e-06) (0.00001)
0.445 1.089** 1.710***
(0.77) (0.47) (0.52)
0.049** 0.039** 0.032
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
0.171 0.391** 0.410
(0.27) (0.19) (0.29)
0.680** 0.630*** 0.653**
(0.31) (0.22) (0.34)
σ 1.778 1.839 1.914
Log pseudo likelihood -515.39 -1056.55 -532.49
N 211 420 208
Known spills
Aggregate NEP score
Environmental consequences
Previously volunteered to protect the environment
Constant
City
Age
Income
 
Where:   Dependent variable: log WTP 
 Standard error in parentheses 
 *   =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 *** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
The results obtained in the interval data models for the three spills largely confirm 
prior expectations. The analysis of the main results obtained are summarised below.  
Key findings: 
The overall data models predicting the WTP to avoid the spills are statistically 
significant. The Wald Chi-squared was equal to 28.22 (p-value = 0.0002) for the small 
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spill; the medium spill had a Wald Chi-squared of 48.24 (p-value = 0.0000) and the 
large spill had a Wald Chi-squared of 26.67 (p-value = 0.0004). This implies that the null 
hypothesis that all parameter coefficients are jointly equal to zero134 is rejected. 
Testing the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero (H0: βi=0) in each of 
the three spills, we reject the null hypotheses for age and for previously volunteered to 
protect the environment, as the coefficient is significantly different from zero across 
the three spills. These two independent variables have the expected sign. Somewhat 
surprisingly the city is not significant in any of the spills.  
For the rest of the independent variables, rejection of the null hypothesis (H0:βi=0) 
depends on the size of the spill. Income is significant and has the expected positive 
sign for the medium spill. Whether the respondent had prior knowledge of oil spills 
was significant for the large spill and had the expected positive sign. The coefficient for 
pro-ecological worldview (higher aggregate NEP score) is significantly different from 
zero and has the expected positive sign for the small and medium spills. Whether 
respondents had been influenced by environmental consequences of oil spills was also 
significant and had a positive influence on the amount they said they would be willing 
to pay for the medium spill.  
Interpreting the coefficients: 
• An increase of one year of age will reduce willingness to pay by 1.7% for the 
small and medium spills and 1.8% for the large spill. 
• An increase of 1,000€ in income will increase the willingness to pay by 1.2% for 
the medium spill. 
• Having prior knowledge of oil spills will increase the WTP by 108% and 171% for 
the medium and large spills respectively.  
• An additional point to the aggregate NEP score will increase the willingness to 
pay by 4.9% and by 3.9% for the small and medium spills respectively.  
• If respondents’ attention was drawn by environmental consequences in the 
valuation exercise the WTP increases by 39.1% for the medium spill.  
                                               
134
 (H0: β0=β1=β2=β3=β4=β5=β6=β7= 0) 
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• If respondents have previously volunteered to protect the environment the 
WTP will increase by 68%, 63% and 65.3% for the small, the medium and the 
large spills respectively.  
In order to calculate the parametric median and mean WTP we use equations (15) and 
(16) and we obtain the results presented in table 5.3.15: 
Table 5.3.15 Parametric estimates. Mean and median WTP(€). Brouwer et al. (2008) 
Small Spill Medium spill Large Spill
Median = exp(Xi'β*) 9.2 10.8 12.42
Mean = exp(Xi'β*).exp(σ^2/2) 44.7 58.55 77.47  
 
The parametric mean values are lower than their non-parametric counterparts135.  
As was discussed in section 5.2.1 previous WTP estimates obtained in other CV studies 
can serve as a comparison with the WTP estimates obtained in this thesis. For 
example, the Carson et al. (2003) updated analysis of the Exxon Valdez CV presents a 
mean WTP value of 79.2$ to prevent a future oil spill.  Appéré (2002) in Bonnieux and 
Rainelli, (2003) estimated the monthly mean WTP to drive to a clean site if the baseline 
was one of limited degradation after an oil spill. In annual terms this amounted to over 
133€. In a second scenario, the baseline was one where there was important 
degradation resulting in fishing bans. The annual WTP to drive to a clean site 
amounted to just under 169€. Finally, the Loureiro et al. (2007; 2009) studies estimate 
the parametric mean WTP to avoid another Prestige-type spill is over 40€. The results 
obtained in this thesis seem reasonable when compared with the above CV analyses. 
Differences in design and in the features of the hypothetical scenarios may help 
explain the differences in mean WTP amounts. 
A final note should be made regarding the possibility of a sample selection problem 
due to the exclusion of protest responses from the analysis of WTP data. The state-of-
the-art as regards the treatment of protest zeros according to Meyerhoff and Liebe 
(2008) is to eliminate them from the sample. A word of caution however is needed 
regarding the elimination of protest responses despite the fact that this is common 
practice among CV practitioners. If protesters have certain common characteristics 
that differ from those of people stating valid reasons for their WTP answers, the 
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 Except for the parametric mean for the large spill that is slightly higher than the non-parametric mean. 
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results of the CV exercise could be biased (Strazzera et al. 2003). In order to address 
this concern, Heckman’s two stage model was run (see annex A.4.3). As the inverse of 
the Mill ratio is not significant it can be concluded that the selection problem is not 
significant and hence we maintain the estimates presented above. 
Chapter 5 in the thesis presents both the mean and the median WTP. The main reason 
for presenting both measures is that despite the mean WTP being the ‘correct’ 
measure to use in cost benefit analyses (Smith et al. 1999; Pearce et al. 2006), allowing 
us to calculate aggregate benefits from a policy by multiplying mean values by the 
number of people with standing, it is sensitive to the distribution of WTP data. In this 
sense Hanemann (1984: 333) claims that greater attention should be paid to the 
median as it is ‘more robust to errors and outliers in experimental responses’ (see also 
Carson et al. 2003 and Carson et al.  1992). The mean WTP is nevertheless used in CBA 
analyses as it more closely reflects the variance of preferences in society (Pearce et al. 
2006). But, if the WTP values provided by outliers are considered valid, or if there are a 
significant number of valid zeroes, the mean values will be skewed towards these 
figures and will not reflect the demand of the majority of respondents.  
The reason to be concerned about whether the majority of individuals would support a 
policy (such as an oil spill prevention program) is, as was previously mentioned, that 
policies need support from those affected by them to be implemented and maintained 
(Roberts, 2004; Connelly and Smith, 2003). It is here that the median voter theory 
becomes relevant. According to Congleton (2002) the precursor of the median voter 
theory, i.e. majority voting, has been around for thousands of years but it was not until 
the mid twentieth century that Black (1948) analysed majority voting and Downs 
(1957) extended his work in writing about representative democracy. Congleton (2002: 
3) identifies two forms of the median voter theorem, the weak one that states that 
‘the median voter always casts his or her vote for the policy that is adopted’ and the 
strong one that ‘median voter always gets her most preferred policy’. In democracies, 
the above author concludes, it is median voter preferences that tend to emerge and 
hence the median is relevant for the case study analysed in the thesis. Hence, if we are 
to inform policy-makers about the acceptability of a given program or policy, the 
median would be preferred (Pearce et al. 2006). Some empirical evidence furthermore 
confirms that for large scale public projects the theory of the median voter explains 
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policy decisions (Congleton, 2002) although other scholars do not see broad ranging 
support for the median voter theory (Thomson and Torenvlied, 2004). 
 
There are however caveats that should be considered when reporting the median 
rather than the mean. Congleton (2002) argues that the median value is expected to 
be inconsistent with the Pareto criterion and the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion 
that underlies CBA as the majority can impose costs on a minority without any specific 
reference to whether these costs could potentially be compensated. Additionally, 
decision-making according to the median would preclude (hypothetical or real) gains 
from trade between winners and losers to be identified and realised. Lack of complete 
information and power asymmetries between voters and, say, powerful elites, can 
result in deviations from what the median voter wants. Elites and economic elites can 
hold the loci of power, influencing the policy-process as well as the outcomes of policy 
(González, 2001). The debate regarding whether to use the mean WTP or the median 
WTP is still ongoing (Smith et al. 1999; Pearce et al.  2006) and hence both have been 
reported. 
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5.4  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This last empirical chapter has presented the results from the WTP exercise. It 
was argued that, from a theoretical perspective, CV studies can accommodate the 
analysis of any hypothetical occurrence. This includes the analysis of oil spill 
prevention schemes when there is a threat of large, potentially irreversible 
consequences. Building on the existing literature (Bateman et al. (2002), Pearce, 
Atkinson and Mourato (2006), Arrow, et al. (1993), Carson, Flores and Meade, (2000), 
Carson et al. (2003), Loureiro et al. (2009), among others) a CV-type exercise was 
included in the questionnaire. Interviewees were asked, among other things, whether 
they would be willing to pay to avoid spills of three different sizes and consequences. 
Information obtained from focus groups analysis pointed towards the need to limit the 
cognitive burden of respondents. CV was chosen over the alternative considered, 
choice modelling. The CV design process followed best practice guidelines albeit 
subject to the limitations imposed by budget constraints. It also benefited from expert 
and peer reviews and was shaped by the information obtained from the elite interview 
process, the focus groups conducted and the pilot questionnaire. These steps were 
taken to ensure the depiction of a meaningful, credible and understandable valuation 
exercise in order to obtain valid estimates of WTP to avoid future oil spills. 
The analysis of the data revealed that over half of the sampled population was willing 
to pay to prevent future oil spills from happening. The different protest classification 
schemes used (Bateman et al. 2002 and Brouwer et al. 2008) provide non-parametric 
WTP estimates that show statistically significant differences. From a theoretical 
perspective this finding could indicate that routinely reporting the protest classification 
scheme used in CV studies is relevant. It could also help develop additional research 
into best practice guidelines regarding the treatment and reporting of protest 
responses.  
Non-parametric mean WTP estimates using the Bateman et al. (2002) protest 
classification amount to under 66€ to prevent the small spill, 80€ to prevent the 
medium spill and 98€ to prevent the large spill. Non-parametric mean WTP estimates 
using the Brouwer et al. (2008) protest classification scheme are lower; 52€ to prevent 
the small spill, 62€ to prevent the medium spill and 75€ to prevent the large spill.  
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Despite the fact that there are statistically significant differences among the non-
parametric WTP amounts for the different spills, showing internal and external 
sensitivity to scope, the payment amounts are not proportional to the damages 
described. According to Hammitt and Graham (1999: 59) there is no a priori guidance 
emanating from economic theory as regards ‘how much WTP should differ between 
different quantities of an environmental good’, which, applied to this thesis, would 
mean that there is no ex ante expectation regarding the proportionality, or otherwise, 
of WTP to prevent environmental damages of varying sizes.  
The lack of proportionality may imply that CV studies are not the best tool to 
understand the strength of survey respondent preferences for large, potentially 
irreversible losses. In this sense, respondents’ income constraints may be doing a 
disservice to environmental protection limiting their desire to protect the environment 
to the ability to pay for it. It may be the case that other evaluation and decision-
making criteria could be better. Going back to Randall (2000) it may be that moral 
pluralism, in cases where irreversibilities and thresholds can happen, advices higher 
than WTP stated efforts to prevent environmental damages. The reasons for this may 
be either moral imperatives or respect for rights.   
Logit results on the probability of being willing to pay were reported using the 
Bateman et al. (2002) and the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers. 
Even though the relevant independent variables have the expected sign, the results 
under the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest answers show that only the 
city and whether respondents had previous knowledge of oil spills were significant in 
determining whether respondents who had given valid answers were willing to pay.  
As regards the question of which respondents’ characteristics best explain the amount 
respondents are willing to pay to avoid a future spill, these are: city, age, income, 
whether respondents had prior knowledge of past oil spills, the NEP score, whether 
the respondent was influenced by the environmental consequences described in the 
valuation exercise and whether the respondent had previously volunteered to protect 
the environment. All of the above mentioned independent variables have the expected 
sign and are overall significant. This is a sign of construct validity.  
The parametric mean WTP estimates using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification 
scheme amounts to 56€ for the small spill, 69€ for the medium spill and 86€ for the 
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large spill. Parametric mean WTP estimates using the Brouwer et al. (2008) 
classification of protest answers amount to 44€ for the small spill, 58€ for the medium 
spill and 77€ for the large spill. This information provides empirically relevant data as 
regards the benefits of preserving natural capital (defined as one of the key defining 
features of strong sustainability) through damage prevention programs as demanded 
by Atkinson et al. (1997). Additionally, it also answers the call by Arrow et al. (1993) for 
building a body of knowledge of WTP estimates for spills of different sizes and 
consequences.  
Future research could benefit from having larger sample sizes and a random sampling 
process that would enable to generalise the results obtained. Cross-fertilization with 
other disciplines such as neuroeconomics could also help improve survey design and 
results.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first two chapters of this thesis have analysed sustainable development 
from a theoretical perspective. The myriad of definitions, interpretations, criticisms 
and largely theoretical contributions (Pezzey and Toman, 2002) provided scope for an 
applied enquiry into the pursuit of weak and strong sustainability paradigms in the 
context of environmental damages caused by oil spills. This empirical enquiry was 
undertaken by means of a multi-method approach.  
Sustainability has been argued to be a multi-level and multi-agent endeavour 
(Governance for Sustainable Development, 2003 and Jordan, 2008). Sustainability is 
assumed to be largely dependent on citizens’ demands and acceptance of policies. 
Thus, knowing what citizens want in addition to what is politically feasible and 
advisable according to experts is argued to be paramount to defining long-lasting 
environmental policies to protect natural capital.  This thesis has tried to shed some 
light on these issues. 
Chapter three analysed the views of elites (experts) and FG participants (non-expert 
citizens) on sustainable development. This was done through a comparative analysis of 
the key issues within SD. These included: definitions of sustainable development, 
substitutability of different types of capital, trade-offs between economic growth and 
environmental protection, compensation, irreversibilities, thresholds and equity 
concerns. The policy process heuristic by Roberts (2004) was used as a framework for 
understanding decisions. Inputs from social psychology (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) 
were incorporated to enhance the understanding of motivations and intentions as 
regards behaviours. Ethical theories (Randall, 2000) and the development and 
perception of new social movements (Jiménez, 2007) were explored to enrich the 
interpretations of elites and FG participants relative to sustainable development. 
Chapter four analysed survey respondents’ preferences for different compensation 
options. It also analysed the reasons for survey respondent choices and the variables 
relevant in determining their choices. Three compensation ‘packages’ or ‘options’ were 
made available to respondents. The first two compensation options were modelled 
following Pearce et al.’s (1989) divide of weak and strong sustainability. The first one 
offered compensation in man-made capital when natural capital was (hypothetically) 
lost, i.e. the weak sustainability option. The second one offered natural capital in 
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compensation for damaged natural capital, replacing like-for-like, i.e. the strong 
sustainability option. A ‘third way’ in terms of a modified Hartwick-rule was added to 
the weak and strong sustainability compensation options. This third compensation 
package consisted of investments in social capital as proposed by Aldred (2002) and 
Turner (2007).  
Chapter five, the last empirical chapter, analysed survey respondents’ WTP to prevent 
environmental damages of varying degrees as a consequence of future oil spill of 
different sizes. Theoretically, this exercise responded to calls by Arrow et al. (1993) to 
have more WTP estimates in the context of oil spills. It also resulted from the call by 
Atkinson et al. (1997) to analyse the benefits (and costs) of sustainability (i.e. WTP to 
preserve natural capital) and the link between valuation and strong sustainability as 
advocated by Pearce et al. (2006). Moreover, the empirical findings from previous 
chapters signalled that (some) respondents may be willing to pay significantly more to 
prevent large environmental damages, compared to the amount they would be willing 
to pay to prevent smaller damages.  
This last chapter presents the key findings of the thesis. It answers the research 
questions that were presented in the introductory chapter. This is followed by the 
policy recommendations that have emerged from the analyses of the data obtained 
both through the qualitative methods used (elite interviews and focus groups) and 
from the quantitative method (the survey). The chapter will conclude with a brief 
reference to future research that could help test the reliability and robustness of the 
results obtained.   
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6.2 KEY FINDINGS 
This section will discuss the results obtained in the thesis as regards the three 
main research questions presented in the introductory chapter. These questions were: 
Do experts and citizens view sustainability similarly? Do citizens exhibit strong 
sustainability preferences with regards to different compensation schemes? Can CV 
help substantiate the case for strong sustainability? 
The first question, whether experts and non-experts viewed sustainability in the same 
way was discussed with reference to the answers obtained from elite interviewees and 
focus groups and from the survey. Elite interviews were asked to define the term 
sustainability. Definitions provided were overall vague, eschewed towards economic 
development and lacking any recognition of different paradigms within sustainability 
such as those identified in academic debates (see Pearce et al. 1989; Beckerman, 1994, 
1995; Daly, 1995a; Jacobs, 1995; Skolimowski, 1995; Neumayer, 1999; Hediger, 1999, 
among other).  
Despite the lack of accurate definitions, the term sustainability is however used in 
policy strategies and programs. Implicitly, it could be argued that elite interviewees, 
who were directly in contact with natural resource management, were familiar with 
issues relevant to the discussion of weak versus strong sustainability. Additionally, and 
related to the well known diagram of total economic value (see Bateman et al. 2002 
for example), it can also be argued that, commercial resources with direct use values 
such as fishing and shell-fishing received, by and large, more detailed attention in 
terms of information and limits to their use, compared with non-commercial marine 
resources. This statement is overall in accordance with the ideas voiced by Hassan et 
al. (2005) and WWF (2010) but it further stresses the ill-protection of assets with 
potentially high non-use values.    
Focus group respondents were not directly asked to define sustainable development, 
but the various exercises encouraged them to elaborate on issues relevant to the 
understanding of the term. The level of detail and knowledge of FGs as regards 
sustainability was, in accordance with Bäckstrand (2003) more ‘local’ in nature and less 
specialised. Additionally, FG participants discussed intergenerational equity concerns 
when talking about resources whereas elites overall failed to discuss the topic of 
future generations in their analysis. A possible explanation for this may come from a 
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public choice approach as explained by Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) who state 
that even though policy makers may have several motives for their actions, the fact 
that they will generally seek re-election may act as a constraint to long term 
commitments that may hinder current voter wellbeing.   
As regards the possibility of substituting different forms of capital, it has been argued 
that elite interviewees’ responses were very much in-line with their ideology, 
reinforcing the analysis by Jiménez (2007) that states that in Spain during the 90’s new 
social movements such as environmentalism aligned with the ‘left’. As regards the 
views of FG participants, both weak and strong sustainability paradigms were impied 
when discussing the substitutability of different types of capital. There was 
nevertheless an arguable bias towards strong sustainability. This over-representation 
of strong sustainability advocates among FG participants may have resulted from the 
fact that respondents had self-selected themselves and hence may have been more 
environmentally aware than the average citizen. 
Interestingly, when we compare the views of elites and FG participants with those of 
survey respondents we see that the latter only mention that man-made capital is a 
good substitute for damaged natural capital if their preferred compensation option is 
man-made capital. This leads to the preliminary conclusion that for respondents 
favouring a weak sustainability approach, substitutability and compensatability go 
hand in hand, perhaps signalling that the damaged resources are not essential (see for 
example the discussion in Humphrey, 2001).  
On the other hand, for survey respondents who chose either social capital136 or natural 
capital as their preferred compensation option, very few, if any, stated that the reason 
for their choice of compensation option was the fact that their option chosen 
constituted a good substitute. In Humprey’s terms (2001) no substitutability would 
occur but compensation is accepted to improve individual’s welfare level.  
Yet, a third type of respondents (although very few in the sample) rejected 
compensation, arguably due to the combination of non-substitutability and non-
‘compensatability’. This may have been due to the fact that, for these respondents, 
some of whom stated the environmental damages caused by spills should have been 
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 Choosing a modified Hartwick-rule (providing evidence for the Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007). 
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prevented rather that compensated, the damages or lost environment might be 
considered a ‘basic good’.  
Closely linked to the above reflections is the analysis of the second research question 
that explores whether interviewees would prefer a strong sustainability-type 
compensation option. Economic theory of compensation and recent approaches on 
habitat equivalency analysis137 have been concerned with the amount of money or 
resources that would return individuals to pre-injury levels when these occur 
(Ozdemiroglu, et al. 2009). Distinguishing between sustainability paradigms however 
implies, among other things, looking into the type of compensation preferred (Pearce 
et al. 1989; Neumayer, 1999). The views of elites and citizens (FG participants and 
survey respondents) on preferences for different compensation packages is therefore 
discussed below. 
When analysing compensation, elites and FG participants claimed monetary 
compensation was needed in order to help mitigate the economic losses of individuals 
and firms directly affected by the spill. Monetary compensation was however seen as 
morally repugnant and unfair if offered to individuals not directly affected by the spill, 
echoing Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007). This adverse reaction to monetary 
compensation has been observed in other empirical studies (O’Neill and Spash, 2000; 
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).  
Additional compensation in the form of investment ‘packages’ was discussed during 
elite interviews both with reference to the economic recovery plans that were de facto 
implemented after the last large spill (Plan Galicia and Plan de Dinamización 
Económica de Galicia) and with reference to the compensation options that the 
literature review process suggested. As was the case with the above discussion on 
substitutability, elite interviewees’ perceptions of the compensation packages were 
very much in line with their political tendencies and professional persona (Jiménez, 
2007). Thus, conservative representatives and business representatives largely 
favoured past investment packages that fundamentally entailed a weak sustainability 
response, favouring investments in man-made capital (infrastructures). On the other 
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a ‘baseline level of ecological functioning’ (Roach and Wade, 2006: 421)  
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hand, nationalists138 and the NGO’s representative showed discontent with these 
investments (that were largely geared towards building infrastructures) and instead 
advocated for replacement of damaged natural capital with ‘like’ natural capital.  
FG participants showed a wide range of opinions regarding the preferred 
compensation option. Overall, FG participants preferred either replacing damaged 
natural capital with similar natural capital or with investments that would strengthen 
the existing prevention mechanisms. FG participants were not asked about their 
ideologies (as it was thought it could affect the dynamics of the FG discussions) and 
therefore it is not known whether this variable had a bearing on their views on the 
substitutability and ‘compensatability’ of environmental losses. What did emerge from 
the FG sessions, however, was the idea that for most FG participants there seemed to 
be intra-capital substitutability (i.e. economic losses could be compensated by 
monetary compensation for directly affected parties; loss of natural capital could be 
compensated by similar natural capital or by programs that would preserve natural 
capital from future spills) despite theoretical reservations regarding the feasibility of 
compensating ‘like-for-like’ as argued by Dietz and Neumayer (2007). For FG 
participants, however, there seemed to be no or limited possibilities of substituting 
man-made capital (infrastructures) for natural capital, that is, no inter-capital 
substitutability.  
Survey respondents overwhelmingly accepted additional compensation in the form of 
‘investment packages’, reinforcing the findings of the FG, and hence shying away from 
the idea that for the damages described (even in the setting where irreversibilities are 
present) no compensation would be appropriate (see discussions by Humprey, 2001 
and Spash, 1993). This was so despite reminders of the opportunity cost incurred and 
despite reminders of the availability of (unaffected) substitute sites.  
For survey respondents, the most popular compensation option is the investment 
package labelled ‘social capital’ (i.e. building schools, hospitals and undertaking R&D) 
thus providing empirical support for Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) and perhaps 
signalling a modification in SD preferences towards a modified Hartwick-type 
compensation rule.  
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 Bloque Nacionalista Galego is a left-wing party that demands more autonomy for Galicia.  
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Interestingly, the preferred compensation option does not tend to change across spills, 
signalling stable preferences in terms of compensation for environmental losses. The 
hypothetical nature of the exercise plus the fact that the government was purported 
as the provider of additional compensation may have influenced the choice of 
compensation options, reflecting what respondents would want the government to 
invest in irrespective of the issue analysed. Future research with split sample designs 
and various compensation providers could test whether the provider of compensation 
changes respondents’ compensation preferences in ways relevant to the analysis of 
sustainability.  
Hence, survey results provide empirical evidence to doubt a stringent Hartwick-type 
rule in terms of compensation. This is so even though there is substitutability of ‘social 
capital’ for lost natural capital. The fact that over 80% of the compensation funds 
would be allocated by survey respondents to social plus natural capital compensation 
packages could arguably signal either a modified Hartwick–type rule or a stronger SD 
approach.  
The most salient findings from the parametric analysis, through the use of Multinomial 
Logit Models, provided the following information regarding the characteristics that 
best determine the probability of choosing one compensation option or other on the 
choice of social capital over the status quo (infrastructures): People with lower income, 
respondents from Madrid, those less concerned about the economy as one of the 
main socio-economic problems, interviewees with higher pro-ecological worldview and 
a more left-wing ideology are more likely to choose social capital over infrastructures.  
As regards the choice of natural capital over infrastructures, respondents from Madrid, 
younger interviewees, people with lower income, a higher educational attainment, 
interviewees concerned about the environment as one of the fundamental socio-
economic problems, people knowing previous spills, citizens having a higher ecological 
worldview and more left-wing oriented, show an increased probability of choosing 
natural capital over infrastructures. Except for the income variable139 the other 
variables have the expected signs if compared to the predictions of other CV studies 
                                               
139
 That could be seen as counter-intuitive from an economic optimist perspective (see Neumayer, 1999) 
and contrary to the findings from WTP-type questions in which WTP is positively related to income 
levels (see for example Carson et al. 2003). 
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(Giraud, Loomis and Johnson, 1999, Carson, Flores and Meade, 2001 and Bateman et 
al. 2002). 
The minus sign in the income variable in the choice of natural capital over 
infrastructures could be explained from an economic growth pessimist argument 
adapted to the compensation context analysed (see Neumayer, 1999). This would 
mean that greater dependence (less substitution possibilities) of natural resources for 
either leisure activities or for the livelihood of respondents may help explain why 
lower income level increases the likelihood of choosing natural capital over 
infrastructures. Conversely, wealthier respondents may have greater substitution 
possibilities for leisure activities; they are a priori less dependent on natural resources 
for their work and more reliant on largely publicly provided roads and railway 
infrastructure systems. 
To sum up, these preferences for a modified Hartwick rule compensation package, 
with a considerable amount of respondents moving towards stronger forms of 
sustainability, are interesting in theoretical terms. This thesis presents a practical 
application of Aldred (2002) and Turner’s (2007) claim confirming their proposition 
that states that, when faced with environmental losses, such as oil spills of different 
sizes and consequences, money may not be the appropriate compensation140 but 
investments in social capital may be.  
The last research question, whether CV can help substantiate the case for strong 
sustainability, was addressed through a CV-type exercise. This was done after 
establishing the links between valuation and strong sustainability (Pearce et al. 2006) 
and with the aim of providing empirical evidence of the benefits of sustainability 
(Atkinson et al. 1997). Empirical data regarding demonstrations in the aftermath of the 
Prestige spill, the large number of volunteers that helped in cleanup activities and 
answers to FG sessions were thought to be indicative of the possibility of finding  
survey respondents being willing to pay to prevent future spills and hence preserve 
natural capital. The analysis of the WTP data revealed that over half of the sampled 
interviewees were willing to pay to prevent future oil spills from happening141. 
                                               
140
 This was confirmed in the pilot conducted prior to the survey. 
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 This percentage is lower than that found in the FG which was significantly higher (80%).  
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Two different classifications of protest answers were used to analyse WTP data: the 
one proposed by Bateman et al. (2002) and the one by Brouwer et al. (2008). Non-
parametric WTP estimates, logit and interval regression models were reported under 
these two classifications of protest answers as they provided statistically different non-
parametric mean WTP estimates and different model outcomes. The fact that some of 
the key oil spill CV studies do not explicitly report their classification of protest answers 
(see Carson et al. 2003; Bonnieux and Rainelly, 2003; Loureiro et al. 2007, 2009 among 
others) could lead to non-comparable WTP figures that could hinder building a useful 
body of knowledge regarding WTP to prevent oil spills. The findings in this thesis could 
help strengthen the case for routinely reporting the classification of protests used or, 
alternatively, for designing generally accepted protest response classifications.  
The parametric mean WTP estimates using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification 
scheme amounts to 56€ for the small spill, 69€ for the medium spill and 86€ for the 
large spill. Parametric mean WTP estimates using the Brouwer et al. (2008) 
classification of protest answers amount to 44€ for the small spill, 58€ for the medium 
spill and 77€ for the large spill. These figures were compared to other oil spill CV 
studies and the figures obtained in this thesis were in line with the findings of other 
studies (see Carson et al.  2003 or Loureiro et al. 2009).   
Respondents’ characteristics that best explained respondents’ willingness to pay to 
avoid a future spill were also analysed. These were: city, age, income, whether 
respondents had prior knowledge of past oil spills, the NEP score, whether the 
respondent was influenced by the environmental consequences described in the 
valuation exercise and whether the respondent had previously volunteered to protect 
the environment. All of the above mentioned independent variables (except for city, 
arguably due to a lower income level of respondents in the La Coruña sample), have 
the expected sign and are overall significant. This is a sign of construct validity 
(Bateman et al. 2002).  
Scope sensitivity was analysed using mean difference tests (Carson and Mitchell, 
1993). The results show that there are statistically significant differences among the 
WTP to prevent a small spill, a medium spill and a large spill. These results are, as 
explained in the last empirical chapter, indicative of internal and external scope 
sensitivity. The split sample design and the administration of two WTP questions per 
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respondent allowed testing for both internal and external sensitivity to scope. These 
findings would appear to support the findings of other studies (ibid.). 
Despite the fact that scope sensitivity was found, there remain doubts however 
regarding whether valuation scenarios are best suited to capture intentions when 
large, potentially irreversible damages, are presented to respondents. This is so 
because the payment amounts are not proportional to the damages depicted in the 
hypothetical spills. A possible explanation is the fact that income is limited, which may 
limit the proportional payment. Economic theory is silent as regards the 
proportionality of WTP for different quantities of environmental good (Hammitt and 
Graham, 1999) so the WTP  results do not seem to be invalidated by the lack of 
proportionality, but it is possible that complementary criteria may be useful when 
deciding on supporting the preservation of natural capital (see for example Randall, 
2000). 
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6.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As acknowledged by Jiménez (2007) citizens, and hence voters, have been 
increasingly concerned about environmental issues in the past decades. Kirchgässner 
and Schneider (2003) along the same lines state that this environmental concern 
should result in increasing acceptance of sustainable policies. The lack of recognition o 
different sustainability paradigms by elites could however be indicative of a policy 
distance between sustainability as a theoretical construct that has been successfully 
propelled to the international policy agenda and a scant practical uptake of sustainable 
practices in the context analysed.  
Added to the above, a lack of environmental policy integration (EPI) to foster 
sustainability (Jordan and Lenschow, 2008) was discussed in previous chapters. The 
findings in this thesis, with further calls for coordination across departments, could be 
pointing towards an existing opportunity of increasing voter satisfaction by way of 
‘walking the talk’ in terms of effective EPI that is recognised by elites and by FG 
participants to be one of the pending tasks of the Spanish government in marine 
protection.  Additionally, calls for further implementation of civic science (Bäckstrand, 
2003) were made by both elites and FG participants. 
As was stated in the introductory chapter, the issues of compensation and willingness 
to pay to prevent oil spills in the future are considered to be relevant policy-related 
topics to analyse. This is so given the frequency of oil spills suffered in Spain, their 
consequences, the limited compensation foreseen by international and national 
legislations and the still evolving oil spill prevention programs. Policy-makers could 
benefit from the information provided by this thesis as it offers insights into the 
preferences of voters in terms of compensation packages and willingness to contribute 
to oil spill prevention programs. It also sheds light on the variables that determine 
these preferences.  
Were a new spill to occur, policy-makers could benefit from knowing that an 
overwhelming majority of interviewees would want compensation, in addition to that 
offered by the CLC, IOPC funds and supplementary funds. This is so despite reminders 
of opportunity costs and substitute sites. Thus, investment programs that would 
compensate for the damages of future spills would, ceteris paribus, be welcome by 
voters.  
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Tailoring compensation plans to the average voter’s preferences may help appease 
civil unrest and may increase the chances of re-election when and if a new spill occurs.  
This would mean, should we be able to generalise the results obtained, that the 
allocation of funds among different compensation options would differ from that of 
the Plan Galicia and the Plan de Dinamización Económica de Galicia that allocated the 
bulk of their budgets to infrastructure projects.  
If policy-makers were to take into account survey respondents’ allocation of funds 
among different types of capital they would allocate between 16.5% and 18.2% of the 
budget to man-made capital and between 45% and 47.5% would be allocated to social 
capital. Natural capital would receive from 36% to 38% of the compensation funds.  
These findings could arguably be useful for decision-makers in designing future 
compensation schemes. Larger investments in natural capital as requested by 
interviewees would not only help meet civic science precepts but it could also help 
bridge the gap between existing compensation schemes and full compensation of 
environmental losses. Alternatively, policy-makers could pursue increasing the 
compensation for pure environmental losses offered by international institutions and 
the oil shipping industry. Until any such international agreement materialises, national 
and regional policies may be expected to continue providing compensation. 
A recent CV study undertaken by Loureiro et al.  (2009), analyses survey respondents’ 
WTP to prevent a new spill of similar characteristics to those of the Prestige. Its larger 
sample size compared to that of this thesis, plus the fact that CV questionnaires were 
completed in a larger number of cities in Spain, make these results interesting in terms 
of comparison as the Loureiro et al.  (2009) study generalizes the WTP results obtained 
to the Spanish population. When comparing the two studies, note has to be taken that 
differences are expected due to the different questionnaire designs. This comparison 
could be of use to policy-makers in terms of building a body of evidence with a range 
of possible values that could guide future investment in oil spill prevention policies. It 
may also provide the basis for using benefit transfer techniques to value 
environmental losses in future spills.  
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6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future implementations of the CV developed in this research (or an improved 
version of it) should have larger sample sizes. This would allow the generalization of 
parametric mean willingness to pay results to the entire population (following other oil 
spill CV studies such as Carson et al.  2003 or Loureiro et al.  2009). Policy-makers could 
compare these WTP estimates to the annual cost of running additional oil spill 
prevention and management plans in order to decide on the net benefit of future 
policies, should CBA criteria be deemed relevant for oil spill management policies.  
As it was argued in the section on key findings, the thesis survey results signal a non-
existent stringent Hartwick-type rule in terms of compensation for environmental 
losses in the context analysed. Empirical support for Aldred (2002) and Turner (2007) is 
instead provided by survey results. There is furthermore evidence of a significant 
proportion of people preferring natural capital as the preferred compensation option.  
Future oil spill analyses could explicitly test the reliability of these findings.  
Split-sample designs (notwithstanding budget constraints) could be used in future 
research projects to test whether interviewees chose social capital because this is what 
they expect the government to provide them with irrespective of the damage suffered. 
In future survey designs the inclusion of different institutions as compensation 
providers (e.g. the government, the EU, oil shipping industry, NGO’s, etc.) would help 
researchers answer the question of whether the type of institution providing 
compensation affects the type of capital chosen by survey respondents and hence 
whether a modified Hartwick rule would hold irrespective of the institution in charge 
of providing compensation.  
Protest responses are an issue of concern in CV studies. They are routinely excluded 
from CV calculations due to the fact that they distort WTP estimates as respondents do 
not provide information on the true value of the environmental change described. But, 
there is no consensus as regards classification of protest responses in the contingent 
valuation literature (Atkinson et al.  forthcoming) and this may result in non-
comparable WTP figures across studies. The results from the present thesis show that 
the classification of protest answers can yield different outcomes (e.g. statistically 
significant differences in non-parametric WTP estimates). Future developments in CV 
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could strive to generate a consensus classification of protest answers. This could 
arguably help improve the quality of WTP estimates.  
Finally, the fast growing discipline of neuroeconomics, that is using brain images to 
disentangle the relationships between feelings and actions, can be the litmus test for 
CV studies. Future CV-type studies could explore the existence of strategic answers, 
protest responses or warm glow effects using brain images. According to Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec (2005), in the future, neuroscience could bring about either 
incremental changes to economics (helping economists identify previously ignored and 
potentially significant variables that should be included in models) or radical changes 
that may bring new understanding of the underlying assumptions of decision-making 
in economics. 
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Annexes 
A.1 Maps 
A.1.1 Spain. Administrative division. Autonomous Communities or regions. 
  
A.1.2 Map of hydrocarbon traffic world-wide 
 Source: Vázquez, Varela and Prada (2004: 28) 
A.2 Elite interviews and Focus Groups 
A.2.1 Elite interviewee presentation letter 
 
Department of Geography & Environment 
Houghton Street  
London WC2A 2AE 
Madrid, date  
Dear Ms. XXX,  
I am currently carrying out my PhD research project at the London School of Economics in the 
field of Environmental Economics. My thesis topic focuses on research into sustainability and coastal 
management; environmental, economic and social aspects of coastal management are being scrutinised 
in order to produce new insights for future management strategies. To achieve this purpose I am 
conducting interviews with key people that will add relevant and useful insights to the analysis.  
Your views as (add here job position or area of expertise) would greatly contribute to the understanding 
of salient issues in (add the field of expertise of potential interviewee). I would therefore be most 
grateful if you would consider the possibility of taking part in the research project. Your help would be 
acknowledged as part of the London School of Economics sponsored project. The date and place of the 
interview would be arranged at you convenience and any further information you may require will be 
provided.   
Thank you very much for your time. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further 
information.  
Yours faithfully,  
 
Lara Esther Lázaro Touza 
BSc Economics (UAM) 
MSc in Environmental Assessment and Evaluation (LSE)  
L.E.Lazaro-Touza@lse.ac.uk 
Correspondence address in Spain: 
C/ Minerva nº 141 5º B 
C. P. 28032 – Madrid 
Tel: + 34 91 776 91 07 
Mobile: +34 606 02 04 98  
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A.2.2 FG recruitment guide and reminder 
a) Recruitment guide 
 
Good morning / afternoon / evening! My name is Lara and I am conducting a research project 
on oil spills at the London school of Economics. I would like to ask for your cooperation. I would like to 
ask you for a couple of minutes of your time now and 90 minutes sometime this week for which you will 
be gratified. 
Information provided to the potential FG participants during the first contact  
o Date/s of FG 
o Time 
o Duration 
o Venue  
 Fundación Pedro Barrié de la Maza. C/ Cantón Grande nº 9 – Coruña 
 Hotel Maycar. C/ San Andrés nº 159 - Coruña 
 C.U.Cardenal Cisneros. C/ General Díaz Porlier nº 58 – Madrid 
 C/ Minerva nº 141  - Madrid 
o Incentive = 30€ 
• Information required from interviewees: 
o Name and surname 
o Contact details 
 Address 
 Home telephone 
 Work telephone 
 Mobile 
 E-mail 
 Fax 
o Age range 
 18-40 
 41+ 
o Occupation 
 Professional and skilled workers 
 Manual workers 
o Educational attainment 
 Primary 
 Secondary 
 College 
 University 
 Postgraduate 
• Confirmation email sent (Y / N) 
• Reminder call a day before the interview (Y / N) 
• Comments: 
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b) Reminder 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the group discussion about oil spills I am conducting. Your 
input is most valuable! 
Please note you have agreed to attend the following session: 
• Date/s of FG 
• Time 
• Duration.- 90 minutes 
• Venue 
 Fundación Pedro Barrié de la Maza. C/ Cantón Grande nº 9 – Coruña 
 Maycar Hotel. C/ San Andrés nº 159 - Coruña 
OR 
 C.U.Cardenal Cisneros. C/ General Díaz Porlier nº 58 – Madrid 
 C/ Minerva nº 141, Piso 5º Letra B - Madrid 
• Gratification = 30€ 
 
These sessions depend on you and other participants. If you cannot attend PLEASE let me know. 
Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask. 
My contact details are as follows: 
Name: Lara Lázaro 
Mobile: +34 606 02 04 98 
Email: lara_lazaro@yahoo.com 
 
Thank you very much! 
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A.2.3 FG protocol 
 
OIL SPILL MANAGEMENT FOCUS GROUP 
Date & place:  
Group description: 
Other comments:  
 
INTRODUCTION: PARTICIPANTS, TOPIC AND INSTRUCTIONS  
Introduction 
1 Good morning/afternoon/evening and welcome to today’s session.  
2 I would like to start thanking all of you for being here to discuss oil spills 
3 My name is Lara and I work at the London School of Economics.  
 
Purpose of the focus group 
1 The goal of the discussion today is to understand public views and preferences regarding oil spill 
management in Galicia and in Spain. 
2 We are interested in your views. There are no right or wrong answers and we are here to learn 
from you.  
 
Instructions 
1 There is a wide range of topics to discuss so we will have refreshments as we go along 
2 We would like all of you to participate with no-one dominating the discussion. We would like to 
hear as many things as time allows. 
3 If your experience is different to the one being discussed please say so. If your experience is the 
same as other peoples’ experiences please say so as that is valuable information too. There is 
always something unique to each person’s experience/views and we are most interested in 
hearing what you have to say.  
4 We will be on a first name basis throughout the discussion and in my report no names will be 
attached to comments. You may be assured of complete confidentiality. 
5 We would like to ask your permission to tape record the session. This will help us register your 
views in an accurate way.  
6 As we are recording the session please try to speak one at a time with no side conversations 
between neighbours! 
7 The discussion will last 1.5 hours  
 
 
OPENING QUESTIONS  
1 Brief introduction of each participant 
2 I would like you to take a moment to think about oil spills you have experienced or have heard 
of and discuss the main issues of concern with regards to oil spills (brainstorming – focusing on 
the topic)  
Answer:  
 
CONSEQUENCES OF SPILLS 
1) BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES  
Which are the main consequences of an oil spill such as the Prestige? (Brainstorming - beliefs/ 
information)  
Answer:  
Probing: So far we have mentioned (summarise main points discussed). I was surprised we didn’t 
talk about the following (mention those that were not included in the brainstorming exercise) and I 
would like to know what you think about: 
ENVIRONMENT: 
1. Fauna affected: endangered bird species that disappeared or saw a decline in their numbers 
(the guillemot, tridactile seagull, puffin, razorbill, the cormorant, plover and shags). Fish and 
cetaceans: Death of fish and larvae. Malformation of animals. Change in behavioural patterns. 
Most affected species: dolphins, sea otters, turtles and porpoises. 
2. Flora affected: Oil as an herbicide. Oil preventing photosynthesis, reproduction and fixation. 
Likens and vegetation in beaches and cliffs affected.  
3. Environmentally relevant areas affected: Natural parks such as the Atlantic Isles natural park, 
Cíes islands, lagoons of Corrubedo, the Costa da morte area, archipelago of Ons and Sálvora, 
among others 
ECONOMY:  
4. Fishing and Shell-fishing: Death of fish and larvae. Malformation of animals. Change in 
behavioural patterns. Hake and sardine population especially affected due to previous 
overexploitation. Bans on fishing and shell-fishing activities. There is missing information 
regarding the state of crustaceans in Galician waters. Evaluation of crustaceans and how these 
are affected is thus not possible. Bans started in November 2002 and lasted until October 2003. 
During the aftermath of the Prestige nearly the entire Galician coast experienced bans on fishing 
and shell-fishing. The value of fishing and shell-fishing activities in 2002 compared to a year after 
the Prestige dropped by 70%. 
5. Tourism and related activities: The drop in tourism was estimated to be between 15-25% 
compared to 2001 figures.  
HEALTH 
If ingested the following may occur: coughs, breathing difficulties, vomits, nausea, lethargy, and coma 
in the most severe cases. Other consequences of direct contact with hydrocarbons include skin 
irritation and an increase in the cases of skin cancer and lung cancer. There are no known ‘safe levels’ 
for humans.   
 
2) RELEVANCE OF CONSEQUENCES: SORT CARD EXERCISE 
We have just discussed the main consequences that may be derived from an oil spill such as the 
Prestige. I will now like you to open the envelope that has just been given to you (please note an 
envelope with pictures will be distributed by the assistant to every participant. The purpose of the 
envelope is to hold all the visual material loosely so each participant can then sort out the cards 
according to their preferences.). See below for an example of the cards that will be included in the 
envelopes. 
The pictures contained inside the envelope refer to the various consequences we have been 
discussing. These have been selected from the information available after the Prestige oil spill which 
is the most recent large scale spill that has affected the Spanish coast. I would now like you to take a 
few moments to look at the cards inside the envelope and sort them according to the importance of 
each of the consequences. That is, if you think the most important consequence of an oil spill is its 
effect on the bird population this card should go on top of the pile. If you think health consequences 
are the second most important issue, the health card should be ranked second, etc. 
(Brainstorming/ranking) (relevance of consequences of spill to different forms of capital, i.e. natural 
capital and man-made capital). If you think two consequences are equally important just say so.  
Does anyone have any questions so far? (Let participant sort the cards for no more than a couple of 
minutes) 
Can I ask each of you to read out loud the order you have given each of the consequences? 
Record each participant’s answer in a flipchart: (example) 
Discuss the reasons for their preferences and agreement regarding general classification 
(Brainstorming/ranking) (relevance of consequences of spill to different forms of capital, i.e. natural 
capital and man-made capital) 
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Fauna affected   
1 Birds are the most affected animals as they spent time in the water, their food is inside the sea and 
their breeding ground may be close to the affected coast 
2 Oil may affect their feathers. This can reduce their insulating layer and die of hypothermia. They can 
also loose their floatability capabilities. Their reproductive capabilities may be disrupted. 
3 Their liver, lungs and digestive system may be poisoned due to oil ingested 
 
        
Source: SEO-Birdlife (2003)                  Source: 
http://www.imedea.uib.es/pressdbfiles/000107/FaroVigo.pdf 
  
Source: SEO-Birdlife (2003)              Source: EFE- Reuters – IDEAL in http://waste.ideal.es/mareanegra-
fotos.htm 
 Source: EFE- Reuters – IDEAL in http://waste.ideal.es/mareanegra-fotos.htm 
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Flora and landscape 
1 Oil is an herbicide (it kills plants), this means oil will reduce plant photosynthesis or even prevent 
plant photosynthesis.  
2 Plants may fail to reproduce and thrive. 
3 Clean-up activities in sensitive areas such as lagoons may change water exchange patterns. This will 
alter the characteristics of lagoon systems. 
 
Source: FEG (2004) 
Beach of Barrañán 
  
Source: http://www.xente.mundo-r.com/troncoso/prestige/ 
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Environmentally relevant areas  
1 Areas of European relevance such as wetlands are affected 
2 Natural parks will be affected. Rich ecosystems in terms of flora and fauna are polluted. 
3 Relevant areas for birds are also hit by the oil slick 
 
Source: González Laxe (2003: 234) 
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Economy 
1 Health authorities ban all fishing and shell fishing activities as long as oil is present. 
2 Avoiding both oiled fish and damage to fishing equipment is the primary goal of bans 
3 Fishermen and people in related activities such as net menders, fish transport industry, tourist 
industry, etc. are affected by the spill. 
Maximum bans in fishing and shell-fishing activities in the aftermath of the spill: 
(a) Fishing ban (In blue)   (b) Shell fishing ban (in red) 
 
Source: http://www.ccmm-prestige.cesga.es/Prestige_200.htm 
 
 
Source: http://www.xente.mundo-r.com/troncoso/prestige/ 
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Health effects 
1 If ingested the main organs affected are lungs, digestive system and nervous system. The main 
consequences are coughs, breathing difficulties, vomits, nausea, lethargy and coma in the most 
severe cases. There is also a risk of increase probability of skin cancer and lung cancer.  
2 Direct contact can also cause skin irritation 
3 There are no safe levels for humans.  
                
Source: La Voz de Galicia 
http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/especiales/prestige/pdf/heroes/olas_de_fuel.pdf 
 
 
Source: http://www.xente.mundo-r.com/troncoso/prestige/ 
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Answer:  
Environment Economy Health FG # Fauna Flora Sensitive areas Fishing & tourism Health 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
Reasons: 
3) INTRODUCING THRESHOLDS  
Up to now we have been thinking about the consequences of an oil spill. These however depend to a 
large extent on the amount of oil spilled, the area affected, the species affected, the time of the year, 
the previous state (clean or polluted) of the area hit by the spill and the amount of people that may be 
exposed to the spill, among other.  
As the spill increases and the environment affected is more sensitive to pollution, we may reach a 
level of pollution that makes the environment collapse. By this I mean that the flora and fauna are so 
polluted they die. Birds, plants, mammals, etc. disappear of the polluted area. There is no foreseeable 
recovery; the species that used to live in the area can no longer live there. These species are replaced 
by other species that can cope with pollution only after years were no plant or animal may thrive in 
the affected area. The affected environment is no longer what it used to be.   
 
I would now like you to consider this scenario as a possibility and discuss how this may affect you. 
Would you be willing to donate money in order to avoid this from happening, will you be willing to 
volunteer some of your time in order to undertake for example surveillance duties that would help 
avoid this from happening? Would you be willing to pay taxes in order to avoid such a spill? 
 
Alternatively, given the fact that there may be other areas in other regions in Spain of environmental 
importance (in terms of number of species, recreational facilities, economic importance, etc.) that 
have not been polluted you would not be particularly concerned about a spill such as the one we have 
just described. If so, what would you do? Nothing? Would you read about it in the newspapers? 
Would you oppose any investment in order to manage these situations? Other? 
 
Answer: 
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VALUATION 
1) WTP to manage future spills 
The following part of the session today will present a number of scenarios that may take place in the 
event of a future spill. These illustrate different types of spill that may occur and their direct 
consequences in the short run.  
The environment: Oil spills can affect fauna such as birds, flora at sea, in cliffs, estuaries and 
beaches. Environmentally sensitive areas such as natural parks may also be affected. Depending on 
the area affected, when the spill takes place, the volume and toxic content of the oil spilled, the 
recovery of the environment can take up to 25 years.  The previous state of the environment 
(whether clean or polluted) will influence the severity of the damages caused by the oil spill. 
The economy: Fishing and shell-fishing activities can be affected by an oil spill due to temporary bans 
of these activities. These bans can last for years depending on the species affected. Tourism and 
related activities may suffer until the slick is eliminated from the visited areas. This decline in tourism 
can be severe in the first year after the spill, reducing its severity after this period. 
Health: People can be affected by an oil spill in the event of being directly exposed to pollution or 
ingesting oil. This can happen in cases of clean-up activities in the aftermath of the spill and in cases 
of exposure to long-lasting pollution that has not been cleaned.  
Spain’s image: Oil spills may harm the image of a country. This may result in Spain not being 
internationally regarded as an attractive investment area, an attractive tourism area, 
environmentally safe area or other.  
Costs: At present your taxes pay for management of minor spills that will be described in detail in the 
following showcard. In order to manage spills of moderate and major consequences substantial new 
investments would have to be made which you would have to finance through an increase in taxes. 
Additional taxes will mean you have less money to spend on other things. The extra amount will be 
paid every year by everyone in Spain.  
I would now like to ask you to look at the following showcard. In each card three potential spills are 
described along with their consequences. Column A illustrates the case of a minor spill where no 
increase in taxes would be required for the authorities to manage the spill. Column B describes a 
moderate spill and Column C describes a major spill. These last two situations would require an 
increase in taxes to ensure adequate management of the spill.  
According to present data, a minor spill happens every 2 years. Moderate and major spills take place 
in Spain every six or seven years. Please look at the following showcard and choose one of the 
following policy options for oil spill management.  
Comments/questions from interviewees before choosing: 
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Example: I would choose managing a) Minor spills at no extra cost b) Moderate spills paying 50€ every 
year OR c) Major spills paying 400€ every year 
Showcard 1 
Option A: Managing a 
Small Spill 
(170 tons) 
Option B: Managing a 
Medium spill  
(13,000 tons) 
Option C: Managing a 
Large spill 
(77,000 tons) 
State before spill:  
Clean 
State before spill: 
Polluted 
State before spill:  
Clean 
No collapse of affected 
environment 
X% increase in risk of 
collapse in affected 
environment 
Collapse of affected 
environment 
Area affected = 4 Km Area affected = 200 Km Area affected = 1,000 Km  
253 dead birds. 
Whales and dolphins 
oiled. 
19,400 dead birds.  
Whales and dolphins 
mildly affected. 
Between 115,000 and 
250,000 dead birds of 90 
Species including 
endangered. Some 
whales and dolphins 
found dead.  
Environment 
 
 
 
Minor damage to one 
nearby Natural Park 
2 Natural parks badly 
affected by the spill over 
a 10 year period 
10 natural parks will 
collapse. Previous species 
are no longer able to live 
in these parks. There is 
no foreseeable recovery.  
1 Mollusc fishing ground 
closed for 3 months 
Bans up to one year 
after the spill in all 
commercial species 
Bans lasting up to 7 years 
to fishing and shell-
fishing Economy 
 No tourism in affected 
area for six months 
Tourism temporarily 
affected. Drop in tourism 
lasts 3 years. 
Permanent drop in 
tourism due to lost 
ecosystems 
Health 
 
    
 
20 people treated for 
respiratory illness. Low 
increase in risk of cancer.  
236 people treated for 
respiratory illness and 
headaches. Low increase 
in risk of cancer.   
Over 1,400 people 
treated for respiratory 
illness and headaches. 
Moderate increase in risk 
of cancer. 
Image 
 Insignificant image loss. Limited coverage of the 
issue by international 
press and institutions 
Moderate and 
temporary damage to 
Spain’s image. Some 
coverage of  the spill in 
international media 
Large and permanent 
damage to Spain’s image. 
Extensive international 
coverage in the media.  
Cost No additional cost € 50 € 400 
 
Answer:  
Participant 
name 
Option Reason 
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2) PREFERENCES REGARDING COMPENSATION 
In past oil spills the Spanish government paid compensation to fishermen and directly affected firms 
and individuals. This compensation was only partly recovered by the Spanish government from the 
ship’s insurer (London P&I Club in the Prestige case) and the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund.  
International funds can ONLY BE USED TO COMPENSATE lost revenues, clean-up and reasonable 
restoration measures. This compensation was LIMITED to approximately 171M€ at the time of the 
Prestige spill. Any loss or damage that was not contemplated by international compensation 
measures was borne by society. Environmental losses such as ecosystem deterioration, species 
disappearance, etc. are not covered by compensation mechanisms.  
IN THE CASE OF A FUTURE SPILL ANY DAMAGE NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SCHEMES WILL HAVE TO BE PAID BY SPANISH AUTHORITIES AND THEREFORE BY 
SPANISH SOCIETY. As there are NO ESTABLISHED PLANS IN SPAIN FOR FUTURE SPILLS WITH 
REGARDS TO COMPENSATION ADDITIONAL to lost revenues, clean-up and restoration measures, 
WE WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT YOU WOULD PREFER.  
The last exercise today will show you several options in which different alternatives will be available 
regarding compensation that will be provided by Spanish authorities when a new spill occurs.  
1 We ask you to assume the spill is a moderate spill in the first set of options. We ask you to assume 
the spill is a very large spill in the second set of options. (Show showcards with previous options B 
and C to remind them of the consequences of each). We would now like you to look at the following 
showcards and choose the option you would prefer in the event of a future spill.  
2 The last row on the showcard translates the investments made by Spanish authorities into the 
money that would be invested each year per person by the Spanish government into a fund that will 
implement the policy option chosen.   
3 The compensation paid by the Spanish government will mean other investments planned by the 
government will not be executed or will be delayed. Examples of these investments that will not be 
executed or will be delayed may include defence strategies, health programs, educational 
programs, etc.  
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In the event of a future MEDIUM spill with the following consequences: 
Option B: MEDIUM spill  
(13,000 tons) 
Increase in risk of collapse in affected environment 
Area affected = 200 Km 
19,400 dead birds.  
Whales and mildly affected. 
2 Natural parks badly affected by the spill over a 10 year period 
Bans up to one year after the spill in commercial species 
Tourism temporarily affected. Drop in tourism lasts 3 years. 
236 people treated for respiratory illness and headaches. Low increase in risk of 
cancer.   
Moderate and temporary damage to Spain’s image. Some coverage of spill in 
international media 
 
• The government will clean-up and compensate directly affected parties.  
• The government will only recover part of the investment made from international compensation 
funds and insurance companies. 
• Additionally the government is thinking about other compensation possibilities. We would like 
to know what you would like to see happen with regards to this additional compensation in case 
of a future MEDIUM spill: 
 
Example 1: In the event of a future MEDIUM spill I would ask the Spanish authorities to implement the 
following option: 
 Policy Option 1 (WS) 
Policy option 2 
(SS1 – Like for like) 
Policy Option 3 
(SS2 – CNC) 
Goal Reinvigorate the economy 
Replace the damaged 
environment 
Prevent future spills 
compensation 
- Railway works 
- Port facilities for 
commercial 
activities 
- Building 
motorways 
- Marketing 
campaigns to 
promote affected 
areas 
- Fish-farming and 
releasing young fish to 
replace dead animals. 
- Bringing new birds to 
affected areas once clean 
- Creating artificial 
wetlands to replace the 
ones destroyed by the spill 
 - Designate special 
protection areas and 
natural parks to replace 
the ones damaged 
 - Radar satellite surveillance 
through the entire maritime coast 
- Investment in risk and sensitivity 
maps that limit activities in 
environmentally sensitive areas 
- Designate sacrifice areas to hold a 
future spill 
 - Create an international 
negotiation panel to pursue 
increased safety measures 
WTA €700 €300 €100 
Can you please briefly explain the reasons for your option? 
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In the event of a future LARGE SPILL with the following consequences: 
State before spill: Clean 
Collapse of affected environment 
Area affected = 1,000 Km  
Between 115,000 and 250,000 dead birds of 90 Species including endangered. Some whales and 
dolphins found dead.  
10 natural parks will collapse. Previous species are no longer able to live in these parks. There is no 
foreseeable recovery. 
Bans lasting up to 7 years to fishing and shell-fishing 
Permanent drop in tourism due to lost ecosystems 
Over 1,400 people treated for respiratory illness and headaches. Moderate increase in risk of cancer. 
Large and permanent damage to Spain’s image. Extensive international coverage in the media.  
 
• The government will clean-up and compensate directly affected parties.  
• The government will only recover part of the investment made from international compensation 
funds and insurance companies. 
• Additionally the government is thinking about other compensation possibilities. We would like 
to know what you would like to see happen with regards to this additional compensation in case 
of a future and LARGE spill: 
 
Example 1: In the event of a future LARGE spill I would ask the Spanish authorities to implement the 
following option: 
 Policy Option 1 (WS) 
Policy option 2 
(SS1 – Like for like) 
Policy Option 3 
(SS2 – CNC) 
Goal Reinvigorate the economy 
Replace the damaged 
environment 
Prevent future spills 
compensation 
- Railway works 
- Port facilities for 
commercial 
activities 
- Building 
motorways 
- Marketing 
campaigns to 
promote affected 
areas 
- Fish-farming and 
releasing young fish to 
replace dead animals. 
- Bringing new birds to 
affected areas once clean 
- Creating artificial 
wetlands to replace the 
ones destroyed by the spill 
 - Designate special 
protection areas and 
natural parks to replace 
the ones damaged 
 - Radar satellite surveillance 
through the entire maritime 
coast 
- Investment in risk and 
sensitivity maps that limit 
activities in environmentally 
sensitive areas 
- Designate sacrifice areas to hold 
a future spill 
 - Create an international 
negotiation panel to pursue 
increased safety measures 
WTA €700 €300 €100 
 
Can you please briefly explain the reasons for your option? 
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Answer:  
Medium spill  
(equivalent to description above B) 
Large spill 
(equivalent to description above C)  
FG # 
 Example 1 
Op (1vs. 2vs. 3) WS / SS1/SS2 
 
 Example 1 
Op (1vs. 2 vs. 3) WS / SS1/SS2 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Reasons 
Probing: 
1 Did you understand the different options that were just presented to you? 
2 Did you need further explanations to understand what was being described and asked? 
3 Do you think these situations may arise due to an oil spill?    
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CONCERN INDICATORS 
I would now like to ask you to open the last folder. Three different spills are shown and their 
consequences are explained in the slides inside the folder. 
Below each scenario there is a scale that goes from 1 to 10.  I would like to ask you to state how 
important each described scenario is to you. That is, how much it affects your wellbeing.  
Number 1 indicates the scenario is of very little relevance and therefore it has insignificant impact on 
your wellbeing.  
Number 10 indicates the scenario presented is very important and it has a very large impact in your 
wellbeing.  
Answer:  
 
For me a SMALL spill would have an importance of: 
Showcard 
1 
Option A: SMALL Spill 
(170 tons) 
State before spill:  Clean 
No collapse of affected environment 
Area affected = 4 Km 
253 dead birds. 
Whales and dolphins oiled. 
 
 
 
 
Minor damage to one nearby Natural Park 
1 Mollusc fishing ground closed for 3 months  
 No tourism in affected area for six months 
Health 
 
    
 
20 people treated for respiratory illness. Low increase in risk of cancer.  
Image 
 
Insignificant image loss. Limited coverage of the issue by international press and 
institutions 
1            2            3            4               5             6            7            8            9            10 
 Very                                                   Medium                                                          Very  Little                                                  Importance                                                      large   
Importance                                                                                                       Importance 
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For me a MEDIUM spill would have an importance of: 
Showcard 1 Option B: MEDIUM spill  (13,000 tons) 
State before spill: Polluted 
X% increase in risk of collapse in affected environment 
Area affected = 200 Km 
19,400 dead birds.  
Whales and mildly affected. 
 
 
 
 
2 Natural parks badly affected by the spill over a 10 year period 
Bans up to one year after the spill in commercial species  
 Tourism temporarily affected. Drop in tourism lasts 3 years. 
Health 
 
    
 
236 people treated for respiratory illness and headaches. Low increase in risk of 
cancer.   
Image 
 
Moderate and temporary damage to Spain’s image. Some coverage of spill in 
international media 
1            2            3            4               5             6            7            8            9            10 
 Very                                                   Medium                                                          Very  Little                                                  Importance                                                      large   
Importance                                                                                                       Importance 
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For me a LARGE spill would have an importance of: 
Showcard 1 Option C: LARGE spill (77,000 tons) 
State before spill: Clean 
Collapse of affected environment 
Area affected = 1,000 Km  
Between 115,000 and 250,000 dead birds of 90 Species including endangered. 
Some whales and dolphins found dead.  
 
 
 
 10 natural parks will collapse. Previous species are no longer able to live in these 
parks. There is no foreseeable recovery. 
Bans lasting up to 7 years to fishing and shell-fishing  
 Permanent drop in tourism due to lost ecosystems 
Health 
 
    
 
Over 1,400 people treated for respiratory illness and headaches. Moderate 
increase in risk of cancer. 
Image 
 
Large and permanent damage to Spain’s image. Extensive international coverage 
in the media.  
1            2            3            4               5             6            7            8            9            10 
 Very                                                   Medium                                                          Very  Little                                                  Importance                                                      large   
Importance                                                                                                       Importance 
 
Summary of concern indicators for FG 
Participant name Small Medium Very large 
    
    
    
    
    
    
Average    
 
Probing: 
1 Did you understand the different options that were just presented to you? 
2 Did you need further explanations to understand what was being described and asked?  
3 Do you think these situations may arise due to an oil spill?    
4 Would you suggest any improvements in the information presented to you in order to help others 
understand the exercise? 
5 When you were asked whether you would be willing to pay in order to ensure adequate 
management of medium size and large size spills did you think it was fair that you should pay for 
this (due to the fact that you would benefit from adequate management and you use oil in your 
daily activities for example)? If you don’t think it is fair, do you think it is likely that others 
(International oil tanker insurers or cargo owners, the Spanish government for example) will pay for 
adequate management of accidental spills? Did you think you should instead be compensated 
should a new spill occur? If so please state why, who should compensate you and how.  
 
WRAP-UP 
1 These were the last topics I wanted to discuss today. Are there any other issues you would like to 
talk about? 
2 Thank you all very much for your time and ideas. Goodbye! 
3 Process payments 
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A.3 Compensation 
A.3.1 Questionnaire 
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A.3.2 Documentation for interviewees 
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A.3.3 Sampling 
This section will analyse the sampling process followed prior to the implementation of 
the survey. The first subsection will provide a brief discussion of the theory behind the 
sampling decisions made and the second subsection will critically analyse the practical 
application of the theory to the present research project. The conclusions will be 
covered in the third subsection. 
Sampling: Theoretical background 
Choice of sampling method: theory 
One of the criticisms CV studies have had to face is the poor quality of the samples 
which lead to unrepresentative results (Carson et al. 2000). Time and resources 
limitations make interviewing all individuals in the population impossible. Adequate 
sampling can provide us with unbiased and precise142 information about the 
population we are interested in at a reduced cost. The optimal sampling procedure 
(Rodríguez Osuna, 1991, Arrow et al. 1993, Carson et al. 2000, Bateman et al. 2002, 
Champ et al. 2003, etc.) is to have a probability sample in which all members of the 
population of interest have a known, not necessarily equal, independent and nonzero 
probability of being chosen. If there is adequate information (i.e. the sampling frame is 
complete) then the questionnaire can be distributed to a random sample of 
individuals. This will allow the researcher to generalise the results obtained to the 
population from which the sample was extracted.  
Lack of comprehensive sampling frames, limited time and/or resources can result in 
researchers resorting to semi-probability and non-probability sampling143. One of the 
semi-probability sampling methods available144 called superior semi-probability 
sampling by Tukey and Cochran (Pérez, 1999) entails a random selection of some of 
the sampling units through say postcodes or streets for which there exist data on the 
probability of selecting them and then the elements or final sampling units (say the 
individuals) have an unknown probability of being selected. Interviewers make, in this 
sampling method, the final decision as to who should be interviewed.  
                                               
142
 Unbiased and precise estimations imply that the values we obtain from the sample approximate to 
those of the population and thus can be extrapolated to the latter (Rodriguez Osuna, 1991) 
143
 Semi probability sampling implies a random selection of some of the sampling units and a non-random 
selection of other sampling units. For a comprehensive description and analysis of the different sampling 
procedures see Pérez (1999) and Rodíguez Osuna (1991).  
144
 the one used for the present research project, see the following subsection. 
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This multi-stage sampling process can include certain selection criteria to be met by 
interviewees. These criteria are used for example in quota sampling145 for the selection 
of final sampling units to ensure respondents have certain characteristics normally 
with the purpose of ensuring respondents resemble population characteristics. 
Examples of quota categories that may be of interest include age, gender, income, 
educational level, etc. as these may influence individuals attitudes, intentions and 
behaviours with regards to a wide range of economic and environmental issues.  
Quota sampling has several advantages. First, this sampling method is widely used in 
social sciences and its results, although not probabilistic stricto sensus146, are used to 
generalise results to the population as empirical work has shown that the results 
obtained using this sampling approach are ‘of great value’ (Rodríguez Osuna, 1991: 
14). Second, it is relatively less expensive compared to probability sampling methods, 
in terms of the sampling frame needed and the speed in gathering the data as parks, 
busy streets and any open space can be chosen to minimise travel time between 
surveys. For these reasons this sampling method was used in this thesis. The main 
disadvantage is the difficulty in meeting quotas and therefore the possible ‘stretching’ 
of categories by interviewers in order to meet the quotas. Overall, however, careful 
selection of quotas, planning of fieldwork and control of the survey process are known 
to provide good survey results. A further disadvantage of semi-probabilistic sampling is 
that sampling errors cannot be calculated a priori.  
Sample size: theory 
One of the most important decisions before conducting any survey is to decide the 
sample size (Pérez, 1999). The main factors that will affect the sample size are: the 
population size, the variable that will be estimated, the error, the variability among 
data, the sampling method and the confidence coefficient (Rodríguez Osuna, 1991).  
It should be noted that due to the similarities between quota sampling and stratified 
random sampling with proportional allocation, we initially considered the formulae of 
the latter to calculate the sample size. Additionally, given that we also assumed 
constant variability of data across all strata, simple random sampling and stratified 
                                               
145
 ´A quota sample is one in which the units are not selected at random, but in terms of a certain number 
of units in each of a number of categories’, Everitt, (2002: 309) 
146
 But nevertheless considered to have a similar structure to probability sampling, in particular to that of 
stratified random sampling with proportional allocation (Espínola Vílchez, pers. Comm..) 
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random sampling coincide and therefore the final formula used in determining the 
sample size was that of simple random sampling with a given error and a confidence 
coefficient to obtain the estimator for the proportion:  
Formula A.3.3.1 Sample size for a given sampling error and given confidence coefficient (tolerance 
level): estimator for the proportion 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Pérez, 1999: 181) 
For a comprehensive explanation of the formula see Pérez (1999: 179-182). In any 
case, formula A.3.3.1 can be easily obtained from the formulae for calculating the 
sample size in simple random sampling for the mean where: n=λ2α NS2 / (Ne2α+ λ2α S2) 
being S2 the quasi variance. By substituting (N/N-1)*PQ for (S2) we arrive at formula 
A.3.3.1. This formula coincides with the formula used to calculate the sample size in 
stratified random sampling when the error and the confidence levels are given for the 
estimator of the proportion.  
In stratified random sampling, the sample size for the mean is: n=∑WhSh2/((e2/ 
λ2α)+(1/N)*∑WhSh2) being Sh2 the population quasi-variance for the stratum and Wh the 
ponderation coefficients. Given that variability is assumed to be constant for all strata, 
then Sh2 can be taken out of the summation and ∑Wh=1 and therefore simple random 
sampling and stratified random sampling with proportional allocation coincide.  
Quotas: theory 
Quotas are the number of final sampling units (e.g. individuals) that meet certain pre-
requisites (e.g. being over 18, being female, etc.). Once the quotas are determined, the 
interviewer will choose the first individual in each category that meets the criteria. The 
decision regarding the variables according to which quotas will be determined is based 
on the existence of sound knowledge of the characteristics of the population from 
which the sample is drawn which are of interest for the research project. Variables 
according to which quotas can be established include any socio-economic 
characteristic that may be relevant to the research project.  
             λ2α NPQ 
 
       e2α (N-1) + λ2α PQ 
 
n =  
n  = sample size  
λα = critical value in a typified normal distribution of the data 
N  = population size from which the sample is drawn 
P  = proportion of people willing to pay 
Q  = (1-P) = proportion of people not willing to pay 
eα  = estimation error 
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The aforementioned similarities in the structure of quota sampling and stratified 
random sampling with proportional allocation imply that the selection of interviewees 
in both methods follows a similar logic even though the final phase in the selection of 
respondents is not random in quota sampling.  
Sampling in this thesis 
Choice of sampling method: the research project 
The expected high cost of probability sampling plus the lack of an adequate population 
sampling frame from which to draw our random sample of individuals for the present 
research project implied looking for other sampling options that were feasible, less 
expensive, and as close as possible to the ‘gold standard’ (Bateman et al. 2002: 97) 
provided by probability sampling. Semi-probability and non-probability sampling 
options were considered. Following the theoretical precepts discussed in previous 
subsections a superior semi-probability sampling, with a multi-stage process, was 
followed in order to select the final sampling units.  
The first stage consisted in selecting, according to uniform allocation, an equal number 
of questionnaires for each postcode. These postcodes were randomly selected from 
the list of postcodes for the city of Madrid and for the city of La Coruña. IPSOS then 
provided interviewers with a map including the postcode boundaries and interviewers 
travelled to the location where they chose individuals that met the quota criteria, 
therefore following quota sampling for the second and final stage in the sampling 
process. Choosing the final sampling units (i.e. individuals) was left at the discretion of 
the interviewer. 
In practical terms, maps and lists of the postcodes of the city of Madrid and the city of 
La Coruña were obtained from the local government (Madrid Council and La Coruña 
Council). The differences in size and city management criteria meant that whereas in 
Madrid the information was publicly available without the need to request this 
information in writing, La Coruña did require the researcher to provide a written 
request form in which the purpose of the research and the institution for which the 
research was conducted were specified. This additional red tape was however 
compensated by the provision of more up to date population data and detailed 
interactive maps of the city of La Coruña.  
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A final practical consideration in planning and collecting the data was, as was discussed 
in previous subsections, the cost. According to Bateman et al. (2002) the cost of 
completing each face-to-face interview in 2000 was in the range of £25-50 when 
professional interviewers from market research companies are employed. In the 
present study the price paid to IPSOS per completed questionnaire was just under 22€ 
(£17.6)147. The lower price compared to the prices mentioned by Bateman et al. (2002) 
may be derived from the fact that IPSOS partially funded the research148. 
Sample size: the research project 
In order to calculate the sample size we assumed that the variability of the 
population’s willingness to pay is equal across all strata. We made this assumption as 
we decided to assume the worst possible scenario (P=Q= 0.5) which meant that the 
proportion of people that would be willing to pay would be equal to the proportion of 
people not willing to pay. We therefore used the formulae of simple random sampling 
given that if we consider constant variability in the willingness to pay distribution 
across the different strata then simple random sampling and stratified random 
sampling coincide and as we mentioned earlier, quota sampling and stratified random 
sampling share similarities in their structure. 
The initial sample size of 601 interviewees was based on time and budget constraints, 
expert advice on the appropriate number of surveys for this type of studies and the 
literature review conducted (Rodríguez Osuna, 1991). Using formula A.3.3.1, the 
sample sizes for Madrid and for La Coruña were calculated (400 in Madrid and 201 in 
La Coruña). We adjusted the sampling error so that we did not go over the number of 
questionnaires we could afford. This meant that in theory, the errors made with the 
initial sample size where 4.9% for Madrid and 6.9% for La Coruña both with a 95% 
confidence coefficient149.  
The final sample size differed from the initial sample size calculated above. The reason 
for this difference is that a total of 720 surveys were completed but 8% had to be 
                                               
147
 http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-gbp.en.html. Exchange rate used as 
of 5th of September 2008 as the payment for IPSOS was done in this date (1euro=0, 80930£).  
148
 The partial funding by IPSOS Public Affairs Department is gratefully acknowledged. Their 
cooperation, in particular that of Bernardo Lanuza, the field team in Madrid and in La Coruña is greatly 
appreciated.   
149
 Note that the gross personal income data on which the sample size was calculated is based on the IEF 
studies which is a sample of the population in the city of Madrid and in the city of La Coruña.   
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discarded due to errors made during the interview process (IPSOS, 2008). The final 
number of surveys that were analysed was 663. The number of usable questionnaires 
completed in Madrid was 405 and 258 in La Coruña150. The estimated errors for the 
final sample size amounted to 4.87% in Madrid and 6.08% in La Coruña. 
Quotas: the research project 
Age and income are considered relevant socio-economic variables that can affect 
people’s willingness to pay for the policy change proposed in the study (see Bateman 
et al. 2002). And, one of the core exercises of this valuation study is to know if people 
are willing to pay to avoid a future oil spill.  An additional variable that was considered 
in the study was gender which was not expected to influence WTP but it was 
nevertheless included as one of the quota variables due to its relevance as a socio-
economic factor that defines population characteristics. Further reasons to include 
income as one of the quotas are: 
• Availability of gross income data provided by the Institute of Fiscal Studies151  
• Expert advice on the analysis of data suggested including income quota as one 
of the questions in order to facilitate the analysis of survey data152.   
It must be noted that the population from which we determined our sample is in turn 
a sample of people who submitted their tax return in 2003 that were included in the 
IEF database in the city of Madrid and in the city of La Coruña. This may well differ 
from the general population, but the data we had access to only included personal 
annual gross income for these individuals. As we did not have data on age or gender 
characteristics for the people who paid their income tax, we used the census 
                                               
150
 The number of surveys conducted in La Coruña was higher than the number initially planned due to 
errors made by IPSOS who instructed interviewers in Galicia to ask about household gross income rather 
than personal gross income which was the quota question asked in the survey. This mistake was made 
despite of the in person debriefing conducted in Madrid and despite the telephone debriefing conducted 
with the head of fieldwork in Galicia. The mistake was only spotted while monitoring the survey process 
(following interviewers whilst they were interviewing people). 
151
 I am indebted to César Pérez for providing personal gross income data for Madrid and for La Coruña 
which had not been publicly released when the survey was carried out. The input of Rosa Espínola 
Vílchez, lecturer at the Statistics School (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) is also gratefully 
acknowledged in the entire sampling process.  
152
 I am indebted to Mª Dolores Robles, Lecturer in Econometrics at the Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid for helpful comments on income questions and the revision of early versions of the questionnaire. 
The input of María Loureiro in this matter is also gratefully acknowledged.   
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population data in Madrid153 and La Coruña as well as the Statistics Institute for Galicia 
(IGE).  
Sampling: conclusions 
This section has analysed the theoretical background and the practical implementation 
of sampling guidelines in this thesis. The initial aim of following the ‘gold standard’ of 
probability sampling had to be scaled down to a superior semi-probability sampling 
process. This entailed a multi-stage approach in which initial random selection of 
postcodes gave way to the interviewer discretion of respondent selection according to 
income, age and gender quotas. The sample size was calculated according to simple 
random sampling formulae under the assumptions of similarities of quota sampling 
and stratified random sampling with proportional allocation and the equivalence of the 
latter to simple random sampling formulae as explained in this section. The final 
number of usable interviews amounted to 663 which is reasonable for this type of 
studies according to the literature reviewed and the experts consulted. 
                                               
153
 Please note the census data available was gathered in 2001 and this could have caused a selection bias. 
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A.3.4 implementation issues  
According to IPSOS (2008), the survey seemed complicated at the outset due to 
the length of the questionnaire and the depth of the questions. The implementation of 
the survey was however more dynamic than expected and after debriefing, Q&A 
sessions with interviewers and some final adjustments, the survey ran smoothly. A 
total of 720 surveys were completed between the 23rd of June 2008 and the 16th of 
July 2008. The coding and data cleaning process took place in the months following the 
surveys. Once this process was complete, the analysis of the data obtained started.  
This annex will present the process by which professional interviewers were trained for 
this research project, the main hurdles faced and the measures taken to overcome 
these difficulties.  
In order to ensure all interviewers had understood each question, two sets of meetings 
were organised with the IPSOS field team. The first set of meetings took place before 
the questionnaires were administered. In Madrid these were held in-person. During 
the first meeting the main goal of the questionnaire was explained to the interviewers. 
Each question was read out loud and explained to ensure there were no problems in 
understanding the contents and instructions. At this stage, no major issues were raised 
by the field team in Madrid.  
Time and budget constraints did not allow for the same in-person briefing to happen in 
La Coruña and thus the questionnaire was explained over the phone to the head of the 
field team in La Coruña. The main comments made were: 
That the quota questions at the start of the survey could be problematic due to the 
sensitive nature of the income question. This was acknowledged but there was no 
alternative as it was one of the variables of interest that was expected to influence 
WTP answers. Additionally, the budget provided by IPSOS was for 601 interviews and 
thus it was mandatory to have the quota questions at the start in order to meet the 
quota criteria and avoid exceeding the number of questionnaires that were budgeted 
by IPSOS.  
Local newspapers had not been included. This fact was also acknowledged but it was 
not seen as a serious shortcoming as there was the option for adding other 
newspapers under the option ‘other: please state’.  
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Once these briefing meetings had taken place, the heads of the two field teams were 
given the go-ahead and the questionnaires began to be administered in Madrid and in 
La Coruña. Two further quality control steps were taken. Two interviewers in Madrid 
were followed by the researcher during one day. The purpose of this was to ensure 
they had understood the questions and they were following the instructions given 
during the in-person briefing session. The same process was followed in La Coruña 
where two out of the four interviewers hired were followed during one day. After the 
researcher had followed the interviewers, the debriefing meetings were conducted 
both in Madrid and in La Coruña to review the main issues observed by interviewers 
and to gather their impressions about the process. The main findings of the quality 
control exercise were: 
On the interviewers: 
Path dependencies play a significant role in the way professional interviewers ask 
questions. This implies that if similar questions have been repeatedly asked for other 
questionnaires in a certain fashion, it is highly likely that these will be asked in the 
same fashion unless various reminders and checks are introduced. This happened with 
the income question which was not being correctly asked. Interviewers were asking for 
household income (which is the usual income question in other market research 
studies) rather that for individual gross income data. This was seen as a serious 
mistake as it differed from the quota information obtained from the IEF. It was also 
different from the WTP question, which asked about the amount (if any) that the 
interviewee, not the household, was willing to pay. The solution given to this implied 
calling all those interviewees in Galicia who had completed the questionnaire up until 
the error was spotted. The correct income information was then recorded and further 
questionnaires had to be completed to try to meet the quota criteria.  
Some instructions were overlooked, especially when interviewers were asked not to 
read the possible answers out loud. The main lesson from this is not to include in the 
questionnaire anything that is not meant to be disclosed.  
Skip-patterns were not always followed. Minimising these patterns and checking for 
these mistakes in the briefing part of the quality control process could improve this in 
future research.  
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The payment card with uncertainty levels was somewhat complex for interviewers and 
thus instructions on how to complete this section were repeated after following the 
interviewers around.  
Interviewers benefited from examples and illustrations used and stated that more of 
these would have been desirable. The trade-off between a comprehensive explanation 
and having to complete the questionnaire in as little time as possible154 made including 
more examples difficult, but this will be taken into account in future research.  
The implementation time was approximately 15 minutes. 
On the questions: 
The fact that the survey asked about environmental issues and that a university was 
interested in respondents’ views was seen as a confidence builder that encouraged 
people to participate. 
Interviewers found it difficult to meet all the quota criteria, especially the income 
quotas for people in the higher income group.  
Warm up and attitudinal questions were generally unproblematic. The exception to 
this was encountered in statement number 6 of the NEP scale in which, according to 
interviewers, respondents answered in a contradictory manner. A further comment 
made regarding the NEP scale was that it gave rise to a significant number of people 
commenting on the statements and this led to increasing the questionnaire 
completion time. 
The main issue with the first internal scope test155 exercise was that a few (less 
educated and older respondents) experienced some difficulty following the 
instructions. Repetition and clarification by interviewers was seen as key in order to 
minimise this limited understanding. 
The large number of people wanting compensation may have implied that the 
explanation of the opportunity cost of investing in compensation programs was not 
seriously considered by respondents.  
                                               
154
 Due to the nature of intercept interviews which were taking place outdoors 
155
  for which respondents were asked to allocate from 0 to 100 points to three different spills (small, 
medium and large) according to how concerned they would be if each of the presented spills happened. 
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The information prior to the valuation question was perceived as somewhat long by 
interviewers although they said that there were no major problems as interviewees 
understood what was being asked. Some respondents however found it tricky to 
decide on the quantity they would pay. This was to be expected as market transactions 
resemble more a dichotomous choice type question in which consumers either accept 
the price of the good or forego the purchase.  
Some respondents had problems recalling some of the self-reported pro-
environmental behaviours. This is expected to occur if the time lapse between the 
event, say attending a demonstration and the questionnaire, is long. Providing 
concrete examples such as stating the name of the organisation or salient events 
which happened during the demonstrations were said to ‘awaken’ these memories.  
So, even though there were some implementation issues, briefing and debriefing, on 
site monitoring of the interview process and holding meetings with interviewers 
resulted in a relatively smooth implementation of the survey.  
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A.4 Valuation 
A.4.1 uncertainty 
Output A.4.1.1 Uncertainty analysis: Protest responses according to Bateman et al. 
(2002). Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests 
 
We do not reject the null hypothesis that the mean uncertainty amount in WTP to 
prevent the medium spill of respondents who answered the first version of the 
questionnaire is equal to the mean uncertainty amount in WTP to prevent the medium 
spill of respondents who answered the second version of the questionnaire. No order 
effects are present in the uncertainty expressed by respondents to the WTP question.  
Output A.4.1.2 Uncertainty analysis: Protest responses according to Brouwer et al. 
(2008). Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.1385         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.2771           Pr(F > f) = 0.8615
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 240, 240
    ratio = sd(1) / sd(2)                                         f =   0.8689
                                                                              
combined       482    32.53527     2.98357    65.50279    26.67283    38.39771
                                                                              
       2       241    33.87552    4.368519    67.81766    25.26998    42.48105
       1       241    31.19502    4.072102    63.21603     23.1734    39.21665
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest uncertainb, by (vers)
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2581         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5162          Pr(T > t) = 0.7419
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      375
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =  -0.6498
                                                                              
    diff             -4.792479    7.375377               -19.29476    9.709798
                                                                              
combined       377    41.59682    3.681936    71.49027    34.35705    48.83658
                                                                              
       2       181     44.0884     5.59316    75.24828     33.0518    55.12499
       1       196    39.29592    4.853443     67.9482    29.72394     48.8679
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest uncertainb, by(vers) unpaired
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0812         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.1624           Pr(F > f) = 0.9188
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 195, 180
    ratio = sd(1) / sd(2)                                         f =   0.8154
                                                                              
combined       377    41.59682    3.681936    71.49027    34.35705    48.83658
                                                                              
       2       181     44.0884     5.59316    75.24828     33.0518    55.12499
       1       196    39.29592    4.853443     67.9482    29.72394     48.8679
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest  uncertainb, by(vers)
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.3269         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6538          Pr(T > t) = 0.6731
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      480
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =  -0.4488
                                                                              
    diff             -2.680498      5.9721               -14.41519    9.054192
                                                                              
combined       482    32.53527     2.98357    65.50279    26.67283    38.39771
                                                                              
       2       241    33.87552    4.368519    67.81766    25.26998    42.48105
       1       241    31.19502    4.072102    63.21603     23.1734    39.21665
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest uncertainb, by (vers) unpaired
 
We do not reject the null hypothesis that the mean uncertainty amount in WTP to 
prevent the medium spill of respondents who answered the first version of the 
questionnaire is equal to the mean uncertainty amount in WTP to prevent the medium 
spill of respondents who answered the second version of the questionnaire. No order 
effects are present in the uncertainty expressed by respondents to the WTP question.  
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A.4.2 Scope 
Scope sensitivity was tested in the questionnaire via two exercises. The first one asked 
respondents to state how worried they would be on a scale of 1 to 100 if a small spill, a 
medium sized spill and a large spill were to occur. The second exercise where scope 
sensitivity was analysed was through the valuation question. In this question 
interviewees were asked about their WTP to prevent both the small and the medium 
spill (version 1 of the questionnaire) or about their WTP to prevent the medium spill 
and the large spill (version 2 of the questionnaire).  
CONCERN 
In the first scope sensitivity question in order to test whether there were statistically 
significant differences between the concern (worry) felt by questionnaire respondents 
when presented with the three different spills we took into account the fact that all 
respondents were presented with the three spills. This meant respondents’ answers 
were not independent and thus we used the repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA – repeated measures) to test for internal scope sensitivity. 
Output A.4.2.1 Repeated measures ANOVA: concern exercise 
                   Total    1415877.66  1985  713.288494   
                                                                              
                Residual    531714.563  1322  402.204662   
                          
                   spill    883988.104     2  441994.052    1098.93     0.0000
                  cuestn    174.992951   661  .264739714       0.00     1.0000
                          
                   Model    884163.097   663  1333.57933       3.32     0.0000
                                                                              
                  Source    Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F
                           Root MSE      =  20.055     Adj R-squared =  0.4361
                           Number of obs =    1986     R-squared     =  0.6245
. anova concern  cuestn  spill, repeated(spill)
 
 
The value of Mauchly’s W test for sphericity was 0,386 which meant the sphericity 
assumption is not met hence; the following correction factors are used:  
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Output A.4.2.2 Corrections for violation of Sphericity 
                                                                              
                Residual     1322
                   spill        2  1098.93   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
                                                                              
                  Source       df      F    Regular    H-F      G-G      Box
                                                         Prob > F             
                                          Box's conservative epsilon =  0.5000
                                          Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon =  0.6195
                                          Huynh-Feldt epsilon        =  0.6201
Repeated variable: spill
     Lowest b.s.e. variable:  cuestn
                     Levels:  662       (661 df)
Between-subjects error term:  cuestn
 
The output above and its p-values (< α =0.05) indicate that we reject the null 
hypothesis that the mean concern felt by respondents as expressed by the ‘points’ 
allocated to the small spill is equal to the mean concern for the medium spill and equal 
to the mean concern felt regarding the large spill (H0: µ1 = µ2 = µ3). 
The post-hoc estimations using Scheffé produce the following pairwise comparisons: 
Output A.4.2.3 Pairwise comparisons: Scheffé 
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(2) = 317.4089  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           1415877.66   1985   713.288494
                                                                        
 Within groups      531889.556   1983   268.224688
Between groups      883988.104      2   441994.052   1647.85     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
. oneway concern spill, scheffe
 
                0.000      0.000
       3      49.1511    38.4003
          
                0.000
       2      10.7508
                                
Col Mean            1          2
Row Mean- 
                                  (Scheffe)
                        Comparison of concern by spill
 
Scheffé’s post hoc test reflects that we reject the null hypotheses that mean concern 
for the small spill is equal to mean concern for the medium spill; that mean concern for 
the medium spill is equal to the mean concern for the large spill and finally, that mean 
concern for the small spill is equal to mean concern for the large spill.  
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WTP 
Output A.4.2.4 Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests for WTP to avoid small 
and medium oil spills: Bateman et al. (2002) 
a) High midpoint of the WTP interval (H0: midwtpahigh=midwtpbhigh) 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0994         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.1988           Pr(F > f) = 0.9006
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 195, 195
    ratio = sd(midwtpahigh) / sd(midwtpbhigh)                     f =   0.8316
                                                                              
combined       392    73.02934    4.914304    97.29825    63.36757     82.6911
                                                                              
mi~bhigh       196    80.22959    7.251691    101.5237    65.92778    94.53141
mi~ahigh       196    65.82908    6.612902    92.58062    52.78709    78.87107
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest  midwtpahigh=midwtpbhigh if(vers==1)
 
At a 99% confidence level we do not reject that mean variances are equal   
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      195
     mean(diff) = mean(midwtpahigh - midwtpbhigh)                 t =  -7.1405
                                                                              
    diff       196   -14.40051    2.016736     28.2343   -18.37793    -10.4231
                                                                              
mi~bhigh       196    80.22959    7.251691    101.5237    65.92778    94.53141
mi~ahigh       196    65.82908    6.612902    92.58062    52.78709    78.87107
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
. ttest  midwtpahigh=midwtpbhigh if(vers==1)
 
We reject that mean WTP to prevent the small spill is equal to WTP to prevent the 
medium spill.  
Output A.4.2.5 Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests for WTP to avoid the 
medium oil spill: Bateman et al. (2002) 
a) Variance ratio test and mean difference test testing equality of mean WTP to 
prevent the medium spill across sub-samples. External scope test 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.5408         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.9185           Pr(F > f) = 0.4592
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 195, 180
    ratio = sd(1) / sd(2)                                         f =   1.0154
                                                                              
combined       377    79.95889    5.202771    101.0195    69.72871    90.18906
                                                                              
       2       181    79.66575    7.488796    100.7514    64.88862    94.44287
       1       196    80.22959    7.251691    101.5237    65.92778    94.53141
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest midwtpbhigh, by (vers)
 
At a 99% confidence level we do not reject that mean variances are equal 
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.5215         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9569          Pr(T > t) = 0.4785
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      375
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =   0.0541
                                                                              
    diff               .563846    10.42762               -19.94009    21.06779
                                                                              
combined       377    79.95889    5.202771    101.0195    69.72871    90.18906
                                                                              
       2       181    79.66575    7.488796    100.7514    64.88862    94.44287
       1       196    80.22959    7.251691    101.5237    65.92778    94.53141
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest midwtpbhigh, by (vers) unpaired
 
We do not reject that mean WTP to prevent the medium spill is equal across samples. 
This finding would indicate external sensitivity to scope. 
Output A.4.2.6 Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests for WTP to avoid the 
medium oil spill and the large spill: Bateman et al. (2002) 
a) High midpoint of the WTP interval (H0: midwtpbhigh=midwtpchigh) 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0591         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.1183           Pr(F > f) = 0.9409
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 180, 179
    ratio = sd(midwtpbhigh) / sd(midwtpchigh)                     f =   0.7916
                                                                              
combined       361    88.91967    5.653431    107.4152    77.80177    100.0376
                                                                              
mi~chigh       180      98.225    8.440555    113.2419    81.56921    114.8808
mi~bhigh       181    79.66575    7.488796    100.7514    64.88862    94.44287
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest  midwtpbhigh= midwtpchigh if (vers==2)
 
At a 99% confidence level we do not reject that variances are equal  
. 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      179
     mean(diff) = mean(midwtpbhigh - midwtpchigh)                 t =  -5.0546
                                                                              
    diff       180   -18.64444    3.688614    49.48795   -25.92321   -11.36568
                                                                              
mi~chigh       180      98.225    8.440555    113.2419    81.56921    114.8808
mi~bhigh       180    79.58056    7.530029    101.0259    64.72151     94.4396
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
. ttest  midwtpbhigh= midwtpchigh if (vers==2)
 
We reject that mean WTP to prevent the medium spill is equal to mean WTP to 
prevent the large spill for respondents who answered version 2 of the questionnaire. 
The statistical analyses conducted are indicative of internal and external sensitivity to 
scope using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest answers.  
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Output A.4.2.7 Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests for WTP to avoid small 
and medium oil spills: Brouwer et al. (2008) 
a) High midpoint of the WTP interval (H0: midwtpahigh=midwtpbhigh) 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0635         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.1269           Pr(F > f) = 0.9365
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 238, 240
    ratio = sd(midwtpahigh) / sd(midwtpbhigh)                     f =   0.8205
                                                                              
combined       480    58.82917    4.227662    92.62343    50.52211    67.13622
                                                                              
mi~bhigh       241    64.51452     6.24702    96.97983    52.20853    76.82051
mi~ahigh       239    53.09623    5.682124     87.8435    41.90256    64.28991
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest  midwtpahigh= midwtpbhigh if (vers==1)
 
At a 99% confidence level we do not reject that variances are equal  
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      238
     mean(diff) = mean(midwtpahigh - midwtpbhigh)                 t =  -6.8598
                                                                              
    diff       239   -11.61506    1.693213    26.17644   -14.95066   -8.279464
                                                                              
mi~bhigh       239     64.7113    6.296242    97.33754    52.30782    77.11478
mi~ahigh       239    53.09623    5.682124     87.8435    41.90256    64.28991
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
. ttest  midwtpahigh= midwtpbhigh if (vers==1)
 
We reject that mean WTP to prevent the small spill is equal to WTP to prevent the 
medium spill in the high midpoint of the WTP interval.  
Output A.4.2.8 Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests for WTP to avoid the 
medium spill across samples: Brouwer et al. (2008) 
a) Variance ratio test and mean difference test testing equality of mean WTP to 
prevent the medium spill across sub-samples. External scope test 
  Pr(F < f) = 0.7080         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.5841           Pr(F > f) = 0.2920
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 240, 240
    ratio = sd(1) / sd(2)                                         f =   1.0733
                                                                              
combined       482    62.54046    4.337637    95.23065     54.0174    71.06352
                                                                              
       2       241    60.56639    6.029879    93.60889    48.68815    72.44463
       1       241    64.51452     6.24702    96.97983    52.20853    76.82051
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest  midwtpbhigh, by (vers)
 
At a 99% confidence level we do not reject that variances are equal  
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.6752         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6495          Pr(T > t) = 0.3248
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      480
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =   0.4547
                                                                              
    diff              3.948133    8.682436               -13.11215    21.00841
                                                                              
combined       482    62.54046    4.337637    95.23065     54.0174    71.06352
                                                                              
       2       241    60.56639    6.029879    93.60889    48.68815    72.44463
       1       241    64.51452     6.24702    96.97983    52.20853    76.82051
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest  midwtpbhigh, by (vers)
 
We do not reject that mean WTP to prevent the medium spill is equal across survey 
respondents who were administered different versions of the questionnaire. This 
would be indicative of external scope sensitivity.  
Output A.4.2.9 Variance ratio tests and mean difference tests for WTP to avoid 
medium and large oil spills: Brouwer et al. (2008) 
a) High midpoint of the WTP interval for the medium and the large spill  
  Pr(F < f) = 0.0150         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0299           Pr(F > f) = 0.9850
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 240, 232
    ratio = sd(midwtpbhigh) / sd(midwtpchigh)                     f =   0.7534
                                                                              
combined       474    67.88186    4.640277     101.026    58.76375    76.99996
                                                                              
mi~chigh       233     75.4485    7.065163     107.845    61.52842    89.36858
mi~bhigh       241    60.56639    6.029879    93.60889    48.68815    72.44463
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Variance ratio test
. sdtest  midwtpbhigh= midwtpchigh if(vers==2)
 
At a 99% confidence level we do not reject that variances are equal  
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      232
     mean(diff) = mean(midwtpbhigh - midwtpchigh)                 t =  -4.9487
                                                                              
    diff       233   -14.32189    2.894087    44.17631   -20.02394   -8.619838
                                                                              
mi~chigh       233     75.4485    7.065163     107.845    61.52842    89.36858
mi~bhigh       233    61.12661    6.220623    94.95369    48.87048    73.38274
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Paired t test
. ttest  midwtpbhigh= midwtpchigh if(vers==2)
 
We reject that mean WTP to prevent the medium spill is equal to WTP to prevent the 
large one.  
So, no matter the protest classification used, the results of the mean t-tests indicate 
internal and external sensitivity to scope.  
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A.4.3 Heckman’s two-stage model  
In the interval data models presented in section 5.3.2 above there is a sample selection 
problem due to the fact that there are survey respondents who protest and are 
excluded from the sample following the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest 
answers and the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers. Eliminating 
protesters could lead to biased results. In order to solve this problem, we follow the 
Heckman (1976, 1979) method that allows to correct this problem obtaining consistent 
estimators.   
Given our interval data model as specified in section 5.3.2 above: 
LogY1i=X’1iβ + εi                      (1) 
Where: 
Y1i : WTP amount  
X’1i : Row vector of regressors 
β  : Column vector of coefficients 
εi : Error term 
We have: 
Y*2i=X’2iβ + εi                  (2) 
Where: 
Y*2i :  Unobservable (latent) variable. Informs about respondent predisposition not to protest 
X’2i : Row vector of regressors 
β  : Column vector of coefficients 
εi : Error term 
 
   = 1 if Y*2i ≥ 0 if the predisposition not to protest is high (i.e. NO  
  And                      Y*2i  protest) 
   = 0 if Y*2i  < 0 if the predisposition not to protest is low (i.e. protest) 
 
Hence, we only observe Y1i if Y2i =1, that is, if the respondent does not protest 
 
In our case, Heckman’s correction for the possible sample selection problem entails 
the following steps: 
1) Estimate a probit for the sample selection problem (e.g. protestors) with all 
respondents, protestors and non-protestors: 
P(Y2i=1) =Φ (X’2i β)                (3) 
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Where: 
Φ is the standard normal distribution function 
  
And from β* (estimated) we obtain the inverse Mills ratio: 
λ*i = θ (Zi) / 1- Φ(Zi)                 (4) 
Where: 
λ*i : Estimated inverse Mills ratio 
θ : Density function of the standard normal distribution  
Zi  : = -X’2i β*  
The results from the probit models run are as follows for the Bateman et al. (2002) 
classification of protest answers and the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest 
answers is as shown in table A.4.3.1: 
Table. A.4.3.1 Independent variables in the valuation exercise: WTP Yes/No 
Independent variable Possible values 
City 0= if resident of Coruña  1= if resident of Madrid 
Age = (18-79) 
Education 
= 1 if illiterate 
= 2 if no formal education but can read 
= 3 if nursery school 
= 4 if primary education (up to 10 years of age) 
= 5 if high school or equivalent ( up to 14 years of age)   
= 6 if secondary school certificate 
= 7 if undergraduate 
= 8 if postgraduate  
Previously volunteered to protect the environment = 0 if No = 1 if Yes 
The results are presented in table A.10.2 below:  
Table A.4.3.2 Logit model (protest: Yes = 0 / No = 1)  
 Protest classification 
Variables Bateman et al.  (2002) Brouwer et al.(2008) 
Constant 1.42*** (0.33) 
2.126 
(0.35) 
City -0.305*** (0.10) 
-0.253** 
(0.11) 
Age -0.015*** (0.03) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Education -0.044 (0.03) 
-0.108*** 
(0.04) 
Previous donations to protect the environment 0.109 (0.08) 
0.076 
(0.09) 
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.026 
Number of observations 656 656 
Where :  Standard error in parentheses 
 *   =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
**  =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 *** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
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Using the Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest answers the Wald chi-squared 
is equal to 31.30 (p-value = 0.000). This implies that the model specified fits 
significantly better than an empty model.  Using the Bateman et al. (2002) 
classification of protest answers we see that the city and the age of respondents are 
significant in determining protest answers at a 99% confidence level. Respondents 
from Madrid are more likely to protest compared with respondents from La Coruña. 
Older respondents are more likely to protest than younger respondents. For the 
Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protest responses neither the education level of 
respondents nor previous donations to protect the environment (natural capital) are 
significant in determining the decision to protest.  Using the Brouwer et al. (2008) 
classification of protest answers the Wald chi-squared is equal to 19.88 (p-value = 
0.0005).  
This implies that the model specified fits significantly better than an empty 
model. Additionally, city, age and education are significant in determining protest 
responses at a 95% confidence level. The interpretation of the output above tells us 
that respondents from Madrid are more likely to protest than respondents from La 
Coruña. Older respondents are more likely to protest than younger respondents and 
respondents that have attained a higher educational level are more likely to protest 
than respondents with lower educational attainment. Whether the respondent had 
previously donated money to protect the environment was not significant in 
determining the decision to protest.   
2) Introduce λ*I as an additional regressor in the interval data model: 
LogY1i=X’1iβ + α λi +ui                      (5) 
Where: 
X’1i : Row vector of regressors 
β  : Column vector of coefficients for the independent variables Xi 
α : Coefficient for  the Mills ratio λ*i 
ui  : Error term 
 
The interval data model results were calculated for both, the Bateman et al. (2002) 
classification of protest responses and for the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of 
protest responses. These are presented in table A.4.3.3 below:  
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Table A.4.3.3 Interval data models with Heckman’s correction. WTP using the 
Bateman et al. (2002) classification of protests  
 Small spill Medium Spill Large spill 
Constant 1.069 (2.47) 
-0.072 
(1.26) 
-1.92 
(1.45) 
City 0.56 (0.42) 
0.691** 
(0.34) 
0.851 
(0.58) 
Age -0.005 (0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Income 7.12e-06 (9.59e-06) 
0.00001** 
(7.27e-06) 
0.00002*** 
(9.70e-06) 
Known spills 0.498 (1.12) 
1.033 
(0.71) 
1.577** 
(0.79) 
Aggregate NEP score 0.025 (0.02) 
0.033** 
(0.01) 
0.054** 
(0.02) 
Environmental consequences 0.298 (0.28) 
0.489*** 
(0.18) 
0.534** 
(0.24) 
Previously volunteered to protect the environment 0.606** (0.30) 
0.420** 
(0.20) 
0.291 
(0.29) 
Mills -0.902 (2.25) 
-1.04 
(1.74) 
-1.49 
(2.93) 
σ 1.593 1.567 1.556 
Log pseudo likelihood -409.33 -819.87 -402.67 
N 167 329 161 
Where:   Dependent variable: log WTP 
 Standard error in parentheses 
 *   =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 *** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
The above results indicate that the inverse Mills ratio is not significant in any of the 
spills. This implies we do not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the 
inverse Mills ratio is equal to zero. The selection problem is not relevant and therefore 
we would maintain the results obtained in table 5.3.12. Additionally, if we compare 
table A.4.3.3 with table 5.3.12 we see that the results are very similar.  
For the Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protest answers, the interval data model 
including the inverse Mills ratio is as follows: 
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Table A.4.3.4 Interval data models with Heckman’s correction. WTP using the 
Brouwer et al. (2008) classification of protests  
 Small spill Medium Spill Large spill 
Constant -0.681 (1.66) 
-0.868 
(1.14) 
-1.114 
(1.57) 
City 0.110 (0.34) 
0.174 
(0.25) 
0.089 
(0.41) 
Age -0.018 (0.01) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
-0.028** 
(0.01) 
Income 9.25e-06 (9.14e-06) 
0.000011* 
(6.62e-06) 
0.00001 
(0.00001) 
Known spills 0.541 (0.88) 
1.170** 
(0.50) 
1.654*** 
(0.53) 
Aggregate NEP score 0.049** (0.02) 
0.039** 
(0.01) 
0.033 
(0.02) 
Environmental consequences 0.180 (0.27) 
0.402** 
(0.19) 
0.418 
(0.29) 
Previously volunteered to protect the environment 0.684** (0.31) 
0.632*** 
(0.22) 
0.621* 
(0.35) 
Mills 0.088 (2.34) 
0.772 
(1.73) 
2.312 
(2.85) 
σ 1.782 1.841 1.914 
Log pseudo likelihood -515.74 -1052.57 -530.06 
N 210 418 207 
Where:   Dependent variable: log WTP 
 Standard error in parentheses 
 *   =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence level 
** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level 
 *** =The coefficient is significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level 
The above results indicate that the inverse Mills ratio is not significant in any of the 
spills. This implies we do not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the 
inverse Mills ratio is equal to zero. The selection problem is not relevant and therefore 
we would maintain the results obtained in table 5.3.14. Additionally, if we compare 
table A.4.3.4 with table 5.3.14 we see that the results are very similar.  
